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This dissertation examines the role of the United States in the mass expulsion of
Germans from East-Central Europe from spring 1945 through 1947. By agreeing to allow
Czechoslovakia and Poland to expel their German minority populations in 1943, and
again in 1945 under Article XIII of the Potsdam Agreement, the United States permitted
approximately 14 million to 16 million Germans to be forcibly relocated into a truncated,
war-torn Germany, an incident that is the largest example of ethnic cleansing in world
history. Although these expulsions threatened the postwar stability of Europe and were of
great concern they were of marginal interest to most people in the United States.
Informed discussion of these expulsions occurred among a fairly narrow group of
military officials, diplomats, politicians, intellectuals, and immigrants or exiles. In fact
there was a dearth of contemporary debate and analysis on all aspects of the United States
role in the expulsion of Germans, both within governmental and in society more
generally. Newspaper reports, magazine articles, diplomatic documents, government
documents and the personal papers of diplomats and politicians reveal that the expulsion
of Germans it seems that most Americans lacked both awareness of and compassion for

the plight of the German expellees. These expulsions however, changed the politics and
the demographics of Europe forever and made the ethnic cleansing of the minority
populations of nations an international legal precedent. Today, the expulsions remain a
controversial subject within the region of East-Central Europe where the people of
Czechoslovakia, Germany and Poland still debate the expulsions as if they occurred
yesterday. In the United States, however, the expulsions have been long forgotten. This
dissertation is unique in that examines the involvement of the United States in the
planning of the expulsions and the reaction of the American press, intellectuals and
policymakers whereas previous literature has focused very sparingly on this aspect of the
expulsions.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The cessation of World War II hostilities in 1945 marked the end of hell for some,
and the beginning of hell for others throughout East-Central Europe. Complete surrender
by the German Reich to the Western Allies ended the war and the calculated
extermination of European Jews and other minorities deemed racially inferior to
Germanic peoples in accordance with the racial policies of Adolf Hitler. As the Holocaust
came to an end in 1945 the stage was set for another great European atrocity, the ethnic
cleansing of Germans by forced expulsion from their centuries old homelands of the
Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia and territory acquired by Poland after the war that
previously had been the Eastern region of Germany. The expulsion of Germans from
their homes by the Czechoslovak and Polish governments represents the single largest
episode of ethnic cleansing in recorded history and resulted in the forced movement of
approximately 15 million Germans back to Germany.1 Though the expulsion of Germans
continued sporadically into the early 1950s, most occurred between 1945 and 1947 a
period of time that saw millions of Germans forced into a crowded Germany that was

Alfred M. de Zayas, Nemesis at Potsdam (London: Routledge Keegan & Paul, 1979),
xix.
1

1

geographically just a bit smaller “than the state of California and possessed a population
density of 600 persons per square mile.2 Thus the demographics of Europe were forever
shifted and the unique culture and tradition of the expelled Germans became a distinct
subculture of the West German nation.3
Early in the war Allied leaders were very aware of the intent of Czechoslovakia
and Poland to expel Germans from within their respective borders so as to cleanse their
nations of the German menace that they believed was a threat to their future stability. As
far as the United States and Great Britain were concerned, there was no doubt that the
Germans of East-Central Europe were to be transferred but “how many and from where,”
and what would their final destination be?4 By agreeing to the expulsion plans of the
Czechoslovak and Polish governments, the United States and Great Britain legitimized
ethnic cleansing in the form of forced population transfer (expulsion) as acceptable
within the arena of international politics for the remainder of the twentieth-century.5
The initial expulsion of Germans from East-Central Europe lasted from early
spring of 1945 until the finalization of the Potsdam Agreement on August 2, 1945.6
Undertaken by Czech and Polish military and political leaders as well as non-

Ibid, xx.
Ibid, xix.
4 Matthew Frank, Expelling the Germans: British Public Opinion and Post-1945
Population Transfer in Context (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2007),
92.
5 Ibid.
6 Benjamin Lieberman, Terrible Fate: Ethnic Cleansing in the Making of
Modern Europe (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006), 233-234.
2
2
3

governmental groups, the objective of the “wild expulsions”7 was to rid themselves of as
many Germans as possible before the Allies could react and possibly halt the expulsions
altogether.8 What the Czechs and Poles wanted to achieve was the elimination of the
German minority within their borders before the Allies could address the expulsions at a
peace conference thus accomplishing a “fait accompli.”9 Public and political sentiment in
Czechoslovakia and Poland wanted the German minority out of their respective nations
so as to protect themselves from a repeat of German aggression and as a measure of
revenge for the atrocities committed during Germany’s wartime occupation of both
nations.10
In fact the United States and Great Britain never intended to halt the expulsion of
Germans from East-Central Europe, and Article XIII of the Potsdam Agreement finalized
on August 2, 1945 made that strategy very clear.11 Article XIII confirmed that the
expulsions of Germans by the Czechs and Poles were to continue but in an “orderly and

Alfred M. de Zayas, Nemesis At Potsdam, 104. The term “wild expulsions” is
described by de Zayas as being the expulsion of Germans by the Czechoslovakian
and Polish governments that occurred during the ante-Potsdam period in the spring
and early summer of 1945. The “wild expulsions” was the unilateral expulsion of
Germans by the Czechoslovakian and Polish governments without the consent of the
Western Allies but with the support of the Soviet Union. The goal of the “wild
expulsions” was to expel Germans from Czechoslovakia and Poland as quickly as
possible in order to present a fait accompli to the Western Allies at the Potsdam
Conference. The expulsion of millions of Germans proved to be much more difficult
than expected.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Giles Macdonough, After the Reich: The Brutal History of the Allied Occupation
(New York: Basic Books, 2007), 493.
7
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humane manner,” and would be subject to regulation by the United States, Great Britain
and the Soviet Union. Until then all further expulsions were to be halted until the Allied
Control Council could evaluate the situation and develop “time and rate ordinates” that
would allow the transfer of population to run smoothly and subsequently be more orderly
and humane.12 During the interim period when the transfer of expellees was supposed to
be halted, some expulsions did continue, but for the most part the Germans of EastCentral Europe were temporarily interned at camps, where they were “living in limbo
waiting for a destination” that they would be forced to call home.13
The Potsdam Agreement gave population transfers an international legality that
allowed Czechoslovakia and Poland to ethnically cleanse Germans from their borders.14
Sadly, the orderly and humane transfers dictated by Article XIII made the expulsions a
bit safer but the German expellees were still subject to being “robbed and abused before
their departure” from either Czechoslovakia or the recovered territories of Poland.15
Potsdam merely sought to make the expulsion process more tolerable for Germans who
were forced to give up their occupations, property and cultural history all because of their
German ethnicity.16 Removal of the German minority from their historic homelands in

Joseph B. Schechtman, Postwar Population Transfers in Europe: 1945-1955
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1962), 75.
13 Ibid.
14 Philipp Ther, “A Century of Forced Migration: The Origins and Consequences of
Ethnic Cleansing,” in Redrawing Nations: Ethnic Cleansing in East-Central Europe,
1944-1948, ed. Philipp Ther and Ana Siljak (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001),
55.
15 Ibid.
16 Norman Naimark, Fires of Hared: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 111.
12

4

East-Central Europe by the Czechoslovakian and Polish governments was, even with
Allied supervision, still a nightmarish experience for the expellees who had no control
over their fate.17

17

Ibid.
5

Figure 1

Ethnic Cleansing in Europe: 1944-1948.18

Philip Ther and Ana Siljak, ed. Redrawing Nations: Ethnic Cleansing in Europe,
1944-1948 London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), xii.
6
18

The forced population transfers that occurred following World War II brought
about what has been called the greatest demographic change to the European continent
since the medieval era.19 Not only were people moved, but historic cultures were also
wiped from existence as towns that were once German in population and name were
given Czech and Polish language names.20 Expulsion of the German population of EastCentral Europe changed Europe in a unique way that has had a long-lasting impact on the
nations of Europe. The expulsion of Germans from their historic homelands unleashed
upon Europe the trend of “ethno-nationalism,” defined as the dominance of a nation both
politically and culturally by a single ethnic group.21 Europe was changed forever as the
expulsions moved populations (mostly Germans) from their native lands instead of
moving the borders to fit the ethnic distribution of the population, as had been done at the
end of World War I.22 Once the Germans (or others depending on the nation) were
removed from the borders of Czechoslovakia and Poland those states became ethnically
homogenous, ironically fulfilling the legacy of Nazi Germany with Russian, British, and
most disturbingly of all, United States connivance.23 Not only did World War II rid the
world of the Nazi racial state, but its aftermath also brought to an end the multi-ethnicity
of many European nations by allowing the expulsion of Germans and other minorities to

Mark Kramer, “Introduction,” in Redrawing Nations: Ethnic Cleansing in EastCentral Europe, 1944-1948, ed. Philip Ther and Ana Siljak (New York: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2001), 16.
20 Ibid.
21 Jerry Z. Muller, “Us and Them: The Enduring Power of Ethno-Nationalism,”
Foreign Affairs 87 (March/April 2008): 19-20.
22 Ibid, 27.
23 Ibid.
19
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become “the largest forced population movement in European history,” for the sake of
European and world security.24
There are certain circumstances that make the post-World War II expulsion of
Germans from East-Central Europe very perplexing. For one the defeat of Nazi Germany
by the Americans and other Allies put an end to German racial politics and social
engineering throughout Europe, but racial politics were not abandoned after the war and
were practiced by Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Soviet Union through their expulsion
strategy. The fact that the supposedly democratic and humanitarian nations of the United
States and Great Britain approved of population transfer by the Czechs and Poles well
before the war had ended, while nominally fighting to free Europe of genocidal German
racial policies is a paradox to say the least. Also, the willingness of the Soviet Union to
support the Czechoslovakian and Polish governments in their quest to rid themselves of
their German minority populations presented the Western powers with a very special
problem. The postwar peace, therefore, was characterized by the politics of racialism that
had started the war.
This study will demonstrate that the implementation and regulation of the
expulsion of Germans under the stipulations of Article XIII of the Potsdam Agreement
marked the adoption of ethnic cleansing as United States policy. Such a policy was in
direct opposition to the American values of democracy and humanity and set an
international legal precedent by making ethnic cleansing a universal legal solution for

24

Ibid.
8

nations with troublesome minority populations. United States officials saw Article XIII as
a quick and convenient solution to a complex problem that was of secondary importance
in comparison to other postwar issues, such as the battle with the Soviet Union over the
location of Poland’s western border and the distribution of reparations, the threat of
Communism spreading throughout Europe and the termination of the war with Japan. On
the domestic front the expulsion of Germans lacked importance for most Americans
except for those with direct ties to East-Central Europe, such as immigrants and
diplomats. There were, however, strong protestations by American intellectuals and even
strong doubts about American policy pertaining to the expulsions by U.S. soldiers,
diplomats and congressmen, all of whom questioned the immediate inhumanity and the
long-term ramifications of Article XIII. This study will further show that the absence of
a coordinated information strategy by the United States government explaining expulsion
policy combined with sporadic coverage of the expulsions by the American print media
resulted in a lack of interest by the American public the expulsion of Germans. As a
result the U.S. policy of ethnic cleansing enablement was never really challenged within
the social or political strata of the United States. Politically and socially the expulsions
were an afterthought, which is often the case immediately following a prolonged war
when the welfare of nations overrides the welfare of individual human beings.
Chapters I and II function as the foundations for this study by introducing the
scholarly literature on the expulsions and delving into the definition of ethnic cleansing
and various incidents of ethnic cleansing that occurred during the twentieth century.
Chapter III focuses on how the German expulsions originated from the 1938 German
acquisition of the Sudetenland and subsequent takeover of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet
9

seizure of eastern Poland in 1939. It also explains how Czechoslovakian President
Edouard Beněs secured the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans through crafty, separate
negotiations with the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. The
expulsion of Germans from the new Polish territories was inevitable after the Allies
decided to compensate Poland with German territory in the west to make up for losing
eastern Poland to the Soviet Union. The expulsions were inevitable because of the disdain
and mistrust of German minority populations in Czechoslovakia and Poland that
fomented during the inter war years. It was the circumstances of war that provided
Czechoslovakia and Poland with an opportunity to make their nations ethnically
homogenous at the expense of their German minorities.
Chapter IV explains how the expulsions went from being the calculated
unregulated and revenge driven wild expulsions that began in the spring of 1945 to the
post-Potsdam expulsions that occurred from January 1946 through the end of 1947. A
flood of German expellees into the U.S. Zone of Occupation prompted the U.S. officials
at Potsdam to seek a way to slow the expulsions to a manageable pace, which resulted in
the orderly and humane stipulations of Article XIII. Orderly and humane might have been
the objective, but it did not bring an end to the violent inhumanity that characterized the
expulsions.
Chapter V examines how the expulsions were discussed and covered within
popular print media vehicles and scholarly publications in the United States. Though
sporadic, media coverage of expulsions was ample enough to generate public awareness
about the violence and hunger the expelled Germans faced during and after their journey
west. The numerous newspaper and magazine articles ran the gamut from those that
10

defended the expulsions to those that portrayed the expulsions as an affront to humanity
perpetuated by the U.S. government’s sponsorship of the Potsdam Agreement. Most
Americans saw the expulsion of Germans as one of many problematic postwar situations
that faced the United States, which seems to have contributed to the lack of focus on the
expulsions. The limited scholarly literature was the exception. It vociferously proclaimed
the expulsions a violation of humanity and decried U.S. implementation of Article XIII as
a betrayal of the American values of freedom and compassion.
Chapter VI examines the private and public opinions of diplomats, military
officials and Congressmen regarding Article XIII and the forcible expulsions. American
diplomatic and military officials in Europe were responsible for the enforcement of the
policy provisions of Article XIII, and some witnessed their negative impact within
Germany. In Washington D.C., members of both houses of Congress largely opposed the
starvation, crowding, disease and potential long-term instability caused by the provisions
of Article XIII. Ironically, the release of a Congressional investigation of United States
involvement in the expulsion of Germans in 1950 known as the Walter Report revealed
that the United States was not responsible for the expulsions and had only attempted to
make them more orderly and humane. Despite pervasive doubts concerning the impact of
Article XIII among some individuals within the government, the course of United States
policy regarding the expulsion of Germans never changed.
Chapter VII centers on the legacy and reality of the expulsions from the fall of the
Berlin Wall in 1989 to the present and how the paradigm concerning the expulsions in
Europe has shifted over the past twenty-three years. Once the Berlin Wall fell the
expulsions emerged from the darkness of communism in Czechoslovakia, East Germany
11

and Poland. Both the German expellees and the nations that expelled them demanded
apologies for crimes committed against them by the other. Over time debate about the
expulsions in the early post-Cold War era from 1989 to 2002 focused on the demands for
reparations for suffering and property lost by the expellees amidst the backdrop of
reconciliation agreements between Germany and the once German occupied nations of
Czechoslovakia and Poland. After 2002 popular literature within Germany shifted
discourse on the expulsions to the subject of victimization. Authors such as Gunter Grass
wrote about the German expellee experience during the war and asserted that the
expellees had been just as much victims of war as those who endured German
occupation. The citizens of Czechoslovakia and Poland who believed that the German
expellees had no right to claim victimhood vehemently debunked this assertion. Although
not of much concern in the United States today, the expulsions still evoke raw emotion
within East-Central Europe where conflicts over property rights, battles over degrees of
victimization and how the expulsions should be memorialized have made the expulsions
a point of contention not only within Germany but in Czechoslovakia and Poland as well.
Review of Literature
Ethnic hatred has not only defined the culture and politics of twentieth-century
East-Central Europe, but it has also defined scholarly literature pertaining to the region.
From ethnic hatred came the solution of ethnic cleansing, which throughout the
twentieth-century consisted of the forced removal of troublesome minority populations
by both organized and unorganized means. Forced removal of minority populations, or

12

expulsion, is neither new nor unique in the annals of world history.25 What made the
expulsion of Germans from the various nations throughout East-Central Europe after
World War II different was that they were born of the prospect and circumstance of
peace, not war.26 There is no denying that the racial policies of Adolf Hitler both before
and during the war set the stage for the postwar expulsions. Most scholarly literature on
the subject explains that the post-World War II expulsions, and the violence and
destruction that characterized them, were a product of the pursuit of ethnically
homogenous nation-states by Czechoslovakia and Poland.
The German occupation of Czechoslovakia and Poland gave rise to a hatred of
Germans that was “understandable but not justifiable,” but did not make the expulsion of
Germans a certainty.27 Eagle Glassheim makes the point that ethnic hatreds often lie
dormant until events transform them it into a moving social and political force as
happened following World War II in Czechoslovakia and Poland.28 Hatred and mistrust
of Germans by the citizens and politicians of Czechoslovakia and Poland fostered the
thinking that the expulsion of Germans from the Sudetenland and the recovered Polish
territories was not only “necessary but desirable.”29 The immediate aftermath of the war

Benjamin Frommer, National Cleansing: Retribution Against Nazi Collaborators in
Postwar Czechoslovakia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 60-61.
26 Ibid.
27 Eagle Glasshein, “The Mechanics of Ethnic Cleansing: The Expulsion of Germans
from Czechoslovakia, 1945-1947,” in Redrawing Nations: Ethnic Cleansing in EastCentral Europe, 1944-1948, ed. Philip Ther and Ana Siljak (New York: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2001), 215.
28 Ibid.
29 Lieberman, Terrible Fate, 249.
25
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presented the Czech and Polish governments with an opportunity to rid themselves of
their troublesome German minority populations. It was a combination of Soviet support
for the expulsion of Germans and a passive Allied presence in East-Central Europe that
allowed the Czechs and Poles to unilaterally expel Germans from their borders in the
spring and summer of 1945. It was the events of peace that allowed ethnic hatred to assert
itself in the expulsion of Germans by the Czechoslovakian and Polish governments so as
to present a “fait accompli” so they would not be bound by Allied regulations regarding
the transfer of populations.30
Presented with an opportunity to expel Germans from their borders and achieve
ethnically homogeneous states, the Czech and Polish governments allowed violent acts
against expellees to occur and go unpunished. Their need and opportunity to rid their
nations of Germans saw the “logic of ethnic cleansing” welcomed and diligently
practiced by citizens and governmental officials and was seen part of the inheritance of
the war.31 Expulsion of Germans after World War II was an example of societal and
governmental acceptance of the “ideology of hate” which manifested into a culture of
ethnic cleansing throughout East-Central Europe.32 Poland desired a “uniformly Polish
state” and pursued it with a nationalistic fervor that resulted in 350,000 Germans being
expelled from east of the Oder-Neisse during the wild expulsions of spring and summer

Frommer, National Cleansing, 60-61.
Lieberman, Terrible Fate, 249.
32 Tomasz Kamusella, “Ethnic Cleansing in Upper Silesia, 1944-1945,” in Ethnic
Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe, ed. Steven Bela Vardy and T. Hunt Tooley
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 310.
30
31
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of 1945.33 In the opinion of T. David Curp it was the ethnic cleansing of Germans from
the recovered Polish territories following World War II that shaped the character and
culture of Poland until the end of the Cold War.34 Curp explains that the quest for a
homogenous Polish state through the ethnic cleansing of Germans from its borders
actually enabled Poland to remain freer from Soviet influences than any other nation in
the Soviet sphere.35 Neither Czechoslovakia nor Poland invented ethnic cleansing.
Instead the Czechs and Poles utilized a strategic policy that had been introduced by the
Western Allies as part of the Lausanne Treaty of 1922, which gave legal sanction to the
post World War I “Greco-Turkish” population exchange.36
The wild expulsion of Germans by the Czechoslovakian and Polish governments
during the spring and early summer of 1945 were cruel ruthless and very unorganized in
an organized way. Both governments knew they were going to happen but did very little
in the way of official planning and monitoring of the process on the ground level which
left most of the uprooting and expelling of Germans to various non-governmental groups
at the regional and local levels. Article XIII of Potsdam was an attempt to take the
spontaneity and ruthlessness out of the expulsions so as to streamline the process and
make it more efficient and manageable for the Western Allies and the Czech and Polish
governments. In addition, the “orderly and humane” diktat of Article XIII specified that

T. David Curp, A Clean Sweep? The Politics of Ethnic Cleansing in Western Poland,
1945-1948 (Rochester: Rochester University Press, 2006), 53.
34 Ibid, 5.
35 Ibid.
36 De Zayas, Nemesis at Potsdam, 11.
33
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the transfer of Germans would be less violent and would focus on the welfare and
security of those being forcefully uprooted from their homes.
One school of thought suggests that the situation, such as the one that existed
between the German minority populations subject to rule by Czechoslovakia and Poland,
could be best handled from “without” by outside parties because as the best way to
achieve a long-lasting peaceful solution to such problems.37 Outside involvement of the
United States and the Western Allies in the expulsion of Germans is the confirmation of
the “injustice of an arbitrary or careless decision,” in the opinion of Isaiah Bowman.38
Although the “orderly and humane” provision of Article XIII was flawed, and the United
States seen them as the only plausible solution to the expellee problem.39 Article XIII was
interpreted differently by the Allies who saw it as a humane solution to the expellee
problem, whereas the nations conducting the expulsions saw it as an opportunity to purge
unwanted German minority populations.40 For U.S. officials Article XIII was a means of
having input on how, where and when the expulsions were to occur and it was a way to
deal with circumstances that could not be changed.41 The United Kingdom also supported
population transfer, viewing the expulsions as a “rational and progressive choice of last

Isaiah Bowman, “The Strategy of Territorial Decisions,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 24, no.
2 (January 1946), 180.
38 Ibid, 187.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid, 189.
41 Debra J. Allen, The Oder-Neisse Line: The United States, Poland and Germany in the
Cold War (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2003), 31-32.
37
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resort” and a means by which to achieve lasting peace in Europe.42 Another
circumstance that played a large role in the American decision to allow the expulsions to
occur was the Russian military presence in the region of East-Central Europe.43
The main problem the Allied policy of forced migration looked to solve was to
make the region of East-Central Europe one that consisted of nations of ethnically
homogenous nation-states in order to prevent future ethnic conflict.44 Gregor Thum
concludes that the expulsion of Germans after World War II was a unique case of ethnic
cleansing in that responsibility can be placed on a “global military alliance” of nations
that were members of the “anti Hitler coalition.”45 In actuality, responsibility for the post
World War II expulsion of Germans rests with all parties involved in the grisly and
inhumane process of population transfer. Thus the objective of all nations involved was
the creation of ethnically homogeneous nations as a convenient means to achieve
permanent peace.46
Scholar and human rights lawyer Alfred de Zayas places responsibility for the
inhumanity of the expulsions on the governments and populations of Czechoslovakia and
Poland but explains that the United States and United Kingdom were the facilitators of

Matthew Frank, Expelling the Germans: British Opinion and Post-1945 Population
Transfer in Context, 275.
43 Ibid, 187.
44 Gregor Thum, Uprooted: How Breslau Became Wroclaw During the Century of
Expulsions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 53-54.
45 Ibid.
46 A.F. Noskova, “Migration of the Germans after the Second World War: Political and
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violence and inhumanity through the provisions of Article XIII of the Potsdam
Agreement.47 He acknowledges that had the Allies not gotten involved in the expulsion
process, the violence and inhumanity could have been worse than it actually was, but he
faulted the United States and United Kingdom for the failure to “re-examine the
principles for which the war had been fought’” and the failure to determine whether or
not “those principles were being observed in the peace process.”48 Wilhelm K. Turnwald,
who has compiled an important set of expulsion documents, came to the same conclusion
much earlier and explained that although the Czechs and Poles did the dirty work, the
Western Allies and the Soviet Union were just as complicit because through Potsdam
they gave the expulsions a “certain international legality” that became an international
precedent for the removal of problematic minority groups by host nations.49
Allied implementation of Article XIII of Potsdam legalized physical reprisal in
cases of assumed collective guilt Joseph B. Schechtman explained that “compulsory
transfer of an entire population has nothing in common with guilt and penalty nor even
justice” and should be “preventive” measures not conduits of revenge as they were in the
aftermath of World War II.50 The historical background of the expulsions is draped in
collective guilt and absolute victimhood, which ignores the harsh realism that they were a
“process of cause and effect, action and reaction” because there are no absolutes in the
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early stages of postwar peace.51 Despite the orderly and humane specification of Article
XIII the Western Allies became the purveyors of everything they fought against and
assisted in the perpetuation of the Czechoslovakian and Polish pursuit of homogeneity.
The end of the Cold War in 1989 and the removal of constraints on scholars,
writers and the media in what was once Communist Europe allowed the expulsions to be
critically analyzed and debated in an impartial manner for the first time. The expulsions
are still a very complex subject that defies definition and is prone to “political
instrumentation” by the expellees and their descendants who reside in Germany and the
nations that expelled them.52 Gregor Thum asserts that, after being so “politicized” for so
long it is hard to find a way to debate the expulsions in a realistic and impartial, openminded approach that is not rife with the stench of politics.53 The end of communism and
the reunification of Germany not only allowed the expulsions to become a part of
“mainstream discourse” in East-Central Europe, but those events also enabled the
formation of distinctive collective memories by expellees, expellers and their
descendants.54
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CHAPTER II
ETHNIC CLEANSING IN EUROPE BEFORE THE POST–WORLD WAR II
EXPULSIONS

This chapter focuses on ethnic cleansing in Europe and how it became an
acceptable and common occurrence in twentieth-century Europe before World War II.
Ethnic cleansing in the twentieth-century did not begin in the well-publicized case of the
former Republic of Yugoslavia in the 1990s; it has a long sad and twisted history that
dates back to before World War I and into World War II. The forcible removal of the
Armenians by the Turks during the World War I, the exchange of populations between
Greece and Turkey after the war and the exchange of populations in the Baltic States
between Germany and the Soviet Union during the first two years of World War II,
removed troublesome minorities from places they were not wanted. The often violent,
and stressful act of forced minority population removal became a solution that focused on
the security of the state rather than the welfare of the people, and came to be utilized by
both dictatorships and democracies in a twentieth-century Europe characterized by
various episodes of ethnic cleansing.
Ethnic Cleansing Defined
Ethnic cleansing is an ancient practice but the term “ethnic cleansing” is quite
modern. Though there are recorded instances of ethnic cleansing being employed as early
20

as 1912 in the Balkan mountains of Southeastern Europe, the term ethnic cleansing came
into common usage during the wars of Yugoslavian Secession in the 1990s via
international media coverage.1 International law expert Drazen Petrovic was the first to
identify ethnic cleansing as a term originated by the Yugoslavian Army, which was
translated into English from the Serbo-Croatian term etnicko ciscenje.2 Klejda Mulaj
explains that ethnic cleansing was a term used by “soldiers, journalists, sociologists and
social scientists, among others, to define a phenomenon which is not described by law,”
but has been utilized extensively in the twentieth-century by nations to deal with
troublesome ethnic populations.3
There are varied definitions of ethnic cleansing but all have the common theme of
forcible removal of one ethnic group by another ethnic group, which possesses a
numerical advantage and military or political power. Petrovic was one of the first to coin
the term ethnic cleansing and did so in the broadest sense.4
According to him:
Ethnic cleansing is a well-defined policy of a particular group of persons to
systematically eliminate another group from a given territory on the basis of
religion, ethnic or national origin. Such a policy involves violence and is very
often connected with military operations. It is to be achieved by all possible
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means, from discrimination to extermination, and entails violations of human
rights and international humanitarian law.5
Ethnic cleansing has also been examined, from a historical perspective by
Andrew Bell-Fialkoff who explains that ethnic cleansing is very difficult to define but
contends that from the late nineteenth-century onwards instances of ethnic cleansing
have increased and “intensified” in the modern era, despite supposedly greater tolerance
of others and acceptance of universal human rights.6 Bell-Fialkoff defines ethnic
cleansing in a straightforward manner:
Ethnic cleansing can be understood as the expulsion of an undesirable population
from a given territory due to religious or ethnic discrimination, political, strategic,
or ideological considerations, or a combination of these.7
Philipp Ther, the leading Europeanist at the Free University of Berlin, defines ethnic
cleansing in a fashion similar to Petrovic emphasizing state control over the process of
cleansing a particular nation of unwanted peoples.8 He states:
Ethnic cleansing is always directed at a particular ethnic group or nation
perceived as harmful and the goal is almost always the complete removal of that
group from a given territory. The ethnicity of the victims is defined by the state,
occupying power, or dominant nation and groups or individuals so defined usually
have no opportunity to declare a different ethnicity or prevent their removal from
their homelands.9
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As the above definitions suggest, although there are commonalities in all cases of
ethnic cleansing the act and strategy of ethnic cleansing can be viewed and defined from
many different perspectives.
How Turkey Made the Armenians Disappear
The terms genocide and ethnic cleansing are often linked, as evidenced in the
Ottoman Empire’s effort to cleanse itself of its Armenian population during World War I.
The Armenian genocide and the removal of Armenians by the Turks from Turkish
territory can also be defined as ethnic cleansing. The main goal was to remove the
Armenian population from Ottoman lands regardless of the cost in lives to the
Armenians. When United States Ambassador to Turkey Henry Morgenthau attempted to
placate the Turks in 1915, by stating that they were in no way responsible for brutalities
committed against Armenians, Young Turk leader Enver Pasha replied with the following
words: “I am willing to accept responsibility myself for everything that happened.”10
Proud of his government’s deportation of the Armenians and the violence and death that
accompanied it Enver Pasha was offended by Morgenthau’s suggestion.11 Turkey
possessed a mostly Muslim population among which lived Christian populations such as
the Armenians who were treated as second-class citizens by their Islamic rulers.12 While
Turkey appeareed to be a tolerant society on the surface, hatred and intolerance toward
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the Armenians occurred sporadically from the late nineteenth-century until the beginning
of World War I.13 Turkey was an empire in decline and the deportation and violence that
targeted the Armenians “happened in an empire on the verge of extinction.”14
The fate of the Armenians owed much to the course of the World War I.
Significantly, Russian military successes in the area resulted from the fact that many
Ottoman Armenians fought against the Turks throughout the conflict at places such as
Sarikamish.15 Even though many other Armenians fought with the Turks, Turkish
nationalists “focused on those that fought for the Russians against Turkey” and saw all
Armenians as traitors, and as a result the removal of Armenians from Turkey became
their major objective.16 Upon securing power in 1913 through a military coup, the
Committee on Union and Progress (or the Young Turks, as they were also known) had
been waiting for a chance to deport the Armenians from Turkish borders.17 The first step
toward the deportation of Armenians began in February 1915 when Armenian soldiers
from Turkey were sent into slave labor or in some instances executed by Turkish army
leaders despite the lack of evidence the Armenians were a military threat.18 Another
episode occurred on April 24, 1915 when the Turkish army arrested important and
influential individuals of Armenian origin in Constantinople such as doctors, lawyers,
professors and writers, and deported them to the hinterlands of Turkey.19 The official
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policy of deporting Armenians formally began with the Emergency Law of May 27,
1915, which made it clear that the Armenians of Turkey were no longer welcomed in
their traditional homeland.20 By August 1915, the deportation of Armenians was
underway throughout Turkey.21
The Committee of Union and Progress created the Special Organization Teliskat 1
to handle internal security problems in Turkey.22 The deportations began with the arrest,
torture and imprisonment of prominent Armenians from a city or village followed by a
posted declaration that ordered all Armenians to leave their places of residence.23 Orders
for deportation were given with little or no prior warning and the Armenians were
deported in anywhere from just a few hours or four to five days after the orders were
issued.24 Not surprisingly, their Muslim neighbors took advantage of the doomed
Armenians by buying up their property for virtually nothing.25 In some cases individual
Armenians tried to save themselves from deportation by “bribery” and in other instances,
Armenian women attempted to sell themselves as wives to Muslims while yet others
mutilated their faces so as not to be “forced to live in a harem.”26As Armenians marched
to the Turkish frontier many fell victim to hunger and disease, some committed suicide,
and others were massacred at the hands of the Turks.27
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Some Armenians were deported via railroad herded on to boxcars like “cattle”
which resulted in many of them being crushed to death during the journey to the city of
Konya. From where there, the deportees traveled south crossing the Euphrates River
traversing to Aleppo and various cities and towns in the Syrian desert.28 Other less lucky
Armenians were driven across Anatolia where they were forced to endure intense daily
heat and very cold nights with no shelter and little food or water on their trek south to the
Euphrates.29 According to foreign eyewitness statements the Armenians were treated as if
their lives had no human value and to make matters worse the Turkish government
forbade foreign missionaries from providing food or other assistance to the Armenians on
their long trek out of Turkey.30 The Armenians were truly an unwanted people on their
own.
Turkish ethnic cleansing of the Armenians was so inhumane and severe that it
crossed the line to genocide possessing characteristics of systematic extermination.31 Of
course, many Armenian deaths were attributed to the deportations, but the real total is
unknown. The Armenian Patriarchate estimated approximately 2.1 million Armenians
resided in Turkey before the deportations and the Ottoman Census estimated that 1.6
million Armenians resided in Turkey before the deportations began.32 Most historians in
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the twenty-first century now estimate the number of Armenians killed during the
deportations at somewhere near 800,000.33 Norman M. Naimark suggests that the Young
Turks achieved their intended goal of “eliminating the Armenians as a serious force in
Anatolian politics and society” while also eliminating any historical memory of the
Armenians by destroying Armenian churches, monuments and graveyards.34 The success
of the deportation of Armenians is verified by the fact that Turkish historical maps do not
list the Armenians as ever having existed and Turkish tourism literature fails to mention
the Armenians as a historical culture for tourists to consider learning about.35 The
Armenians are considered a historical culture in that they were part of Turkey’s
Anatolian and Ottoman heritage.36
In retrospect, it is disheartening to realize that the Turks knew what they were
doing and that many Armenians perished but what is even more worse is that despite
grand ideas and promises, the United States government did nothing to help the
Armenians. A major reason for this inaction was that the administration of President
Woodrow Wilson very much wanted to avoid war with Turkey as part of its policy of
neutrality toward World War I. In fact, some American officials believed that the
deportation of Armenians was “justifiable” since their homeland was located in a
“military zone of operations.”37 Secretary of State Robert Lansing wrote to President
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Wilson on November 21, 1916, that he had no problem with the general principle of
deportation, but did find the “horrible brutality” of its implementation quite appalling.38
United States neutrality ended with the declaration of war on Germany in April
1917, but American entry into the European conflict did not result in any action on behalf
of the Armenians. Despite being faced with the reality that he would possibly have to
expand military operations east, Wilson refused to do so.39 Wilson’s hesitance was
influenced by ties to American Christian missionaries who had cultivated quite a bit of
political influence within the Ottoman Empire and opposed an American war against
Turkey out of belief that it would damage their status and influence and leave them
unable to help the Armenians at all.40 This American intent to remain friendly with
Turkey was expressed in a March 31, 1917, directive from Secretary of State Robert
Lansing to Ambassador in Turkey Abram Elkus that instructed him to make it clear to
Turkish leaders that the United States had “no controversy” with Turkey and had no
desire to “sever relations” unless Turkey took it upon itself to follow a “German
mandate.” 41 Wilson had been sympathetic to the plight of the Armenians and the creation
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of an Armenian state as part of his “struggle for the vision of international justice” but he
knew that any such proposals would have to be made after the convening of a peace
conference after the war.42
Wilson’s view of the post World War I world was a “vision of world democracy”
in which the smaller nationalities possessed and used the right of self-determination to
create and structure their individual nations as they wished. This was articulated in his
Address on the Fourteen Points for Peace on January 8, 1918.43 Wilson viewed the
Armenians as the epitome of a smaller nationality and made them the focus of his twelfth
point, which guaranteed the sovereignty of Turkey, but also that: “nationalities under
Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life, and an absolutely
unmolested opportunity of autonomous development.”44 Wilson believed that smaller
nations, such as the proposed Armenian state should be protected by the League of
Nations through a “mandate system” that would safeguard smaller nations from the
transgressions of larger ones.45 Great Britain, Italy and France all balked at supporting

Balakian, the Burning Tigris, 303.
Ibid, 300-301.
44 Woodrow Wilson Address on the Fourteen Points for Peace, 8 January 1918:
Address of the President of the United States, Delivered At A Joint Session of
Congress. Woodrow Wilson Presidential Library, eLibrary. (Accessed on September
13, 2012). http://wwl2.dataformat.com/Document.aspx?doc=30716;
The Continuation and Conclusion of the War-Participation of the United States,
Address of the President of the United States Delivered at a Joint Session of the Two
Houses of Congress, January 8, 1919, United States Department of State, Papers
Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Supplement I: The World War
Vol. I. 1918, Part I: (Washington: GPO, 1918), 12-17.
http://digitl.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS1918Supp01v01
45 Balakian, The Burning Tigris, 300-301.
42
43

29

such a mandate, citing that they were “overburdened” by other mandate commitments
throughout the Middle East and Africa, which left the United States as the lone guarantor
of the Armenian mandate.46 The American position on the Armenian question derived
from an analysis by President Wilson’s King-Crane Report issued in August of 1919.47
The King-Crane Report concluded that the repeated massacre and inhumane treatment of
the Armenians by the Turks made them “unfit” to rule over the Armenians.48 Thus the
report favored the idea of an Armenian mandate, which was also supported by the
American press and the various Armenian relief organizations in the United States.49
Congress, however, opposed such a scheme and the Senate vote against United States
membership in the League of Nations on March 19, 1920, and eliminated the possibility
of American involvement in an internationally-sanctioned mandate arrangement.50
Even though the Senate rejected the Versailles Treaty, Wilson believed American
public opinion so strongly favored the Armenian cause that a mandate could still be
achieved if there was a sufficient public outcry to pressure Congress into action.51 By
January of 1920, however, support for the Armenian mandate had waned in the Senate
where Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Henry Cabot Lodge (RMA) vehemently opposed it, despite recent British, French and Italian recognition of the
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Armenian Republic.52 The principal grounds for opposition were that the borders of the
Armenian Republic had not been finalized and Lodge considered that Armenia was a
“poorhouse” of no clear strategic or economic value to the United States. 53
Subsequently, on June 1, 1920, the Senate defeated the Armenian mandate by a 52-23
vote despite some continuing public support for its approval.54 The combined rejection of
the League of Nations and the Armenian mandate by the Senate ended the possibility of
Wilson’s vision for the postwar world becoming a reality. Thus, the League of Nations
was doomed to failure absent of United States membership.
From 1920 to 1922 the American government’s focus on an Armenian mandate
gradually dissipated despite lingering public support.55 World War I had impressed upon
State Department officials that access to an abundant oil supply would be vital for “the
national defense” and economic growth of the United States, and thus the procurement of
oil became a major focus of foreign policy decision making in the Near East.56 The
problem was that in 1914, before the onset of the war, Great Britain had purchased the
Turkish Petroleum Company and worked with the French and Dutch during 1919 and
1920 to prevent United States entrance into Near Eastern oil fields.57 With a European
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monopoly over Mesopotamian oil fields a real possibility, Secretary of State Lansing and
United States representative at the Lausanne Conference Admiral Mark L. Bristol
concluded during the last days of the Wilson Administration that to focus financial
“resources and political capital on a new Armenian state” was not expedient.58 Such
thinking laid the foundation for an American “open door policy” in the Near East focused
on access to oil.59 To secure access to oil in the region the United States needed to be on
friendly terms with Turkey, but at the Lausanne Peace Conference the Turks insisted that
the Armenians had to be removed.60 As a result the American need for oil made the exile
of Armenians from Turkey a certainty.61 The United States State Department became the
chief representatives of American business interests, and most prominent were claims of
Admiral Colby M. Chester of the Chester Oil Company. In June 1920, that he had been
awarded “concessions” to a Mesopotamian oil field in 1911-1912 by the government of
the Ottoman Empire that preceded those awarded to Great Britain in 1914.62 Turkey
indeed granted concessions to Chester in 1923 that included access to Mesopotamian oil
projects, public works projects and rights to railroad construction from Turkey into
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Persia.63 Most importantly American oil companies secured access to Mesopotamian oil
fields that had been under British control since before World War I.64
The importance of American strategic and business interests began to take
precedence over the Armenians in Turkey in the latter years of the Wilson administration
and this became even more pronounced under President Warren G. Harding’s Secretary
of State Charles Evans Hughes.65 Access to Mesopotamian oil fields and protection of the
“”vast real estate holdings of American missionaries” combined with the prevention of
the spread of Bolshevism throughout Europe comprised the foundations of the American
foreign policy stressed by Hughes.66 Turkey came to be viewed by the United States as
nation that was not a threat to infiltrate the labor force or endanger the American way of
life in order to provoke a world Bolshevik revolution.67 Turkey’s geographic border with
the Soviet Union led Hughes to envision Turkey as a buffer against the spread of
Bolshevism.68 The pursuit of oil and the emerging presence of Bolshevism in Russia
predicated a shift in United States policy that became increasingly pro-Turk and ignored
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the Armenian deportations and genocide.69 The combination of securing access to oil and
the containment of a hostile ideology became the foundation of United States foreign
policy until the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s and beyond.
Trading Populations for the Greater Good
The next major episode of ethnic cleansing in Europe during the twentiethcentury was the reciprocal population exchange between Greece and Turkey in the early
1920s. Ethnic conflict was a major problem in Europe after World War I and European
leaders relied exclusively on two strategies to deal with ethnic hostilities. One was the
adoption “Minority Rights Treaties” which protected minorities within a nation from
majority encroachment upon their minority rights.70 A second strategy was the
implementation of population transfers of which the 1923 exchange of people between
Greece and Turkey was a prime example.71 A Greco-Turkish population exchange
became a realistic possibility at the Lausanne Peace Conference of 1922-1923 as a means
by which to extinguish ethnic problems between the Greek and Turkish nations by
making them ethnically and religiously homogenous.72
Tensions between Greece and Turkey had been high since the end of World War
I, which saw the Greeks euphoric over Turkey’s wartime misfortunes. Greek leaders saw
Turkey’s wartime troubles as an opportunity to achieve their long-held strategic goal of
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the “Megali Ideal,” or a “Greater Greece.”73 The Megali Ideal was a nationalist vision of
consolidating surrounding areas of the Aegean Sea into Greece because the area was so
heavily populated with “ethnic Greeks.”74 Despite the predominance of Greek culture in
the Aegean region, Greece had never been a nation that incorporated all Greeks.75 Many
Greeks resided within Turkey and were defined by the Turkish government as being
unredeemed Greeks.76 Thus, the new Turkish state strove to repossess former Ottoman
lands.77
Turkey’s strategic policies were oriented eastward and focused on the Muslim
world and the presence of so many Greek Christians within Turkish boundaries meant
that the Greeks would eventually have to be dealt with.78 In 1918, Greece invaded
Turkish Anatolia and occupied the city of Smyrna, located on the Aegean Sea, and parts
of the Anatolian hinterland.79 Greek leaders viewed the occupation of Smyrna as a chance
to achieve a Greater Greece through the union of Hellenic and Anatolian Greek lands and
a return to the former splendor of the Byzantine age.80 Initially, Turkey was too weak and
near defeat to muster much resistance to the Greek offensive.81 The Greeks also expected
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that if the Turks did mount any formidable resistance, the Western Allies would bail them
out.82 The Greeks badly miscalculated and their 1921 offensive to the north and east of
Turkey stalled in the face of strong Turkish resistance.83 Led by Mustafa Kemal the
Turks drove the Greeks back to Smyrna in September 1921.84
During the Greek occupation of Smyrna, the Greek military showed no mercy to
the Turkish Muslim population and subjected the masses to brutal atrocities, but the most
horrific acts of terror were targeted toward the Turkish upper class.85 Greek aggression
and subsequent acts of violence toward the Turkish people alarmed Turkish officials who
saw the attack as a Greek attempt to annihilate the Muslim Turks from the face of the
earth.86 Thus the Turks were radicalized when they drove the Greeks back and used the
nationalist fervor created by the attacks to achieve Turkish strategic goals.87 With Greek
refugees following the Greek military back to Smyrna Turkish leader Mustafa Kemal
seized the opportunity to clear Western Anatolia of its Greek population in a very bloody
and violent manner.88 The Turkish counterattack against the Greeks “had all of the
characteristics of ethnic cleansing” which saw murder, rape and pillage of Greeks who
were forcefully removed from their homes by the Turks.89 In beating the Greeks
backwards and then out of “Western Anatolia and seizing Smyrna in September 1922,”
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the Turks were on the way to the achievement of the nationalist goal to make Anatolia a
homogenous Turkish dominion.90
At the 1922 Lausanne Peace Conference the Turks proposed population transfers
but the lead diplomat presiding over the conference, Lord George Nathaniel Curzon of
Great Britain, declared that the “populations in question were way too large,” and argued
that many Greeks and Turks would refuse to move.91 The United States government also
opposed the population exchange of Greeks and Turks, a position made clear by United
States Ambassador to Turkey W. C. Child at the Lausanne Conference in December of
1922.92 An American Observer, Child let it be known that the United States and its
people had no problem with providing Turkey with financial assistance to deal with its
minority refugee problem but wanted to supervise the allocation and administering of
funds.93 Outward opposition to the exchange of Greeks and Turks by the United States
was an attempt to appease an American public repulsed by the Turkish treatment of
Armenians, however, at the same time the administration of President Warren G. Harding
placed great importance on the advancement of economic relations with Turkey.94
Eventually, Curzon dropped his objections to the compulsory transfers due to the refusal
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of the Turks to accept Allied control and monitoring of Turkish minority affairs and
departed the Lausanne Conference in early February of 1923.95 Once Curzon left the
scene the United States pursued an economic agreement with Turkey that became official
on August 6, 1923, after the main Treaty of Lausanne had been agreed upon.96 The
Turko-American Treaty of Amity and Commerce granted U.S. ships unrestricted access
to the Dardanelles Straits, the protection of Christians in Turkey and an “open-door
policy for American business, especially oil business.”97 Thus, economic interests of the
United States overrode public opinion, both abandoning the Armenians and also setting
the stage for the population exchange between Turkey and Greece.
The Turks believed that to turn over control of their domestic and diplomatic
affairs was a “violation of their sovereignty.”98 Thus the stage was set for legally
recognized ethnic cleansing in accordance with the stipulations of the final Treaty of
Lausanne that was signed in 1923.99 Both Greek and Turkish officials accepted the
compulsory exchange of populations.100 Turkish officials favored the transfers because
they believed they would prevent Greeks from ever being able to return to Anatolia.101
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Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Youssouf Kemal explained that the removal of
Greeks from Anatolia was “justified because immediate deportations and transfers” were
to “prevent spying and a possible Greek landing on the Black Sea Coast.”102 Most
significantly Turkish leaders believed the Greek population of Turkey had “stabbed them
in the back.”103 Greek leaders were no different in that they approved of the population
exchanges with Turkey and believed that by forcing their Turkish population from
Greece the “resettlement of Greek refugees” would be much more easily
accomplished.104 Hence the population exchange in accordance with the Treaty of
Lausanne served to make ethnic cleansing a valid legal option for nations to utilize in
dealing with troublesome ethnic minority populations.
A combination of officials from Greece and Turkey administered the transfer of
1.2 million to 1.5 million Anatolian Greeks to Greece and the reciprocal transfer of
365,000 Turks from Greece back to Turkey.105 Large numbers of Greeks died in transit to
Greece, and many of the Turks traveling to Anatolia faced the same fate as their Greek
counterparts.106 Both groups faced major difficulties assimilating into the new cultures
after arrival at their new homes.107 In the case of the transferees, religion defined their
ethnicity as the Turks were Muslims and the Greeks were Christians of the Greek
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Orthodox.108 It was religion that mainly identified one as being Greek or Turk.109
Transferees found the process very difficult and the exchange of population also taxed
the Greek and Turkish governments. 110 Above all the legally-sanctioned ethnic cleansing
by Greece and Turkey changed the ethnic and religious makeup of both nations and left
both with “widely divergent memories” and very distinctive histories, despite the fact that
“Greeks and Turks had lived beside one another for centuries but possessed different
views of the events of the recent past.”111 Ethnic cleansing redefines the future by
eliminating the past and forces the cleansed to adopt a past that is not theirs and in some
cases never will be.
Toward a Greater Germany
Ethnic cleansing and genocide were cornerstones of domestic and foreign policy
during Adolf Hitler’s reign as leader of Germany, which lasted from January 30, 1933
until his death on April 30, 1945.112 National Socialists wanted to “widen the union of all
Germans in order to form a Greater Germany” that would allow Germans throughout
Europe and the world to assert themselves as the world’s most powerful race.113 In order
to achieve European and global dominance Germany needed more natural and human
resources, which were to be acquired via the acquisition of Lebensraum (living space or
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elbow room).114 According to Hitler Germany needed what he referred to as “vital space”
and it was the quest for space that led to the removal of many conquered peoples from
their homes in order to make room for Germans allowing the Reich to expand and
become ever more dominant throughout Europe.115
During the period of Nazi rule over Germany, Germans were the most numerous
ethnic group throughout the nations of Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe.116
Germans had migrated throughout Europe in two major waves: one during the eleventh
century and the other periodically from the sixteenth through the nineteenth centuries.
They made homes in what became the Sudetenland, Poland, the Volga basin, Yugoslavia,
Hungary, the Baltic region, the Danube basin and the Wartheland region of the
Carpathian Mountains.117 Before Nazi rule, Germans living outside the Reich were of
“little concern” within Germany proper especially in the years leading up to World War I
during which time Emperor Wilhelm II “proposed to disavow” Germans outside the
Reich in conjunction with his policy objectives.118 The Weimar Republic acted sparingly
on behalf of the German diaspora in Europe because their “rights were guaranteed by
international agreements.”119 This changed dramatically when Hitler became Chancellor
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of Germany. He identified German populations throughout Europe as strategic assets who
could assist in bringing the German Reich to European dominance by serving as cultural
and political “missionaries.”120 Hitler’s foreign and domestic policy called for all
Germans to be part of a “common Reich” whose borders would stretch throughout EastCentral and Southeastern Europe, thereby achieving “the union of all Germans in order to
form a Greater Germany on the basis of the right of self-determination.”121
On October 7, 1939, Hitler declared that “all Germans threatened by deGermanization” were to be transferred to the Reich immediately and he named Gestapo
leader Heinrich Himmler Commissioner for the Strengthening of Germandom.122 This
put Himmler “in charge of resettlement programs” throughout Europe.123 Hitler assumed
the role of “protector” of Germans in Italy, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Poland, Russia,
Romania and the Baltic region through agreements that freed Germans from those
countries to leave voluntarily if they wished to do so.124 The most important of these
agreements to transfer various populations of Volksdeutshe back to Germany was the
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of September28, 1939.125 By the terms of the agreement
Germany was to receive 49% of Polish territory whereas Russia was to occupy the
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remaining 51% of Polish land.126 The redistribution of Polish lands led to internal
population transfers within the Soviet Union as well as population exchanges between the
Nazis and the Soviet Union.127 By March 1941 approximately 490,000 Germans from the
nations of Eastern Europe had been moved or transferred from their historic homelands
back to Germany with the exception of those located in the recovered territories who
were deemed unacceptable the Third Reich.128
As Germany sought to use the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact to bring
Germans residing outside the Reich within the Reich, the Soviet Union used the
agreement to rid itself of unwanted Germans from the Baltic and other areas of the Soviet
hinterlands. By allowing Germans from the Soviet Union and Baltic states to relocate to
Germany, Soviet officials believed that they were eliminating a potentially problematic
minority population.129 Soviet officials realized that “immediate evacuation of Germans”
to Germany was the most convenient and painless solution to a very serious problem and
would avert any “German influence in the Baltic” region of the Soviet Union.130 Most
importantly the Soviet Union seized the opportunity to rid itself of a minority population
of Germans who were likely to be resistant to Soviet nationalization plans.131
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Of the three Baltic nations (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), Lithuania witnessed
the largest number of repatriations back to the German Reich as the Soviets deported
approximately 50,000 Germans in 1940.132 Estonian and Latvian Germans were a mostly
urban population made up primarily of merchants and those who pursued “liberal
professions,” which German officials considered to be less productive than the largely
rural Lithuanian German population.133 Estonians and Latvians may have been viewed as
less German than the Lithuanians but they still possessed value to the Reich. In one
instance approximately 12,000 Estonian scientists, technicians and military officers were
repatriated to Germany despite some of them having little or no German ethnic origin.134
Nearly three-quarters of the Lithuanian German population resided in rural villages
where craftsman and agricultural workers were prominent and whom German leaders
deemed important to the expansion of the Reich.135 Lithuanian Germans also seemed to
be more German than those from Estonia and Latvia because they had preserved their
national character through the creation of German schools, welfare organizations,
libraries and various other institutions.136 Most of the Eastern European Germans were
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relocated to the Wartheland region of Poland because, according to German officials, it
was “the region in which Germanization was most urgently needed.”137
As historian Alfred J. Rieber points out, from 1939 to 1941, the division of
Eastern Europe into Nazi and Soviet areas led to a series of forced population transfers
and violent atrocities that radically changed the demographic profile of the region.138 The
Soviet Union occupied the nations of the Baltic region and nearly half of Poland while
the remaining portion of Poland was taken over by the Germans who assigned the SS to
deport Poles and Jews in order to make living space for Germans on the new frontier.139
In accordance with the expansionist policy of Nazi Germany 700,000 Poles and 500,000
Jews were forcefully removed from Eastern Europe and replaced by nearly 720,000
Germans.140 German officials “never had enough settlers to effectively Germanize
Poland” which was a major problem but there were other problems that plagued the
Germanization of Eastern Europe.141 First and foremost Nazi agricultural goals were
unrealistic and never met despite the placement of German farmers in agricultural areas
such as the Wartheland.142 Agricultural production in the annexed lands of Eastern
Europe lagged behind projected goals because “the war effort required increased
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production and settlers were not familiar with modern methods of farming” utilized by
farmers in the German homeland.143
During 1941 Hitler decided to halt his pursuit of the “colonial idea” of
resettlement during preparations for the invasion of the Soviet Union.144 However,
Hitler’s plan for the resettlement of Germans to newly acquired lands in Eastern Europe
was only to be delayed until German soldiers could occupy the farms they were to
receive as “victory rewards” for assistance in the acquisition of land that would enable
the Reich to expand eastward.145 Hitler’s colonial dream was never realized, but ethnic
cleansing was the primary tool used to achieve strategic policy goals by the Germans and
Soviets before and during World War II.
United States official reaction toward the Hitler and Stalin’s agreement to transfer
Baltic Germans to Germany is quite sketchy. Although United States officials knew that
the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact contained provisions pertaining to territorial concerns and
other issues, they were more concerned with improving diplomatic relations between
Great Britain and the Soviet Union and preventing a German attack on Poland.146
Diplomatic dispatches provide evidence that the United States possessed some detailed
knowledge of the transfer of the Baltic Germans to Germany. A dispatch sent from the
United States Ambassador in the Soviet Union, Laurence A. Steinhardt to Secretary of
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State Cordell Hull on January 17, 1941 reported that Germany and the Soviet Union had
agreed to transfer 45,000 Lithuanian Germans along with 12,000 Germans from Estonia
and Latvia in accordance with a repatriation agreement finalized between Germany and
the Soviet Union on January 10, 1941.147 Another dispatch from Steinhardt to the
Secretary of State delivered on March 26, 1941, contained a report from the Moscow
Press that announced the repatriation 21,343 Lithuanians, Russians and White Russians
from the German occupied Polish Provinces of Memel and Suvalki to the Soviet Union,
along with the repatriation 67,805 Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian Germans to
Germany under the stipulations of the January10, 1941 repatriation agreement considered
fulfilled as of March 25, 1941.148 Thus, there was no real United States policy pertaining
to the transfer of populations between Germany and the Soviet Union but there was some
knowledge of the events taking place, and the fact that population transfers had been used
in the past in Europe to settle minority population problems.
The United States had no past record of support for population transfers or
exchanges but did nothing to stop them, as was the case with the forced removal of the
Armenians from Turkey during World War I and the population exchanges between
Greece and Turkey that took place in 1923. Both instances were publicly condemned by
the United States in order to placate the American public but that condemnation was
halfhearted due to strategic reasons deemed more important to national security. Support
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for population transfers by the United States first came about in 1943 when President
Franklin D. Roosevelt mentioned that Germans could be transferred in East-Central
Europe after the war similar to how the Greeks and Turks had exchanged unwanted
minority populations.149 United States officials were well aware of population transfers as
a solution to minority problems in Europe long before World War II, but it did not
become part of American policy until after the war ended.
In the first half of the twentieth-century, ethnic cleansing offered a solution to the
problem of minority populations in Europe for both democracies and totalitarian regimes
alike. Population transfers seemed to offer an easy and efficient way to settle problems
concerning minorities quickly, as in the case of the Armenians, swapping of populations
between Greece and Turkey and the transfer of Baltic Germans by the Third Reich. In all
of the previously mentioned cases the nations of the west watched from afar as minorities
were uprooted from their homes and it seemed to the leaders of Great Britain, France and
the United States that an established legal precedent and formula for dealing with
problematic ethnic minorities in Europe had been found.
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CHAPTER III
THE ORIGIN OF THE EXPULSIONS

After the Nazis were defeated and driven from Czechoslovakia and Poland, “the
war against National Socialism turned into a war against Germans.”1 Other than being
dead, permanently injured or maimed the worst thing an individual could be after the war
in Czechoslovakia or Poland was German. At the outset of the war, Czechs and Poles
made some differentiation between Nazis and innocent Germans but as the war continued
and Nazi oppression and violence against inhabitants of occupied nations increased in
viciousness such differentiation disappeared.2 By the time World War II ended most
Czechs and Poles identified all Germans as responsible for their exploitation and
oppression.
As unfair and inhumane as the act of expulsion seems today, the “practice of
cleansing minorities to conform to border changes” to create ethnically homogenous
nations was inline with “accepted moral standards” in 1945 because of the 1923
Lausanne Treaty precedent.3 Forced population transfers were also validated by the most
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strident proponent of democracy and human rights in the world, the United States of
America.4 Many politicians of the time saw the World War II expulsions as a
“culmination of a process that had already begun spontaneously” when German soldiers
and civilians in retreat sought to escape the wrath of a Red Army looking for vengeance.5
Chaos at the end of the war enabled the governments of Poland and Czechoslovakia, with
the support of the Soviet Union, to attempt to rid their nations of unwanted Germans.6
Both Czechs and Poles used the spring and early summer of 1945 to expel as many
Germans as possible in order to achieve a fait accompli before the United States and
Great Britain decided to regulate or halt the expulsions altogether.7 Article XIII of the
Potsdam Agreement of August 2, 1945 eventually stipulated all transfers be orderly and
humane and be regulated by the Allied Control Council (ACC). According to American
demographer Douglas Kirk the expulsion of Germans from East-Central Europe proved
that “greater permanent movements of populations are caused not only by war but also by
the peace that follows.”8 The following examination of the initial wild expulsions and
those governed by the Potsdam Agreement the reveal that the art of making peace can be
just as deadly as that of making of war.
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The United States emerged from World War II as global military power that also
possessed great financial strength and could assume the bulk of the financial burden for
rebuilding Germany. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes and other American leaders
came to the realization that the expulsion of Germans would have to be regulated from a
point of strategic practically that would allow for the transfer of limited numbers of
people as efficiently as possible.9 Most importantly during the wild expulsions
immediately after the war American administrative officials came to the realization that
the Czechoslovak and Polish governments wanted their German minority populations
removed from their borders by any means necessary, and these violent and unorganized
population transfers might destabilize occupied Germany if left unchecked.10 The
Potsdam Conference in the summer of 1945 aired the contrasting ideologies and
strategies between the Western Allies and the Czechs, Poles and Soviets. The Allies
(including the Soviet Union) declared that expulsions would be conducted in an orderly
and humane manner under the direction and regulation of the Allied Control Council. But
by allowing the expulsions to occur at all the United States adopted characteristics of
Hitler’s racialist policy that had sought to establish a homogenous Germany.
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The Czech Government in Exile and the idea of German Expulsion
The Czech and Polish expulsions of their German minorities from their borders
emanated from Czech nationalism of the nineteenth-century and post World War I policy
engineered by the United States under President Woodrow Wilson.11 As the borders of
Europe were being redrawn after World War I by western powers, Czech leaders
(Edouard Beněs and Tomas Masaryk) campaigned for the creation of a Czech Republic
based upon the ideologies of nineteenth-century Czech nationalism and the democratic
idea of the self-determination of peoples championed by Wilson whose fourteen points
for peace proposed that the various peoples compromising the Austro-Hungarian and
Ottoman empires should be able to pursue “autonomous development.”12 Historian John
Milton Cooper Jr. points out that Wilson’s speech did not call for the destruction of the
Austro-Hungarian or Ottoman empires, for he believed their dismemberment would be
too “destabilizing” for Europe to handle, but rather proposed that the nationalities within
those empires be given autonomy.13 As for the Austro-Hungarian Empire Wilson favored
a federation of autonomous nationalities but the disintegration of the empire forced him
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to “amend the fourteen points by recognizing the new state of Czechoslovakia.”14
Despite the Czech campaign for self-determination the nation of Czechoslovakia ended
up being a multi-ethnic state whose population according to the 1930 Czechoslovakian
Census, consisted of a Czech and Slovak majority of 14,729, 536 and a minority
population of some 3,231,688 Germans who accounted for 21.9% of Czechoslovakia’s
total population.15 There were 2,270,536 Germans in Bohemia, 799,995 in Moravia and
Silesia, 147,501 in Slovakia and 13,249 in Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia.16 As a minority
within a nation dominated by Czechs and Slovaks the Sudeten Germans had trouble
accepting their secondary status, such as the fact that their representation within the state
governmental apparatus was limited to 12.9% of total government employees.17
Following the creation of Czechoslovakia in 1919, Czechoslovakian political
leaders assured Sudeten Germans that that they would not fall victim to discrimination.18
They were granted “full minority rights” that included the creation of German schools
and the seating of German judges within the Czechoslovakian judiciary system.19 Such
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recognition and guarantees were “not in harmony with nationalist sentiments” of Czech
and Slovak citizens and revealed the underlying mistrust and tension within the multiethnic state of Czechoslovakia during the interwar years.20 Czechoslovakian policy
toward the Germans continued to be “firm but conciliatory” after Edouard Beněs
succeeded Tomas Masaryk as president of the Czechoslovak Republic in 1935.21 Even
though Beněs attempted to improve relations between the Czechoslovakian government
and its German minority, the relationship deteriorated amidst tough economic times
during the mid-1930s.22 The depression created an atmosphere of paranoia and suspicion
between the majority Czech and Slovak population and the Sudeten German minority
which helped set the stage for the expulsion of Germans from Czechoslovakia that began
after the war in 1945.23
On September 29, 1938, the relationship between the Czechoslovak majority and
German minority in Czechoslovakia changed forever when the United Kingdom, France,
Germany and Italy concluded that the heavily populated German Sudetenland located on
the border with Germany be forfeited to Hitler’s Germany.24 The Munich Agreement of
1938 that ceded the Sudetenland also forced the resignation of President Beněs. More
importantly, the cessation of the Sudetenland to Hitler’s Germany changed the social,
political and economic status of Czechoslovakia’s remaining Germans.25
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After resigning from office on October 5, 1938 Beněs went from Prague to
Chicago, where he became a “politically active” professor at the University of Chicago
traveling the United States and speaking at universities to intellectual elites and at
political events to prominent American politicians before traveling to London on July 12,
1939, in order to establish himself within the Czechoslovakian political exile
community.26A similar community of Czechoslovakians in exile in Paris established the
Czechoslovak National Committee on October 17, 1939.27 In response Beněs petitioned
the British and French foreign offices and argued that a Czechoslovakian government inexile would be best for the Czechoslovakian people, Europe and also the British and
French governments.28 On July 21, 1940, the British government recognized the Benesled London faction of Czechoslovakian exiles as the official Czechoslovakian Provisional
Government.29 Not surprisingly the Czechoslovakian government-in-exile consisted
entirely of Czechs and Slovaks but there was also a Sudetendeutsche Sozialdemokratiche
Partei (Sdp) contingent in London under the direction of party leader Wenzel Jaksch.30
The SdP made it clear to the Czech government in-exile during negotiations in London
from 1939 to1943 that they wanted the Sudetenland to be part of a postwar
Czechoslovakia but as an autonomous “provincial government” that would be part of a
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Czech-Slovak-Sudeten German federation.31 From the perspective of the Sudeten
Germans, such an arrangement would protect them “against blind revenge” and prevent
“radical groups” from being involved in Czech politics.32 Knowing that within
Czechoslovakia there was full support for the removal of Germans as a form of
retribution after the war, Beněs made it clear to Jaksch in late 1942 that neither Fascist
nor anti-Fascist Germans were going be part of a postwar Czechoslovakia.33
From this my dear friends we can draw but one calm, but stern conclusion: A just
retribution for all direct and indirect, active and passive war criminals as a lesson
for the future and-complete separation! Otherwise after this dreadful war, an
unheard of massacre will ensue between our two races! We can and must prevent
this by our complete separation! Only this way will we be able to meet again
later-when the present sufferings are forgotten-as neighbors and live each in his
new home without bitterness and in peace, separated, side by side with one
another.34
The role played by the German population of Czechoslovakia, and more importantly
the Czech and Slovak perception of that role during the war, provided the impetus for the
policy of expulsion. Although the exclusion of Sudeten Germans from the Czech
Provisional Government was a product of popular sentiment during the first year of the
war Beněs believed that Czechs, Slovaks and Germans could possibly cohabit in
Czechoslovakia after the war, but as the war trudged along both public and political
opinion grew increasingly anti-German.35 From 1940 on, Beněs committed himself to
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seeing the Sudeten German population removed from Czechoslovakia, although he only
made his feelings public to the British press in early 1945, shortly before the wild
expulsions began.36 He stated: “The alternative to expulsion would not be humane. It
would be a pity if we were penalized for being civilized.”37
Beněs launched a political and public relations campaign in order to convince
British, Russian and American leaders that lasting peace in postwar Europe could only be
realized if Czechoslovakia were allowed to rid itself of its Sudeten German minority.
Benes believed that even though the removal would mean an extended period of hardship
for the Sudeten Germans their expulsion would provide for a better and more humane
solution than inhumane massacres spurred by revenge that would cause the “continuation
of nationality struggles” in East-Central Europe.38 Beněs presented the idea of German
expulsion as an act that would show Czechoslovakia to be a nation of “democratic and
human values” and an agent of European social change.39 As president of the
Czechoslovak government in-exile Beněs sought to stress to the Allies, especially the
United States, that the expulsion of Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia following the
war would make for a peaceful and secure Europe. Most of all Beněs knew that the key to
a Czechoslovakia free of Sudeten Germans rested on the approval of the United States
and the Soviet Union.40
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The actions of the German military inside Czechoslovakia during the war
contributed greatly to the achievement of Beněs’s goal of ridding Czechoslovakia of all
Germans, German occupation policy centered on the “Germanization” of the Czech
people. The process intensified after Reinhard Heydrich of the Schutzstaffel (SS) became
Reichsprotektor of what had once been Czechoslovakia in 1941.41 Heydrich immediately
“intensified” the German implementation of martial law within the protectorate, and by
late November nearly 400 Czech citizens had been executed by Heydrich’s use of terror
tactics to bring about “Czech compliance to German laws.”42 By itself the word
Germanization sounds harmless but in reality Germanization was a euphemism for
“selecting Czechs for assimilation, deportation or extermination.”43 Reinitiated with a
new-found fervor by Heydrich in October 1941, the process of Germanization classified
Czechoslovakian citizens into one of three racial-political categories: those deemed as
being racially hostile and recently politically active against the German Reich were
designated for expulsion; those determined to be racially reliable and politically loyal
were to be assimilated or Germanized; and those Czechoslovak citizens seen as being
non-supportive of the Germans were executed.44
Heydrich’s terroristic reign and implementation of Germanization within the
Czech protectorate achieved two things. First, the brutal actions of the Nazis in occupied
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Czechoslovakia did not go unnoticed by Czechoslovakians or by the world, especially by
the Western Allies where the “anti-German” sentiment increased exponentially in
reaction Heydrich’s strategy of terror.45 Second, the actions of Heydrich proved
successful in hindering the effectiveness of the Czech resistance movement on the
ground, which resulted in the core of Czechoslovak “political activity” and power being
confined to Beněs’s Czech government in-exile in London.46 With the resistance
effectively neutralized by the terror tactics of Heydrich the Czech government in-exile
approved a covert operation to achieve his assassination.47 Aggressive actions by the
Germans against Czechoslovakians in the protectorate led Czech resistance leaders to
vehemently request the assassination of Heydrich be postponed indefinitely and
suggested the Czech government in-exile choose another “target” of lesser importance.48
Nevertheless, Beněs viewed the assassination plan as an act that would benefit
Czechoslovakia’s postwar interests by demonstrating to the international community that
a postwar Czechoslovakia would not be a passive nation in the arena of global affairs.49
On May 27, 1942 two Czech resistance members assassinated Reichsprotektor
Heydrich as he traveled by automobile to Prague.50 The German response targeted the
small village of Lidice as the epicenter of retribution because German officials believed
the citizens of Lidice had provided assistance to the assassination team.51 There was no
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proof that the citizens of Lidice had provided such assistance.52 Such complicity is
unlikely because the area around Lidice was a productive industrial region that produced
10% of the “Nazi Reich’s industrial output” and Czech workers there were better
compensated and received larger food ration allotments than Germans who did the same
work.53 The SS decided to make an example of the small mining village of Lidice and its
inhabitants in order to send a message to the whole protectorate.54 In the ensuing carnage
the SS executed 199 villagers (192 men and 7 women) and many residents of the
surrounding area.55 They rounded up the women and children, deporting the former and
sending the children to concentration camps such as the one at Chelmno.56 Those children
the SS deemed to be of Aryan racial stock were adopted by German families.57 Once the
SS was done there was nothing left of Lidice, the village had been burned to the ground,
families split apart and people executed despite the fact that there was no proof that
anyone from Lidice had assisted the Czech resistance in the assassination of Heydrich.58
The events at Lidice put Czechoslovakia on notice.59 German leaders “ordered all
Czechoslovakians to report to special offices to have their identity cards stamped” and
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those who refused were executed on the spot as collaborators in the assassination of
Heydrich.60
As a strategic measure, the thorough and brutal attack on Lidice by the German
SS proved successful and struck fear throughout the ranks of the Czechoslovak
resistance, many of whom decided that participation in “armed resistance was not a
viable option” in the effort to remove Germany from Czechoslovakia.61 For the Czech
government in-exile and President Edouard Beněs, Lidice did two things that made the
expulsion of Germans from Czechoslovakia inevitable after the war in Europe ended.
First the razing of Lidice by the SS only intensified Czech and Slovak hatred for
Germans in general and played a large role in the decision to expel Germans by the
Czechoslovakian government after the war.62 Second, the Lidice massacre was noticed by
the Western Allies (USA, UK), who became aware of the repressive and inhumane
German occupation of Czechoslovakia, and became more responsive to demands from
Beněs that the German population be expelled in order to establish lasting peace in
Europe.63 American reaction to the German assault on Lidice made it clear that Nazi
tyranny would be defeated. On June 12, 1942 Secretary of State Cordell Hull called the
Lidice massacre an act of “mass terrorization” so vile and ruthless that such acts were
below “savage tribes.”64 Hull went on to explain that through the senseless murder and
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torture of “innocent women and children” Hitler managed to further enrage the world
through a horrible display of the cruel inhumanity he and Nazi Germany stood for.65 The
American stance on Lidice was reinforced by Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox who
spoke before 15,000 people at a United Nations rally in Boston as President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt’s representative on June 14, 1942 , and declared that the Allies would
“fight until the Nazi butchers were swept from the face of the earth.”66 Knox also stated
that Lidice would once again emerge and “the Nazi ideas of degradation and enslavement
would be crushed.”67 As sympathetic as the United States government was to the victims
of the senseless slaughter that occurred at Lidice, there was no desire or readiness to
“resort to measures of retaliation such as indiscriminate bombing of civilian populations
in enemy countries.”68 Although the massacre at Lidice was a domestic nightmare for the
Czechoslovak people, it turned out to be a strategic asset in the Czech government inexile’s campaign to rid itself of an unwanted German minority after the war. Brutalities
committed by the Nazis against the villagers of Lidice made the Czechoslovakian
strategy for the expulsion of its German minority more justifiable in the eyes of the
United States and its junior ally Great Britain.69
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Although the Lidice massacre virtually guaranteed that the German minority
population of Czechoslovakia would be expelled once the war ended, the idea of
expulsion was not new. As mentioned earlier Czech President Edouard Beněs knew soon
after the Munich Agreement had been completed that the Sudeten German minority of
Czechoslovakia had to be transferred out of Czechoslovakia if the nation were to be safe
and secure after the war. Beněs had first proposed the idea in 1940 when he suggested it
was crucial that a million Sudeten Germans be transferred from Czechoslovakia in order
to restore the pre-Munich borders.70 There was support in the “newly radicalized
Czechoslovakia” for the idea of forcibly transferring the Sudeten Germans and Beněs
knew that in order for the transfer to occur he had to portray it as essential to “Allied
postwar plans for Europe” specifically establishing a lasting peace.71 Much to Beněs’s
advantage the aftermath of Lidice saw the Western Allies more inclined to listen to the
Czechoslovak leader’s claims that peace in Czechoslovakia and East-Central Europe
would only come about through the expulsion of Germans from the region.72
The summer of 1942 proved to be very important to Beněs’s pursuit of Allied
approval for his plan to expel Germans from Czechoslovakia. On June 9, 1942 Soviet
Foreign Minister V.M. Molotov made it clear that the Soviet Union had never recognized
the Munich Agreement of 1938 and also approved of the forced transfer of Sudeten
Germans from Czechoslovakia.73 Molotov put the United States and Great Britain in a
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very precarious situation regarding the expulsion of Germans. Soviet support of Beněs’s
transfer plans heavily influenced Great Britain’s policy pertaining to the German question
in East-Central Europe.74 British officials justified support of the transfer process by
stating it was an “endeavor, which would make Czechoslovakia homogenous from the
standpoint of nationality.”75
In late 1942, Beněs received notification that United States President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt “requested” that he make an official visit to Washington D.C. in
1943.76 His official visit to the United States was to focus on the discussion of “Allied
war problems,” but Beněs saw it as an opportunity to gain American support for the
expulsion of Czechoslovakia’s Sudeten German minority.77 Although the Soviet Union
had given verbal support to the expulsions in the summer of 1942 Beněs needed official
support from not only the Soviets but also the United States and Great Britain.78 He
decided to make his official visit to America the first leg in a journey that would take him
to the Soviet Union and then back to Great Britain in a quest to procure support from all
three Allies.79
Prior to his departure for Washington D.C., Beněs authored an article in the
American foreign-policy journal Foreign Affairs, which was designed to present to
American politicians and intellectuals his ideological and political justification for the
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expulsion of Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia.80 Although the piece discussed
postwar Europe it also addressed the European minority question and declared it to be a
“large part of Czechoslovak policymaking.”81 Beněs made the claim that the minority
question centered around the German threat to the nations of East-Central Europe in
particular.82 He argued that the German threat to Czechoslovakia and the other nations of
the region was the result of the German attempt to colonize central and eastern Europe by
sending German settlers as “agents of expanding German interests” throughout the
region83 Germans who had moved into nations such as Czechoslovakia and Poland were
in effect a “cultural” and political “fifth column” of the German assault eastward.84
According to Beněs only one solution could nullify the German threat to Czechoslovakia
and the whole of East-Central Europe and that was the “extensive” transfer of Germans
out of the region.85
Within the pages of Foreign Affairs, Beněs explained to his American audience
that “the protection of minorities” within a nation such as Czechoslovakia was an
impractical burden upon the state.86 Beněs admitted that there was “no ideal solution”
regarding the German question but justified his transfer plans by mentioning the
population transfers undertaken after World War I.87 Beněs explained that it would be
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better for “national minorities” such as the Sudeten Germans to have the right to live with
their “native population” which would also serve the best interests of Czechoslovakia’s
Czech and Slovak majority.88 Thus the case for expulsion was packaged and presented to
American politicians and the American public in a way that made Czechoslovakia’s plan
to transfer Sudeten Germans look as if it benefited the Sudeten Germans as much as the
majority Czechoslovak population.
Beněs knew he needed American approval of the proposed transfer of Sudeten
Germans, but he did not know where the United States stood on the issue and requested
that the Czechoslovakian Information Service conduct a study of United States policy
regarding the plan to expel Germans from Czechoslovakia.89 The study was based on
discussions conducted by Czechoslovak diplomat J. Hanc along with fifteen
Czechoslovakian political and foreign policy experts who studied United States policy.90
Information garnered for the report revealed that the United States was likely to support
pre-Munich (1938) frontiers, limited minority rights and possibly the expulsion of
Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia, if it would bring peace to the European
continent.91 Although American support for the transfer of Germans was not ironclad
Beněs had a couple of aces in the hole. Before he left for Washington he met with British
Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden in April of 1943, who declared that if the transfer of
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Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia was “deemed necessary” to achieve peace in
Central Europe Great Britain would support it.92 Beněs already knew he had tentative
Soviet support for the transfer of Sudeten Germans before his discussions with President
Roosevelt began.93 Before he ever arrived in Washington he therefore knew that
American approval of the transfers was a possibility but with both Great Britain and the
Soviet Union in favor of the Czechoslovak transfer plan the chances of garnering
American approval of the transfers increased exponentially.
While in Washington in early June 1943, Beněs played a high stakes diplomatic
game leading FDR to believe that he had Soviet support for the transfer of Germans from
Czechoslovakia before it became official.94 President Roosevelt and Benes discussed the
Sudeten German situation twice and both times Benes led FDR to believe he had the full
support of the Soviet Union by letting it be known that the Czechoslovak government had
conducted talks with the Soviet Union concerning the Sudeten German issue.95 After
listening carefully to Beněs on June 7, 1943 FDR indicated that the United States
approved of the transfer of Germans from East Prussia, Transylvania and
Czechoslovakia.96 Once he secured President Roosevelt’s support for the Sudeten
German transfers Benes asked FDR to “clarify again” his support for the forced removal
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of Germans from Czechoslovakia.97 A June 15, 1943, memorandum by Harry N. Howard
of the Division of Political Affairs concerning the German-Czechoslovak border stated
that the United States favored the restoration of Czechoslovakia’s 1937 pre-Munich
border with Germany, which Beněs desired greatly.98 In addition to the restoration of
Czechoslovakia’s pre-Munich borders the report noted that the “German character” of the
area returned to Czechoslovakia “could be transferred without economic or strategic
injury” through the return of nearly 2.3 million Germans to Germany.99The removal of
Germans from the German-Czechoslovak border area would remove the “strategic value”
of the area as far as Germany was concerned.100 Although Beněs stated in his memoirs
and elsewhere that Roosevelt had approved of the transfer of Sudeten Germans there are
no written records of the meetings that took place between Beněs and Roosevelt in
Washington between May 8 and June 9, 1943, in the State Department files or the FDR
Library in Hyde Park, New York.101 There may be no eyewitness verification of
Roosevelt’s discussion with Benes concerning the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans but
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documents exist that rove Roosevelt had given the German minority question some
thought. Special assistant to the President Harry L. Hopkins wrote in a memorandum
dated March 15, 1943, that Roosevelt had discussed the postwar fate of Germans in East
Prussia at a dinner with himself, Roosevelt and British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden
the night before.102 Hopkins’s memorandum quoted Roosevelt as saying:
The President said he thought we should make some arrangements to get the
Prussians out of East Prussia the same way the Greeks were moved out of Turkey,
which this is a harsh procedure, it is the only way to maintain peace and that, the
Prussians cannot be trusted.103
This conversation took place in March, three months before Beněs reportedly received
Roosevelt’s approval of his plan to transfer the Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia,
and it reveals that Roosevelt believed the German minority Population of East-Central
Europe was a threat to the post-war peace and security of Europe.
The trip to Washington had been a success in more than one way. Not only did
Beněs secure United States approval of the transfer of Sudeten Germans while in
America, but he also received word that the Soviet Union had agreed to make its support
of the Benes transfer plan official shortly thereafter. Beněs met his objective and had
received the support of the Big Three Allied powers but in actuality the Soviet agreement
to support the Czechoslovak transfer of Germans was significantly more important than
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American approval. First, Benes wanted the approval of all three Allies so as demonstrate
that Czechoslovakia was willing to deal with the Sudeten German issue in accordance
with any international postwar peace agreement. Second and more importantly the
procurement of the Soviet Union as an official supporter of the Czechoslovak transfer
plan gave Beněs a powerful regional ally who could be used to counterbalance any
amount of power and influence the Western Allies could exert over Czechoslovakia’s
policy of population transfer.
In mid-December 1943, Beněs traveled to the Soviet Union and later that month
the USSR and Czechoslovakia signed a “Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.”104 The
treaty provided for “mutual assistance” between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia
during the war against Germany accentuated by “promises of mutual noninterference in
internal affairs” of one another.”105 After a few meetings with Soviet leader Josef Stalin,
Benes met with Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov, to whom he presented a
memorandum that presented a ten-point plan to transfer the Sudeten Germans out of
Czechoslovakia over a five-year period with most of the transfers occurring during the
first two years of implementation.106 In response Molotov gave a guarantee of Soviet
support by stating that the Sudeten German “transfer was a minor problem and would be
easily completed.”107 While in the Soviet Union Beněs also received additional support
for the transfer of Sudeten Germans from leaders of the Czechoslovak Communist party
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in-exile in Russia who agreed to support Benes in the endeavor of ridding
Czechoslovakia of its Germans.108 Beněs’s success in procuring Soviet support for the
expulsions came to fruition, in part, from his stressing to Soviet officials that the
expulsion of Sudeten Germans would be part of a larger Communist-friendly social
revolution. 109
The “Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation” between Czechoslovakia and the
Soviet Union was vital to Beněs. Beněs viewed the Munich Agreement of 1938 as
evidence that the Western Allies would never totally commit themselves to the defense of
Czechoslovakia and this was the main reason he looked to the Soviets for friendship and
security.110 Also the Soviet Union had displayed loyalty to Czechoslovakia in 1938 by
not recognizing the Munich Agreement, an action that had been admired by
Czechoslovakian citizens.111 Thus, not only was the “Treaty of Friendship and
Cooperation” popular with the Czechoslovak public but it would also serve as a guarantor
of the existence of Czechoslovakia by establishing “the Soviet Union Alliance as a
natural response to the problem of German expansion.”112 Czechoslovakian independence
would be guaranteed and the relationship with the Soviet Union would “supplement
relations with the West” which meant all angles were covered and the relationship with
the Soviets might be used to extract cooperation from the Western Allies regarding future
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Czechoslovakian security, including the German population transfer plan.113 And with
Moscow being the wartime headquarters of the Czechoslovakian Communist party,
Soviet approval of the expulsions brought with it the approval of Czech communist
leaders.
As President of Czechoslovakia, Beněs’s only major policy goals for the
immediate postwar period were the reinstatement of pre-1938 borders, the removal of the
troublesome Sudeten German minority from within his nation’s border and security
agreements with the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union. In a radio
message broadcast to the Czechoslovakian people from the Soviet Union in 1943 Beněs
declared Czechoslovakia to be a republic for the first time and stated that Czechoslovakia
had the right to do whatever it wanted in relation to the Sudeten German issue.114 In
essence Beněs was telling his nation and the world that the Czechoslovakian Republic
would be a homogenous national state devoid of any significant minority populations.115
While mostly focused on the removal of the Sudeten Germans, Beněs also saw the
Hungarian minority of Czechoslovakia as problem. By the end of 1943, Beněs had
coaxed the Allied powers of the east and west into possibly supporting his plan to transfer
the Sudeten German population of Czechoslovakia to their ethnic homeland of Germany
and had done so in a very calculated manner.116 Full support of the expulsion of Germans
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by the United States came in the summer of 1944 when the Post War Policy Committee,
a branch of the Division of Central European Affairs in the State Department,
communicated to Czechoslovakian leaders that the United States would be interested in
pursuing transfers of Germans if they were well timed and logistically manageable.117
Although sympathetic to Czechoslovakia’s desire to divest itself of a troublesome
minority population, the Committee on Post War Policy explained to American and
British representatives of the European Advisory Committee (EAC) on August 5, 1944
that the transfer of Sudeten Germans was a means by which to combat the effects of
National Socialism and bring stability to East-Central Europe.118
Once he received approval from FDR for the transfer of Sudeten Germans from
Czechoslovakia Beněs published another article in Foreign Affairs in October of 1944.
This second piece explained why the Sudeten Germans had to be transferred out of
Czechoslovakia. However, this essay intentionally targeted American intellectuals and
politicians and was used by Beněs as a trial population transfer proposal.119 Beneěs
explained that the Western sponsored Munich Agreement of 1938 had seen the “last
bastion of Central European democracy surrendered” and Czechoslovakia had been given
away to Hitler.120 Beněs explained that there would be no return to “pre-Munich
conditions” and there was no choice but to transfer those Germans out of
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Czechoslovakia.121 Beněs used this article in Foreign Affairs as a public relations piece
that presented the rationale behind Czechoslovak thinking in regard to the German
expulsions. On November 23, 1944 the London-based Czechoslovakian government inexile presented its “detailed transfer scheme” to the EAC, which consisted of
representatives from Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union.122 The
document asserted wholesale transference of the Sudeten German minority was the only
viable solution to the Czech minority problem because Germans were to be denied any
official minority status or rights in a postwar Czechoslovakia.123
Both the United States and Great Britain endorsed Czechoslovakia’s transfer
plans. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill delivered a speech to the House of
Commons on December 15, 1944, concerning the transfer of Germans from East-Central
Europe, referred to the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, and explained that population transfers
were an “idée fixe” and were the only plausible solution to the “German minority
problem in East-Central Europe.”124 He explained British support for the transfer process
declaring “a clean sweep will be made, I am not alarmed at the displacement of
population” and further explained to parliament that such large population transfers were
logistically more possible and efficient in the modern world.125 Churchill cited the
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disentanglement of populations that took place after World War I between Greece and
Turkey that were largely successful and led to “friendly relations” between them in the
years after the conclusion of the transfers.126 He then explained that the population
exchange between Greece and Turkey had not been without difficulty but he believed
that the “disentanglement” of population it solved problems which had before been the
cause of immense friction, of words and rumors of wars.”127 As a result Churchill saw no
reason why the transfer of German populations could not solve the German minority
problem in East-Central Europe.128 While Churchill’s comments focused on the transfer
of Germans from territory that was to be occupied by Poland his words were applicable
to Czechoslovakia as well. The American response to the Czechoslovak transfer plan was
more practical simply because the United States was the only Allied power willing and
able to feed and house the expelled populations once they arrived in the planned
American zone of occupation in Southern Germany. According to Secretary of State
Edward Stettinius the United States would assist, police and administer the transfer of
Germans from Czechoslovakia and Poland as part of a process that was to be conducted
under international supervision.129 American officials knew the transfers were going to
occur and subsequently replied to Czechoslovak transfer plans by making it clear on
December 18, 1944 that it was the responsibility of the United States to prevent the
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spread of disease and control the flow of expellee traffic during the transfer process once
they entered Germany so that the transferees would not impede military traffic.130
Beněs campaigned hard in the United States for Allied approval of the transfer
plan for Czechoslovakia’s German minority. At the same time he was also preparing the
Czechoslovak homeland for the mass expulsions.131 While he was espousing “equality
and international law” and the desire of the Czechoslovak government to follow the
transfer guidelines of an international peace agreement to the Western Allies, Benes was
simultaneously seeking to transfer the Sudeten Germans in accordance with
Czechoslovakian needs and desires.132 Beněs relayed instructions to the Czechoslovakian
resistance that directed the creation of conditions that would bring about the exodus of
Sudeten Germans and create a fait accompli before any international agreement could be
brought into existence.133
For Beněs 1945 was to be very different from 1944 with regard to the American
and British position on the transfer of Germans from East-Central Europe, the parameters
of the transfers were to be more restrictive than he previously thought. Beněs was
“disturbed” that the United States (followed by Great Britain) started to add conditions to
the transfer process such as linking the number of Sudeten Germans to be transferred to
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the exact placement of the western Polish border.134 The British conveyed to Beněs that
the transfer plans had been carefully studied and that nothing would become final until
other powers, namely the United States, had been consulted.135 American officials
explained to Beněs that the transfers would occur only as a part of an “international
agreement” and were to be done at a “gradual” pace not unilaterally by the
Czechoslovakian government.136 On January 3, 1945, the United States expressed to
Czechoslovak officials that it was “aware” of the harm inflicted upon Czechoslovakia by
Germany and the German minority and the problem was under examination by American
officials so as to bring about a “satisfactory solution” for the region of Central Europe
and Czechoslovakia.137 Above all else American officials expressed a desire that the
expulsion of all Germans from the region should occur gradually under the auspices of an
international peace agreement that would allow large groups to be transferred and thus
eliminate the unilateral transfer of people by the Czechoslovak government and the
attendant logistical problems for areas receiving an influx of refugees.138
On January 11, 1945, a memo from the United States Department of Central
European Affairs set forth recommendations how the expulsion of Germans from East-
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Central Europe should be approached and handled.139 The memo stated United States
officials should approach the transfer of Germans with extreme caution due to the fact
that some ten to twelve million Germans resided in Czechoslovak and Polish
territories.140 It also suggested that the transfer of Germans be strategically addressed in
accordance with what was best for the region rather than individual nations. The
situations facing Czechoslovakia and Poland during the German occupation were unique
to each nation and the United States was sympathetic to both.141 But, the state department
recommended that population transfers should be handled by the Allies in conjunction
with an international peace agreement.142
Poland and the Transfer of Germans
Whereas the transfer of Germans from Czechoslovakia was based upon the Czech
and Slovak majority’s desire to be rid their nation of a troublesome German minority
whereas the expulsion of Germans from the newly-recovered territories of Poland after
World War II was the result of wartime geopolitics. At the end of World War II the
borders of Poland had changed drastically from 1939, the Soviet Union had annexed the
eastern half of Poland.143 In return for land that it lost in the east to the Soviet Union the
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Western Allies decided to compensate Poland with German lands that bordered it to the
West.144 Included in the Westward expansion of Poland were the industrial and fertile
agricultural lands of East Prussia, Western Pomerania, and Upper Silesia and the free city
of Danzig, which the Allies thought would make Poland a stronger and more selfsufficient nation that would be better equipped to fight off foreign intruders.145 Within the
newly acquired Polish territories that were once part of Germany resided millions of
Germans who would have to be moved in order to accommodate Poles who had been
displaced from their homes by the Soviet occupation of eastern Poland.146
American government agencies and officials assessed the expulsions and how
they would impact American interests and the stability of Europe. On August 5, 1944 the
American government released a report by the Postwar-Committee working in
conjunction with the EAC titled The Treatment of Germany: Long-Term Interests of the
United States which acknowledged the plans of Czechoslovakia to transfer approximately
3.2 million Sudeten Germans and the intention of Poland to transfer an unknown number
of Germans from their newly acquired Western territories.147 The American report to the
EAC Postwar Committee concluded that the transfer of the region’s German minority to
Germany would in all probability “contribute to the tranquility of the countries
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concerned” but many problems would arise from the transfer process and its aftermath.148
One obvious difficulty was the lack of assurance and prospect of a future home or
employment for the expellees after they settled in Germany.149 Germany would have to
undergo land reform so that approximately one million of the transferees could pursue
agricultural employment.150 However, the reality of the situation dictated that most of the
transferees “would have to enter urban life” which would place the German economy
under considerable stress unless “there was an increase in foreign trade.”151 Not only
would the German economy be stressed by the transfer of population but the economies
of Czechoslovakia and Poland would also suffer from the loss of skilled industrial
laborers and productive agricultural workers of German descent.152
The American assessment of the transfer of Germans from East-Central Europe
concluded that the United States government should oppose “the mass transfer of these
peoples immediately upon the cessation of hostilities” but did acknowledge that the
Sudeten Germans and volksdeutsche who had assisted the Nazis in the occupation of
Poland and in the “National Socialist penetration of Europe” would be prime candidates
for transfer.153 The selection process for those deemed eligible for transfer would have to
be determined after the establishment of an Inter-Allied Committee that would plan and
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organize any population transfers that were to occur after the war.154 The study conceded
that the transfer of Germans by the Czechoslovak and Polish governments after the war
would bring peace to the region, but with peace would come economic and social
difficulties for all nations involved.
Poland’s German problem was more complicated than the one that faced
Czechoslovakia because of the unknown finality of Poland’s Western border and the
large population of Germans who resided in former German territory that now belonged
to Poland.155 Most of the ten to twelve million Germans in the newly acquired Polish
territories resided between the western Oder and eastern Neisse Rivers.156 Polish officials
knew that the Germans of the western territories would be very hard to incorporate into a
new Polish nation as a result of the horrific German occupation of Poland during the war,
which left in its wake widespread anti-German sentiment among Poles.157 Six years of
German rape and pillage of Poland’s people and natural resources made compulsory
transfer of the German population of the western territories a solution that would rid the
Polish government of what it deemed to be a very serious threat to its internal stability.158
Forced transfer was made a stronger possibility because Germans and “local
Volksdeutsche, transferees from Germany and Reich Germans” were detested by the
peasant population of Poland who vowed during the six long years of occupation that
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they would exact revenge upon the Germans for the suffering Polish citizens endured
during the war.159 Expulsion of Germans was seen as one way to exact some revenge.
Poland and the Polish people had been subject to exploitation, brutalization,
humiliation, and mass murder by their German occupiers during the war, and not
surprisingly the Poles sought revenge against their former oppressors.160 Following the
war there “was a deep and natural hatred that was part of society” within Poland and was
recognized by the United States (and the other Allies) as being a threat to long-term
peace in the region if something were not done to relieve tensions between Germans and
Poles.161 British Prime Minister Winston Churchill wrote to President Roosevelt in
January of 1944 that the Polish Government-in-exile made it clear that it wanted to be a
strong independent nation after the war and that the Allies could contribute to their
strength and independence by guaranteeing that they would “assist in expelling the
Germans from the new territories assigned Poland.”162 Churchill also expressed concern
about the formation of a new a Polish government in Warsaw backed by the Soviet Union
that would “raise issues in Great Britain and the United States detrimental to the close
accord of the Three Great Powers” that the future of the world so depended.163 Then on
February 5, Churchill conveyed to Roosevelt comments made by Josef Stalin during an
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“interview” with Great Britain’s Ambassador to the Soviet Union Archibald Clark Kerr
that guaranteed not only would Poland be an independent nation but “she could count
upon all he help she needed in expelling the Germans.”164 In November of 1944,
President Roosevelt made it clear that if the Polish people and government “in connection
with the new frontiers of the Polish state” sought to “bring about the transfer to and from
the territory of national minorities” the United States would not object as long as the
transfers were a valid and practical solution to the problem of national minorities in
Poland.165 On December 19, 1944 United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union W.
Averell Harriman informed the State Department that both the Polish communist
government in Lublin and London Polish leader Stanislaw Mikolajczyk opposed
Germans residing in the newly acquired Polish territories.166 Harriman noted that the
Soviet Union supported the westward expansion of Poland’s border to the Oder-Neisse
line because it justified the Soviet seizure of territory in Eastern Poland earlier in the
war.167
The Big Three discussed Poland’s final Western border and the fate of its large
German minority population at the Yalta Conference in February 1945. President
Roosevelt received a list of policy and strategy suggestions that had been agreed upon at
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the Malta Conference of 1944 by American Secretary of State Edward Stettinius and
British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden. Regarding to Poland’s German minority
problem, Stettinius suggested to President Roosevelt that the United States “should
oppose, so far as possible, indiscriminate mass transfer of minorities” but if there were no
other solution to the minority question transfer should be carried out gradually under
international supervision.168 American policy regarding the transfer of Germans from
Poland’s newly acquired territories at Yalta was based on pragmatism. On practical
grounds, the United States opposed to the transfer of Germans by the Poles or
Czechoslovaks, but American officials accepted the reality that the transfers were going
to occur anyway and that the transfer of population was the only long-term solution to
Poland’s German minority dilemma.169 As for the Western border of Poland American
officials favored “the Curzon Line in the north and center and the southern border along
the eastern line of Lwow province.”170
Minutes from the February 6, 1945, Third Plenary Meeting of the Yalta
Conference reveal that President Roosevelt declared the United States preference for the
Curzon Line as the permanent western border of Poland.171 Churchill echoed the
American suggestion by stating that “after what Russia had been through the Curzon line
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was not a decision of force but one of right.”172 Churchill went on to explain that the
Polish “frontier was not of vital importance” to the British government which was more
concerned with the “government structure” of postwar Poland.173 Stalin disagreed,
arguing that for the Soviet Union the location of the border was a strategic matter because
Poland had been used many times as a corridor for attack on Russia with the most
frequent aggressor being Germany.174 Poland had been historically a weak nation and
Stalin emphasized that the existence of a strong, independent and “democratic” Poland
would ensure the security of the Soviet Union from a geographic standpoint.175 Stalin
solemnly stated it was a “question of Russian honor, life and death” and to accept the
Curzon line would make Stalin himself less than Russian.176 Stalin insisted that the Soviet
Union needed the boundary of Poland to be extended farther west to the Oder-Neisse
region, an idea both Great Britain and the United States opposed. 177
Even as the Yalta Conference was underway, the Soviet Red Army was in the
process of advancing westward to the Oder River, and a considerable portion of the
German minority of Poland (and also many Poles) had fled west out of fear of a Red
Army looking for vengeance.178 In some cases however, members of the mistaken
German minority returned to their ancestral homes rather than fleeing in the belief that
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they had survived similar situations “for centuries” and chose to face the brunt of Soviet
occupation.179 Stalin assured the Allies that millions of Germans would flee the region
out of fear of the Red Army as it entered the Oder-Neisse region which would necessitate
very limited population transfers, if any at all.180 At Yalta, therefore, the “Big Three”
agreed that Poland should “receive substantial” territory in northeast Germany for
suffering at the hands of Germany during the war and for land taken by the Soviet Union
in the east.181 The main point of disagreement amongst the Allies was over how far west
the Polish border would be located.182 The final press release of the Yalta Conference
revealed the Allies agreed on the following:
The three heads of Government consider that the Eastern frontier of Poland
should follow the Curzon Line, with digressions from it in some regions of five
eight kilometers in favor of Poland. They recognize that Poland must receive to
substantial accessions of territory in the North and West. They feel that the
opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be
sought in due course on the extent of these accessions, and that the final
delimitation of the Western frontier of Poland should therefore await the Peace
Conference.183
FDR was preoccupied at Yalta with the American war effort in the Pacific and
“found the Polish issue irritating.”184He never really addressed the differences between
the “Big Three” about Poland and instead focused on what was agreed upon by the
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Allies.185 Historian Debrah Allen claims that FDR focused on the points of agreement
regarding Poland in order to “give the appearance of Allied unity” on the issue.186
Despite FDR’s attempt to frame the Yalta Conference as a success back home, the truth
of the matter was that the only decision made at Yalta that concerned the final position of
Poland’s western border was a decision to delay discussion on the matter until a final
peace conference could be scheduled. The Yalta agreement was presented as a success
by the FDR administration so as to avoid the United States being seen as weak or having
given in to the Soviet Union. Far from being a success the Yalta agreement was
fundamentally an agreement by the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union to
discuss the final location of Poland’s western border at a future peace conference and
there was no guarantee that a final resolution could be reached at all. It was the decisions
not made at Yalta that allowed the wild expulsions of spring and early summer of 1945 to
transpire as they did.187
Czechoslovakian President Edouard Beněs’s proposal to expel the Sudeten
German minority from that nation does not make him solely responsible for the largest
episode of ethnic cleansing in the twentieth-century.188 Beněs had three accomplices in
Josef Stalin, Winston Churchill and Franklin Delano Roosevelt.189 Stalin’s support of the
expulsion of Germans from Czechoslovakia and especially the new Polish territories is
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understandable, as was Churchill’s considering the geopolitical situation during and after
the war. But United States approval of the expulsion of Germans is both explicable and
inexplicable. It was explicable in that the expulsion of Germans was probably going to
happen whether the U.S. was involved or not and by being a part of the process the U.S.
had some control over when, where and how the expulsions were to take place but not
total control of the situation. United States approval of the expulsions was inexplicable
and it seemed as though the removal of large swaths of Germans from their historic
homelands countered the ideological base of morality and justice on which the United
States was founded upon and ran counter to why American soldiers were sent to Europe.
War and its immediate aftermath however, is a place where reality and ideology collide,
and the attainment of peace is more complex than the onset of war.
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CHAPTER IV
FROM WILD EXPULSIONS TO ALLIED SANCTIONED
ETHNIC CLEANSING

This chapter describes and examines the transition from the unorganized wild
expulsion of Germans from Czechoslovakia and the new Polish territories that began in
the spring of 1945 to the Allied-regulated expulsions that began in January 1946. The
most significant thing about the transition is that, despite the beginning of Allied
oversight of the expulsions and the orderly and humane decree contained in Article XIII
of the Potsdam Agreement the expulsions continued to be disorganized and brutal. The
Potsdam Agreement only improved the efficiency and decreased the brutality of the
expulsions to a limited extent. The post-Potsdam expulsion process continued to be
characterized by the inhumane destruction of deeply rooted distinct historical cultures in
the heart of Europe
The delayed decision on Poland’s final western border at Yalta provided the
Czechoslovakian and Polish Governments with a brief period in which both nations could
expel as many of their German minority populations as possible to present a future peace
conference with a fait accompli and prevent the Allies from stopping or regulating the
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expulsions.1 This first phase of the post-World War II population transfers lasted from
approximately May through August 1945 and became known as the period of wild
expulsions.2 On August 2, 1945 Article XIII of the Potsdam agreement declared that all
population transfers would henceforth be administered and regulated by the Allied
Control Council (ACC) and stipulated that all transfers be conducted in an orderly and
humane manner. Article XIII ushered in the second phase of population transfer, the
“organized expulsions” of early winter 1946 through 1947, and was followed by sporadic
expulsions that continued into the 1950s.3
The Wild Expulsions
Several months before the wild expulsion of the Sudeten German population of
Czechoslovakia began, Czechoslovakian President Edouard Beněs claimed “I have
discussed this matter with leaders of the Russian and British Governments, and I am
determined that these Germans must go.”4 Beněs was referring to the 2.8 million Sudeten
Germans who resided in Czechoslovakian territory. Even though he spoke of their
transfer from his nation in terms of legality, humanity and international cooperation the
chaotic conditions at the end of the war provided him with an opportunity to expel a large
portion of Czechoslovakia’s German minority before the United States and the Western
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Allies could react by implementing international guidelines and regulations for the
expulsion process. In Czechoslovakia the wild expulsions began after the capitulation of
the German army in spring of 1945 and continued through early August.5 During this
chaotic period, the Czechoslovakian government and independent organizations at the
local level such as military local branches of the Czech National Guard and county
administration offices issued deportation orders and random groups of Czech vigilantes,
with full support of the Soviet Union, and expelled approximately 750,000 Sudeten
Germans.6 Although the Western Allies did not approve unilateral expulsion of the
Sudeten Germans they did make it clear that they supported expulsion in accordance with
international guidance as approved at a peace conference.7
As the Soviet Army headed west toward Germany many Germans fled the
Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia fearing the worst whereas others decided to stay in a
stubborn refusal to leave their historical heimat.8 The disintegration of the German army
combined with the appearance of Soviet and United States troops created a “political void
in Prague” that contributed greatly to the ruthlessness and chaotic atmosphere in
Czechoslovakia.9 Even though the Beněs government arrived in Prague on May 13, 1945
to assume power, there was still no real central authority in Czechoslovakia in the spring
of 1945 and this vacuum was particularly evident in the Sudetenland.10 New
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Czechoslovakian authorities and patriotic organizations such as the Czechoslovak Army
(CSR), District National Committees, National Security Corps (NSB), and various
paramilitary groups, exerted control on the ground in the Sudetenland and “wanted
revenge on any Germans they could find.”11 Despite the fact that the Czechoslovak
government had power in name only at this point, President Beněs made it easier to expel
the Germans when he issued the Benes Decrees on May 19, 1945. These decrees stripped
the Sudeten Germans of their official minority standing in law and required them to wear
white armbands at all times to identify their place as outsiders in Czechoslovakian
society.12 The Sudeten Germans received smaller food rations, were forbidden to use
public communication, had restricted shopping rights, could not visit public places of
amusement, had their German language schools closed, and were subject to conscription
as laborers on farms and factories to repair “Czech infrastructure destroyed during the
war.”13 Already hated thanks to the brutal German occupation of Czechoslovakia, the
Sudeten Germans were no longer citizens of their own nation and no legal protections
remained to shield them from whatever atrocities might be meted out.
Most Czechoslovakians wanted the Sudeten Germans gone as quickly as possible,
which helps to explain the wild expulsions.14 They occurred under “very harsh
conditions” and those expelled from their homeland were only made aware of their fate a
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few hours before they were to be gathered for transport by train to the Soviet zone of
occupation.15 The only Sudeten Germans allowed to stay in Czechoslovakia were the few
who had acquired Czechoslovak citizenship or who could prove they had never
committed a crime against the Czechoslovakian people.16 As the wild expulsions
progressed all ethnic Germans were deemed collectively guilty for German acts of
brutality committed during the wartime occupation.17 Consequently “some local members
of the Czechoslovak Army” and members of “local revolutionary committees” planned
and ordered the removal of Germans from “towns and villages” in June and July of
1945.18 Conducted with brutal indifference the wild expulsions were accompanied by a
complete absence of mercy.19 While rounded-up for deportation many Germans were
randomly murdered. 20 Some were hung by their heels from trees, soaked with gasoline
and set on fire by their Czechoslovakian countrymen.21
Another method used to expel the Sudeten Germans was the use of death marches
such as the one that occurred on May 30, 1945, when the entire German population of
Brünn (Brno), which numbered approximately 30,000 people (all of the German citizens
of Brünn), were gathered by Czechoslovakian authorities and marched approximately
forty-five miles to makeshift camps located near the Austrian border where they awaited
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final expulsion.22 An estimated 1,700 Germans perished during various inhumane
marches from their historical homes into a future of harsh uncertainty.23 From the
moment the Sudeten Germans were forcibly removed from their homes they were subject
to seizure of property and personal belongings, vigilante and mob violence,
imprisonment, torture, starvation and rape in the case of women and young girls. 24
Martha Zatschek along with her daughter and father were expelled from their residence in
Brünn on May 30, 1945, when a group of seven men gave notification that they were to
leave immediately.25 After refusing to sign her property over to the Czechoslovakian
government Zatschek and her family were told not to bring along too much luggage as
they would be walking to their destination.26 Russian soldiers confiscated jewelry,
currency and other items of value during the march to Eichorngasse, where the expellee’s
certificates of domicile were processed.27 Upon departure from Eichorngasse the
expellees’ were urged to travel faster as the slow were beat with whips and machine gun
fire gave further warning to the slow afoot to pick up the pace.28 Strangely enough the
expellees were frequently searched for cameras during the trek that ended at a camp near
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Pohrlitz in order to keep pictures of the brutal ordeal from leaving Czechoslovakia.29
There was little food available at Pohrlitz and many of the elderly and young perished,
including Zatschek’s father.30 Eventually, Zatschek and her daughter were notified by
camp officials that they were to be sent to Austria where they had relatives.31 Those
without relatives in Austria were to be transported to the Soviet Union.32
Most shocking of all was that instead of accepting the fate of expulsion many
Sudeten Germans chose suicide after their property had been confiscated by Czech
authorities.33 Approximately 5,000 mass suicides occurred in towns and villages, and in
some agricultural areas, the suicides “were well planned affairs with Sudeten Germans
adorned in everyday dress, flowers and religious symbols” worn by those who chose to
take their lives rather than leave their home and face the uncertain fate of an expellee.34
As a police doctor in the area around the town of Brüx, Sudeten German Dr. Karl Grimm
estimated that there had been 600 to 700 suicides between May and August of 1945.35
Grimm performed inquests on the bodies of a number of those that committed suicide and
attributed the acts to a pre-expulsion “wave of panic fear, desperation and insanity” in
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response to the uncertainty of what was sure to be a cruel fate at the hands of the
Czechs.36
Witness to the wild expulsion was the United States Third Army commanded by
General George S. Patton, which had moved into the Czechoslovakian region of Bohemia
in late April 1945.37 By May 4, American forces had taken the Egerland but then halted
along the Karlsbad-Pilsen-Budweis line the farthest points east of the U.S. occupation.38
As a result, American forces only occupied the area of Southwest Bohemia because
Allied Commander Dwight D. Eisenhower wanted to avoid conflict with Soviet forces,
which occupied the rest of Czechoslovakia.39 American soldiers who entered Southwest
Czechoslovakia in late April of 1945 were an “indifferent well-disciplined force” that had
no opinion on Czech-Sudeten German relations.40 Once U.S. troops witnessed the
ruthless Czech treatment of the Sudeten Germans, however, they developed a negative
attitude toward “the liberated Czech people” and dropped their shield of “neutrality”
regarding Czech implementation of the wild expulsions.41 The Sudeten Germans called
on American troops to “intervene” in many instances during the brief occupation of

Ibid.
Alfred De Zayas, A Terrible Revenge: The Ethnic Cleansing of East-European
Germans, 1950-1944 (New Tork: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), 89.
38 Ibid.
39 The Ambassador in France (Caffrey) to the Secretary of State. May 6, 1945, in U.S.
Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945: Vol. IV, Europe,
(Washington, D.C: GPO. 1968), 447-448.
Http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.d1/FRUS.FRUSv04
40 Glassheim, “The Mechanics of Ethnic Cleansing,” 203-204.
41 de Zayas, After the Revenge, 90.
36
37

96

Bohemia.42 Nevertheless, not all Americans were sympathetic to the plight of the Sudeten
Germans Ambassador to Czechoslovakia Laurence A. Steinhardt criticized American
troops for being too friendly toward the Sudeten Germans.43 He asserted they were
protecting the Germans from Czech brutality, which was not the job of an American
soldier.44
Most American soldiers and diplomatic officials became disturbed at Czech
treatment of the Sudeten Germans that they witnessed as the wild expulsions gained a
cruel momentum.45 The Czechs on the other hand wanted the American military to leave
so that the Soviet Red Army would occupy Bohemia, which would mean that the Sudeten
Germans could lose their protection from acts of Czech viciousness.46 The United States
military did protect the Sudeten Germans from Czech violence but the American
occupation force also participated in the transport of Sudeten Germans into Germany and
Austria in an unofficial capacity.47 During a June 1-2, 1945 reparations conference held
between the Czechoslovakian Ministry for Protection of Labor and Social Welfare and
representatives of the United States Third Army, the Czech Government requested
American assistance in the transfer of 2,500 repatriates back to Czechoslovakia from
locations in Austria and Germany, and asked that the Americans carry Sudeten Germans
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with them on the return trip to Germany.48 Evidence of the American participation in the
actual expulsion of Sudeten Germans is contained in a June 17, 1945 Washington Post
article that reveals that the Fifth Corps of the United States Third Army had been
complicit in the removal of approximately 1,000 Germans per day from the Sudetenland
in Czechoslovakia.49 The Germans were transferred by the truckload to “points beyond
the Danube River” from where the trucks returned with Czech, Russian and Polish
occupants who had been selected for repatriation.50 Czech historian Tomas Stanek also
cites the involvement of United States forces in the deportation of Germans from
Czechoslovakia in June 1945 from the accounts of Czech military leaders.51
In fact, the role of American occupation forces in the transfer of Sudeten Germans
remained ambivalent. At the same time that some American troops were transporting
Germans out of Czechoslovakia others were preventing the transfer of Sudeten Germans
by blocking roads leading to Germany from the American occupied zone.52 The Third
Army closed these in order to prevent the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans from
creating operational difficulties for the U.S. military caring for Germans in Americanoccupied Germany.53 Ivo Ducháchek, private secretary to Hubert Ripka an influential
advisor of Edouard Benes, complained to Third Army officials about the road closures
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halting the expulsions, but the complaint was summarily ignored and the Sudeten
Germans enjoyed a brief respite.54 American military policy in the expulsion of Germans
was unauthorized, based upon the needs of the Army in relation to situations presented at
various locations throughout American-occupied Czechoslovakia, and was not inline with
any United States government policy, which had yet to be configured.
There was no official United States policy concerning the wild expulsions, which
is revealed by the words American Chargé d’ Affaires in Czechoslovakia Edward
Klieforth’s answer to the Chief of the Division of Central European Affairs James W.
Riddleburger’s inquiry into the course of United States action concerning the
expulsions.55 Klieforth reported to Riddleberger that because there was no international
agreement regarding the expulsion of Germans from the Sudetenland, nothing should be
done to stop them, and the United States would not act to deter the Czech objectives of
population transfer.56 Klieforth also emphasized that American leaders had made the
decision to wait until an internationally agreed policy had been implemented regarding
the expulsion of Germans from all of East-Central Europe not just Czechoslovakia.57 In
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July 1945, acting United States Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew told Klieforth that the
expulsion of Germans “should be carried out only on organized lines and in accordance
with an international agreement.”58 These instructions emanated from Director of the
Office of Strategic Services (OSS) William J. Donovan’s recommendation to the
president that the expulsion of Germans from Czechoslovakia would “best be dealt with
by the Allies in the form of a tripartite agreement.59 Donovan suggested that such an
agreement would be advantageous and would enable the Allies to “ease the stress” of the
transfers and eliminate many problems they would otherwise present.60
Czech vigilantes who now controlled the Sudetenland expelled approximately
660,000 Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia during the wild expulsions.61 According
to Benjamin Frommer, this ethnic cleansing of Sudeten Germans was “more violent and
lasted longer” than it should have.62 Frommer also explains that the wild expulsion of
Sudeten Germans was “not the result of the war” but rather the product of decisions made
and not made by Czechoslovak President Edouard Beněs.63 Although the Beněs
administration had taken over during a power vacuum he possessed the authority to speak
against the expulsions and implement measures that would have at least limited the
violence that accompanied them. Instead Beněs did and said nothing and by doing
nothing he basically gave approval to the “vigilante violence” utilized by Czechs as a
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“way to maximize the flight of the Sudeten Germans” out of Czechoslovakia so fewer
would have to be deported at a later time.64 It was the Benes government that “created
conditions for anarchy to spread” in the Sudetenland first by policy decisions made in
exile and later by the creation of the Beněs Decrees.65 In all fairness given the attitude of
the Czechoslovakian people toward Sudeten Germans and Germans in general. it is
highly likely that any government intervention to stop the violence and the expulsions
would not have worked and possibly would have caused the Benes government unwanted
problems at a time when its power was not fully established.
Change was the predominant dynamic in Czechoslovakia during the time of the
wild expulsions as the nation was in the process of transforming itself, under the direction
of Benes, “to a national state from a state of nationalities” through the expulsion of
Sudeten Germans and Hungarians.66 The removal of unwanted nationalities conducted by
the Czechoslovak Army and patriotic organizations, such as District National
Committees and the National Security Corps along with assistance from various
paramilitary groups and government officials at the local level faced no political
opposition within Czechoslovakia at the time because all of the six major parties
supported the expulsions.67 There was no opposition to the expulsions because the
political infrastructure of Czechoslovakia consisted of “a formal coalition of six major
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political parties (four Czech and two Slovak)” that included the Communist Party of
Czechoslovakia (KSC), Social Democratic Party (CSD), National Socialist Party (CSNS),
the People’s Party (CSL), Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS), and the Democratic Party
(DS) which was also a Slovakian party all of whom wanted the Germans removed from
Czechoslovakia.68
German historian Theodor Schieder, a former Nazi and author of the
Polendenkschrift memorandum that recommended the removal of minority populations in
Poland so as to achieve a racially pure Germanic state, asserts that even though “no
central authority” had been officially charged with implementation of the expulsion
process after the war, the wild expulsions of summer 1945 could not have been executed
“without the order and knowledge” of officials in the uppermost reaches of the
Czechoslovakian government.69 By allowing the wild expulsions to occur without formal
Czech government interference Benes got rid of an unwanted troublesome minority and
deferred the problem to the United States (and Great Britain).
Whereas Czechoslovakia’s wild expulsions were all about removing a
troublesome minority population from the country Poland’s wild expulsions were tied to
the final determination of the country’s western border. The parameters for Poland’s
border laid out at the Yalta Conference in February 1945, where the United States
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delegation that included President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR), made it clear that
the western border of Poland was to be one that would “minimize future points of
friction, possible irredentism” and reduce the number of “minority groups which would
have to be transferred” as a result of the border’s location.70 Going into Yalta the United
States favored the “Curzon Line in the north and center and in the south,” and the eastern
border of Lwów Province which was in line with the 1919 treaty.71 Stalin so disliked the
Curzon Line that he boldly stated: “I prefer the war to last a little longer and give Poland
compensation in the west at the expense of Germany.”72 British Prime Minister Winston
Churchill also opposed the western Neisse, which he knew would never be approved by
the British War Cabinet.73 Eventually, the three great powers agreed on the Curzon Line
as the eastern border of Poland and that the “final delimitation of the western frontier of
Poland” would be decided at a future peace conference.74
According to historian Debra Allen the United States delegation to the Yalta
Conference, which consisted of presidential advisers and State Department officials,
dedicated many hours of preparation to the position of Poland’s western border prior to
the conference.75 But once the conference was underway, early talk between the
American, British and Russian delegations veered primarily toward the composition of
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Poland’s postwar government and other matters.76 The base agreement at Yalta referred
only to the postwar Polish Government and contained “no mention of boundaries, a
deletion that was pointed out by Churchill.77 Both Churchill and Stalin thought “Poland’s
frontiers should be included in the communiqué” a suggestion that Roosevelt, who had a
nonchalant attitude toward the border issue, opposed but eventually acquiesced to in the
spirit of cooperation and unity78 Before issues such as border location could be
approached, the Allies agreed to establish a provisional government to be called the
Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, charged with holding free elections
based on the concept of “universal suffrage and secret ballot.”79 The agreement also
declared that Poland was to receive ample territory in the north and west and the final
delineation of Poland’s border was to be discussed at a future peace conference.80
Theodor Schieder explains that the decision to expel Germans after the war was a
“subsidiary” product of the Yalta negotiations, which focused more on the political
makeup of the Polish government than the location of Poland’s western border.81 The
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removal of Germans from the new Polish territories seemed to the participants at Yalta to
be a harmless and by no a means inhuman exchange or transfer of population.”82
Schieder also explains that the expulsions became inevitable at Yalta and thus set the
stage for the reorganization of the “political and ethnographic” structure of East-Central
Europe.83
In the months following the Yalta Conference Polish leaders jumped into an
“immediate reaction” to “purify” the border area and all of the newly acquired territories
of the much-hated Germans.84 The Polish Worker’s Party (PPR) made it clear on May 26,
1945 that it was in favor of all Germans being removed from the new “Western
territories” and party official Edward Ochab subsequently stated “we need to think how
we will expel these 2,000,000 to 2,500,000 Germans” from the newly acquired
territories.85 Local and regional government officials in Poland supported the removal of
Germans from the western territories, which was reinforced by remarks made by the
Governor of Upper Silesia, Aleksander Zawodzki who declared “we will drive this little
herd to the other bank of the Oder.”86 The proposed expulsion of Germans received
fervent support from former Prime Minister of the Polish Government-in-exile Stanislaw
Mikolajczyk who would go on to be a Deputy Prime Minister in the postwar Polish
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Government of National Unity.87 Mikolajczyk spoke very aggressively and militantly
about the need for Poland to make ridding itself of a cruel, nasty and unwanted German
population from the new western territories a “national act” for the preservation of the
Polish nation.88
The Polish Army functioned as an impetus for Germans to “voluntarily flee” the
new Polish territories.89 Commander of the Polish Army Naczelne Dowództwo Wojska
Polskiego issued an order to Polish soldiers that demanded that the “Germans should be
dealt with in the same way they treated us” and suggested that no Pole should ever forget
“what the Germans have done to our children, wives, and elderly.”90 As in
Czechoslovakia, in Poland the period May through July 1945 was “a time of great flux
and uncertainty” that heavily influenced “the Potsdam decision on transfers from EastCentral Europe.”91 Before a peace conference could occur the Poles were determined to
rid the new territories of as many Germans as they could so as to create a fait accompli
before the Allies could get involved and administer and control the process as part of an
international peace agreement.92 The period of the wild expulsions in Poland witnessed
the ruthless and violent rape of German women as a method of revenge against the
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Germans for war crimes committed against Poles under the Nazi occupation.93 As was
the case of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union supported the wild expulsions and received
a large number of expellees into their zone of occupation in Germany.94
From May through June 26, 1945, approximately 10,000 to 40,000 Germans a day
were expelled from the new western territories of Poland along the Oder-Neisse Line,
primarily from Brandenburg, Danzig, Silesia, Pomerania and East Prussia.95 Germans in
these areas had resided there for hundreds of years and it was very difficult for them to
grasp the reality that they were to be expelled from their historic homeland forever.96
When the time for expulsion came Polish officials gave the Germans only minutes to
gather personal belongings and allowed them to carry only twenty kilograms (44 lbs.) of
luggage.97 The process varied from region to region and even from town to town because
these expulsions were improvised by local and military officials.98 In the newly acquired
territories the Second Polish Army did most of the dirty work “in accordance with the
Ministry of Public Administration” which oversaw the expulsions in a very disorganized
way.99 In Silesia Germans were expelled by armed escorts and many Germans
disappeared during the process of expulsion.100 In Neumarkt a town located west of
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Breslau, the Polish militia tore down doors and told the Germans to be prepared to leave
within two hours, and the victims were then taken on a long march and abandoned by
their military escort.101
Three characteristics of the wild expulsion of Germans from the newly acquired
Polish territories are of note. First, even before the convening of the Potsdam Conference,
the new Polish leaders of the former German territories possessed a steely resolve to
expel Germans as expediently as possible by utilizing “systematic pressure and repeated
demand” along with military force.102 Second, the expulsions were unorganized and truly
wild and violent in nature. Finally, the Polish wild expulsions were much less well
documented by governmental agencies of the Western Allies than the expulsion of
Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia. As a result, the final total of Germans expelled
by Poland from the new territories during the wild expulsions is unknown because no
official statistics were compiled by any of the parties involved or those who monitored
the situation from a distance such as the United States and Great Britain.103 Historian
Stanislaw Jankowiak notes that Polish researchers assert some 200,000 to 1,300,000
Germans were expelled from the New Polish territories whereas a German study claims
approximately 250,000 Germans were expelled by the Poles.104 The only certainty is that
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there are no definitive numbers on how many Germans were expelled. European
historians still hotly debate the total number of Germans expelled in the summer of 1945.
The Poles’ modus operandi was identical to the Czechs’ in that they were all
about revenge against the Germans for what had been done to Poland during the
occupation and ridding it of Germans in order to make Poland a homogenous nation
before the Allies could react. There was however one striking difference between the
Czech and Polish cases, which was that the American military occupied the region of
Southwest Bohemia in Czechoslovakia, but there was no U.S. presence whatsoever inside
Poland during this process. Despite being occupied by the Nazis for the duration of the
war, Czechoslovakia emerged intact without any loss of territory. With no outside
interference in the spring and summer of 1945, and the wild expulsion of Germans “over
fulfilled expectations of Polish authorities by allowing them to rid Poland of more
Germans than they thought realistically possible.”105
The Quest for Order
The atmosphere at the July-August Potsdam Conference was quite different than
it had been at the Yalta Conference in February 1945. Unlike Yalta Potsdam focused on
the intertwined issues of “Poland’s western border and the treatment of Germany.106
Harry S. Truman was now President of the United States, Germany had capitulated and
the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity had been instituted.107 Thus

Curp, A Clean Sweep? The Politics of Ethnic Cleansing in Western Polands19451950, 53.
106 Allen, The Oder-Neisse Line, 21.
107 Ibid.
105

109

“differences among the Allies that had been ignored became more and more evident” at
the onset of the Potsdam Conference.108 These differences were enhanced by the Soviet
Union’s placing German lands that were to be part of the Soviet Zone of Occupation
under Polish administration, which was done out of “military necessity” and justified by
the Soviets under the addendum of the Yalta Accord pertaining to the Polish acquisition
of German territory.109
Going into the Potsdam Conference the main objective of the United States was to
“avoid decisions on territorial issues” and defer them for discussion at future peace
conference.110 Whereas Great Britain preferred to deal with territorial questions at
Potsdam, the United States wanted to delay territorial discussion and pursue “joint
policies for the conduct of the war in the Far East and to foster preparations for a peace
conference.”111 However, the placing of German territory in East Prussia up to the OderNeisse line and the Free City of Danzig under Polish administration by the Soviet Union
forced the United States and Great Britain to deal with territorial issues at Potsdam.112
The U.S. delegation believed that the Soviet transfer of territory to Poland was an
“infringement” of the Yalta Accord and the Allied agreement pertaining to Germany.113
By adding such a large swath of “German territory” to Poland “the transfer of some”

Ibid.
Ibid.
110 Herbert Feis, Between War and Peace: The Potsdam Conference (Princeton:
Princeton University press, 1960), 155-156.
111 Ibid, 156.
112 Briefing Book Paper, Suggested United States Policy Regarding Poland, FRUS
1945, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), I: 743.
113 Ibid, 743-744.
108
109

110

8,000,000 to 10,000,000 Germans became a real possibility, but more importantly,
Poland would become dependent on the Soviet Union “for protection against German
irredentist demands and in fact might become a full-fledged Soviet satellite.”114
New American Secretary of State James F. Byrnes wanted to implement measures
at Potsdam that would slow the transfers so as to make them less haphazard and violent in
nature.115 Byrnes was a pragmatist and realized that the expulsion of Germans was never
going to be halted completely but could at least be monitored by the Allies so that the
focus of the Czechs and Poles would be on the expulsion the Germans, not the pursuit of
revenge for war atrocities committed by the Nazis.116 Soviet leader Josef Stalin
represented the Czechoslovakian and Polish governments at Potsdam and explained to
the United States and Great Britain that the expulsions were a fait accompli and the
Czechoslovaks and the Poles were “powerless to stop them.”117 On July 25, 1945, Stalin
proposed the Oder-Neisse Line be set as the permanent position of Poland’s western
border, which would effectively cede East Prussia, Upper Silesia, the Free City of Danzig
and Pomerania to Poland as compensation for suffering and territory lost in the east to the
Soviet Union during the war.118 Stalin preferred the Oder-Neisse Line because it would
reduce the size of Germany and increase the buffer between Germany and the Soviet
Union. Stalin so influenced Poland’s new government that Poland and the Soviet Union

Ibid, 743-744.
Curp, A Clean Sweep? 53
116 Ibid.
117 Luza, The Transfer of the Sudeten Germans: 279.
118 Debra Allen, The Oder-Neisse Line: The United States, Poland, and Germany in the
Cold War (Westport: Praeger, 2003), 22.
114
115

111

were basically two nations run by a common leader during the early postwar years.
Internally Soviet and Polish leaders knew that they had to rid the newly acquired
territories of their German minority population and replace them with Polish citizens, an
act that would strengthen Poland by shedding itself of a loathed and troublesome
population making Poland an ethnically homogenous state.119
The Soviet Union wanted Poland’s western border to extend to the Oder-Neisse
line in part so the Poles would more easily accept the loss of territory in the east.120
United States officials desired a “less radical solution,” one that focused on achieving
“permanent peace and tranquility in Europe.”121 In order to achieve this the U.S. State
Department pursued a strategy at Potsdam that recommended Poland be awarded the Free
City of Danzig, most of East Prussia, a small portion of German Pomerania “west of the
so-called Polish Corridor” so that Poland would possess a larger sea coast and the
predominantly Polish region of Upper Silesia122 This would decrease the geographical
size of Poland and also minimize the number of Germans that would need to be
transferred.123 The Western Allies opposed the Oder-Neisse line and proposed that the
Western border of Poland extend to the Oder River and no further because there was no
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“historic or ethnic justification for the cession of this area to Poland” and it would create
geopolitical, economic and demographic problems.124

Figure 2

The Oder Neisse Line125

It was imperative for the State Department that the United States and Great
Britain present a united front on the boundary issue so that they did not “work for cross
purposes” and in order to prevent the Soviets presenting them with a fait accompli on
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Poland’s western border.126 But above all, the U.S. did not want to “acquiesce to the
Soviet interpretation” of Poland’s western boundary, which included the area between the
Oder and Neisse rivers, and if a final border solution was to obtained the U.S. would
assist the Poles in the orderly transfer of their German minority.127 However, a final
solution concerning Poland’s western border was neither expected or desired by the
United States, which wanted the border issue to be decided at a future peace
conference128 Therefore the big accomplishment at Potsdam was that the Oder-Neisse
line became the temporary western border of Poland because the Soviet Union, United
States and Great Britain agreed to reaffirm their opinion that the final position of the
western frontier of Poland should await a peace settlement.129 Even though the United
States and Great Britain did not recognize the Oder-Neisse line as the official western
border of Poland they did agree to allow the Poles to transfer the German population out
of its newly acquired western territories.130
Although the United States was wary of the Soviet Union at the time American
officials realized that allowing the expulsions to occur was a “satisfactory compromise”
to a “chaotic” situation in regions where the United States had no physical control.131 In
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the grand scheme of things United States postwar policy toward the expulsion of
Germans from Czechoslovakia, Poland and elsewhere was of minimal importance. World
War II had been a global war for the United States (and Great Britain) and after emerging
from the war as one of the two great world powers (the other being the Soviet Union) the
United States had more than just the fate of Germans in East-Central Europe on its plate.
As the strongest military and economic postwar western ally the United States had
assumed by default the responsibility for rebuilding the infrastructure and the feeding and
housing the refugees of most of Europe. Obviously the expulsion of Germans from
Czechoslovakia and Poland was just one of many policy challenges that faced the United
States after World War II. Under no circumstances was the United States about to risk
offending the Soviet Union to defend the homes of Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia
and Germans of Poland’s newly acquired western territories because there was no sound
strategic reason to do so.
Another factor that contributed to the Western Allies acquiescence to the
expulsion of Germans from Czechoslovakia and the new Polish territories was that the
United States and Great Britain underestimated how many Germans were to be expelled,
especially from Poland.132 American sources had informed President Truman that
approximately 9,000,000 Germans were located in the Oder-Neisse region to be
administered by Poland.133 Stalin explained at Potsdam that a large number of Germans
east of the Oder-Neisse had died or been killed during the war and as a result there were
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no Germans present in the new Polish territory.134 Polish delegates to the Potsdam
Conference estimated approximately 1,500,000 Germans remained in the Oder-Neisse
region and further explained that they were not permanent residents and would be leaving
the area after the fall harvest.135
When it came to the number of Germans left in the new Polish territories in the
Oder-Neisse region, the Western Allies were at the mercy of the Soviet Union and Poland
who used misinformation “subterfuge and fraudulent measures” during the Potsdam
negotiations over the expulsions.136 Such a negotiation strategy was pursued by the
Soviets and the Poles because they wanted the Germans gone and feared the Western
Allies might refuse to allow the expulsions if they knew exactly how many Germans
were to be expelled.137 Having been deceived by the Soviets and Poles, the United States
(and Great Britain) agreed to the expulsions and assumed responsibility to prevent
“crowding and starvation” during the expulsion process by the “feeding and housing” of
expellees once they arrived in Germany.138 What resulted from the negotiations between
the Soviet Union and the Western Allies was Article XIII of the Potsdam Agreement of
August 2, 1945, which allowed for the orderly and humane transfer of Germans from
Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary, but more importantly it placed the expulsion
process under international administration and regulation.139 One stipulation of Article

134
135

Ibid.
Ibid.

Ibid, 87.
Ibid.
138 Ibid.
139 Schechtman, European Population Transfers, 1945-1955: 75.
116
136
137

XIII was the agreement of Czechoslovakia and Poland to halt the expulsions until the
Allied Control Council could implement “time and ration ordinates” that would schedule
the transport and distribution of the expellees in the Allied zones of occupation in
Germany.140
Article XIII of the Potsdam agreement pertaining to The Orderly Transfer of
Germans stated that after much consultation the Allies had decided to recognize the
transfer of the German populations of the Governments of Poland and Czechoslovakia to
the various Allied zones of occupation.141 However, any transfers were to be conducted
in and orderly and humane manner.142 The remainder of Article XIII called for the Allied
Control council to valuate the situation and put forth specifications for the time, rate and
distribution of the transfers in a way that would lessen the economic and logistical burden
facing the Allies in Germany.143
For the United States and Great Britain, Article XIII was intended to establish
some sense of order to an expulsion process which was a much more appealing solution
to the German minority problem than the most probable alternatives, uncontrollable
chaos or a probable war against the USSR and Poland, a decision the United States
“refused to consider after years of fighting a common enemy together.”144 In effect
Article XIII legitimized the expulsions that prior to Potsdam were performed with no
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legal basis or consideration as to how such expulsions would impact the European
demographic and political landscape.145 Utilization of the Allied Control Council to
schedule and regulate the expulsions made the process an “international undertaking.”146
More importantly, the legitimacy given to Article XIII by the Western Allies gave the act
of population transfer by forced expulsion a “certain mantle of legality and
respectability” to what was in reality ethnic cleansing.147 Legality to the Western Allies
meant that Czechoslovakia and Poland knew that their “treatment and ultimate
expulsion” of their German minorities had to abide by international rules and
regulations.148
Somewhat Orderly and Somewhat Humane
Article XIII of the Potsdam agreement required the expulsion of Germans by
Czechoslovakia and Polish governments be halted until the ACC could find logistical
solutions that would assist in making the expulsions as orderly and humane as possible.
Officially the Czechs agreed to stop the expulsions until the ACC presented its plan for
the expulsions but that failed to stop the inhumane treatment of the Sudeten Germans.149
Czech cruelty continued as it had during the period of wild expulsions but on a smaller
scale.150 By allowing the disorganized expulsions to occur during the dead period
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prescribed by Article XIII the Czechoslovakian government violated the agreement.151
The Czechs expelled Germans without allowing the ACC time to evaluate the situation
and obtain information, such as the number of Germans to be transferred, their age, sex
and occupation of which would aid in smoothing the expulsion process and safeguarding
the expellees.152 American officials knew that the continuation of “certain transfers was
unavoidable” but feared unregulated expulsions by the Czechs during the dead period
could possibly spur further unregulated expulsions throughout Czechoslovakia and
Poland.153 Subsequently, Allied Commander Dwight D. Eisenhower ordered Geneeral
Ernest Harmon’s XII Corps in the Sudetenlad to protect Germans there and to ensure that
the Czechs behaved in the manner intended by the Western Allies under Article XIII.154
Altogether, General George S. Patton commanded two divisions of the United
States troops (approximately 30,000 men) in the Sudetenland and Eisenhower ordered
them to protect the Sudeten Germans from Czech aggression during the moratorium on
the expulsions. But this was temporary measure because there was no permanent
commitment by the United States to stay in the Sudetenland until all Germans had been
transferred.155 Welcomed by the Germans, American troops were not quite as popular
with Czech citizens who could not understand why American troops were sympathetic to
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the Germans.156 The main reason for American troops’ sympathy can be explained by the
fact that individual American soldiers knew nothing of the tumultuous historical context
of Czechoslovak/Sudeten German relations and were witness only to the postwar
mistreatment of Germans by the Czechs.157 They had not been present during the war to
observe the cruel treatment of Czechoslovakians by their Nazi occupiers.158 What
American troops witnessed during the Allied occupation of Bohemia was the
Czechoslovakian government and citizens exacting revenge against all Germans not just
those who were actually guilty of committing war crimes against Czechoslovakians.
United States military personnel witnessed the ugly reality of expulsion. The
German population of Czech villages being had to present themselves “at a given
meeting place” after having been evicted from their homes by force and were then
typically “stripped of possessions and beaten” if they defied orders.159 Such scenarios
were so widespread throughout United States occupied Czechoslovakia that American
military and diplomatic officials such as United States Political Adviser for Germany
Robert D. Murphy were fearful that after having witnessed such acts American soldiers
would develop a severe anger and even hatred of Czechoslovakian citizens that would
possibly result in violent acts by American soldiers against the Czech people.160 To the
average soldier of the United States Army the treatment received by the Czechs from the
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Germans during the war did not justify the acts of revenge the Czechs had been exacting
against the Sudeten Germans since the war ended.
Relations between Czechoslovakians and American soldiers were further strained
due to the presence of Soviet forces, which occupied most of the nation and supported the
Czechs in any measures they chose to take against the Sudeten Germans. As a result the
American military had very limited influence over the Czechoslovakian government and
military.161 Rather, American soldiers were more socially interactive with the Sudeten
Germans than they were with the Czechoslovakian people. Relationships between
American soldiers and Sudeten German women were common and such relationships
were approved and sought after by families of German women as a means to procure
provisions and physical security.162 Good relations between the Sudeten Germans and the
American military were essential to the Germans because American soldiers were the
only protection the Sudeten Germans had against Czech acts of revenge against unarmed
men, women, children and the elderly.163 Firsthand accounts of random expulsions and
the horrid treatment of the Sudeten Germans at the hands of the Czechs during the dead
period led American officials to accuse the Czechoslovakian government of violating
Article XIII and executing the expulsions in an “undignified and intolerable manner.”164
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Czech President Eduoard Beněs argued that to compare the Czech treatment of the
Sudeten Germans to the actions of the Nazis toward the Czechs during the war was a slap
in the face that suggested the Czechs were “unworthy of our national tradition.”165 Benes
went on to insist that “the Sudeten Germans must go into the Reich and they will go there
whatever happens.”166
There is no doubt that Czech policy and subsequent actions toward the Sudeten
Germans during the “dead period” of expulsions was inhumane and brutal just as it had
been during the wild expulsions. Not as brutal as the Czech policy, but perplexing
nonetheless, was the policy of the United States Army that occupied Southwestern
Czechoslovakia. American soldiers had been ordered to protect Sudeten Germans from
acts of Czech violence and yet they were instructed to assist the expulsion of the Sudeten
Germans. According to Dwight D. Eisenhower the Commanding General of United
States Forces, European Theatre (USFET), American troops were to protect the Sudeten
Germans from “Czech aggression” but ensure the “orderly evacuations” and to prevent
Soviet troops from entering the United States Zone of Occupation. 167 As mentioned
earlier United States officials knew some expulsions would occur during the dead period
of late 1945 and it was never the intention of the U.S. to halt the expulsions but to
“slowdown indiscriminate and disorderly expulsions and avoid unnecessary hardships on
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the transferees” while protecting the zones of occupation from unexpected burdens as
established in the Potsdam Agreement.168
Nowhere did hatred of the Germans run deeper after the war than in Poland and
that hatred drove the Polish government and people to expel the Germans from Polishclaimed land as soon as possible. One problem that presented itself during the dead
period on expulsions was that Poland needed Germans to work in order to keep the Polish
economy running.169 Despite the desire to create a “Poland for the Poles,” Polish
authorities retained some Germans for short-term labor needs, but Polish officials knew
that in order for Poland to be a safe and secure nation all Germans eventually had to be
expelled from the newly acquired territories.170 The dead period171 of August through
December 1945 saw the inhumanity towards the Germans continue in Poland.172 The
Polish government confiscated property in conjunction with a plan to train Poles from
eastern Poland who were to be resettled to the new territories in the west for jobs
formerly performed by Germans so that the Germans could be removed for good.173
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Up to 7,000,000 Poles migrated west to the newly acquired territories in Upper
and Middle Silesia and West Pomerania where small family farms and large Junker
estates were available.174 As the migrant Poles moved in “in search of homes and
farmsteads” many Germans attempted to leave Polish territory but were forced to await
expulsion at railroad terminals or retention camps.175 Despite Article XIII, Germans
continued to beexpelled from Poland during the designated dead period, with the Poles
attempting to disguise the expulsions as “voluntary departures.”176 In the moments prior
to deportation by train Germans were “forced to sign a voluntary statement in Polish” that
transferred all property to the Polish government.177 In early October 1945 German
authorities requested that the ACC use its power to halt German migration west of the
Oder-Neisse line.178 German welfare officials feared the influx of approximately
4,500,000 expellees from Germany’s lost eastern region into an area where there were
already 10,000,000 to 12,000,000 refugees who had fled from the Soviet Zone of
Occupation.179 Those same German welfare officials suggested that migration west
should only continue if each migrant were certified by the ACC.180 Subsequently the
ACC “requested Poland to quit evicting German nationals until a population settlement
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program” as declared by Article XIII could be formulated and implemented.181 Such
demands did nothing to temper the expulsion of Germans from the new Polish territories,
and neither the Polish government nor the Polish people felt any sympathy toward the
Germans who were getting a taste of what they had served up to Poland during six long
years of occupation.182
For the United States, Poland was much different than Czechoslovakia during the
dead period. Whereas the United States had an army of occupation stationed in
southwestern Czechoslovakia that provided political leaders and diplomats with detailed
firsthand intelligence, there was no American presence in Poland to monitor the situation.
Nor were they able to obtain information on Polish treatment of Germans from the OSS,
which was unable to get agents in on the ground in Poland.183 With little to no accurate
information concerning the treatment of Germans by the Poles it was difficult for United
States officials to grasp the reality of the situation inside the newly acquired Polish
territories. Secretary of State Byrnes informed United States Ambassador to Poland
Arthur Bliss Lane of his concern over the Polish transfer of Germans from east of the
Oder-Neisse line in violation of the Potsdam prescribed dead period on transfers.184
Byrnes conveyed to Lane that the United States Government “has been seriously
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perturbed by reports of continued mass movements of German refugees who appear to
have entered Germany from areas east of the Oder-Neisse line.”185 Details of the various
transfers were sketchy but they were eerily similar to what had happened to Germans
expelled during the wild expulsions.186 Once removed from their homes the Germans
were allowed to carry what property they could secure by hand, but it was a struggle
because most of the expellees were women, children and the elderly most of whom were
physically unable to carry large loads of personal possessions and those that did were
robbed of them during the trip west.187 Upon arrival in Germany the expellees were
exhausted, many had taken ill along the journey and had contacted contagious diseases.188
American officials were incensed because the transfers violated the dead period set aside
by Article XIII and if they continued the “uncontrollable transfers” could hamper the
effectiveness of the implementation of schedules and regulations put in place by the
ACC.189
The United States Political Advisor to Germany Robert Murphy feared that by
allowing the transfers to continue the United States could become “party to an act” that
caused “large scale human suffering.”190 Murphy was also aware that asking the Poles to
discontinue the expulsions of Germans risked the United States looking as if it were
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taking a soft stance on how Germany and the German people should be punished for their
wartime deeds.191 Although Murphy opposed continuing the transfers in violation of the
Potsdam agreement he was concerned that the agreement itself violated established
“United States standards of behavior” and further suggested that if the United States
allowed compromise on certain principles it may be too easy to sacrifice our own people
and severely damage the American way of life.192 American Ambassador to Poland Lane
disagreed. Based on research compiled by his embassy Lane was skeptical of accounts of
Poland’s ill treatment of Germans.193 Lane admitted that there had been some suffering
early in the expulsion process when the Germans were first evicted from their homes but
as the expulsions process wore on there was basically little to no suffering and the
expellees were even provided the opportunity to get food during their journey.194 After
observing the Germans during a trip to Warsaw on September 21, 1945, Eisenhower
opined that the Germans were not being badly treated in the overall scheme of things in
light of the damage that the German military had inflicted upon Warsaw and the rest of
Poland.195
Secretary of State Byrnes ordered Ambassador Lane to explain to the Poles that
the United States deeply understood what the Poles had suffered at the hands of the
Germans during the war and that it was in the best interests of the United States to make
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sure that the details of Article XIII were carried out in an orderly and humane manner in
the spirit in which it was adopted.196 United States officials intended to do little more than
talk sternly to the Poles or the Czechs regarding violations of the dead period of transfers
and the inhumane treatment of Germans. In fact, the United States was in a position to do
nothing but talk to the Czechs and Poles about their dead period violations because the
Germans of East-Central Europe were just one of many problem pieces of the postwar
puzzle for United States officials in Europe and Asia.
Article XIII declared all transfers be discontinued until the ACC could establish
an efficient schedule that included load limits and health and safety regulations so that the
transfers could continue in an orderly and humane manner. American policy was based
on the idea of orderly and humane and the intent of all nations involved to follow Article
XIII to the greatest detail. Of course the Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia
interpreted Potsdam differently and allowed Germans to be expelled during the dead
period despite the ban stipulated by Article XIII. Ambassador Lane wrote to Secretary of
State Byrnes that “reports of ill treatment” of Germans in western Poland had been
refuted by members of his staff who had traveled through there, and credited such reports
to the Germans themselves whom he accused of being whiners upset because they had
lost the war.197 Lane opposed any cruel treatment of the Germans by the Poles, but
thought it “understandable” in light of the “systematic destruction of Warsaw” and the
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barbaric Nazi occupation, that the “Poles have not handled the Germans with kid
gloves.”198 That said, Lane went on to recognize that Poland was bound to the Potsdam
Protocol, but asked Byrnes to allow him to “confine” criticism of Poland’s “alleged
mistreatment of Germans to an oral statement” for it would convey a lack of
understanding by the United States for the inhumanity inflicted upon the Poles by the
Germans.199 Secretary Byrnes approved the idea of an oral statement from Lane to the
Poles regarding the transfer of Germans but asked Lane to clarify that such a message
was not a “lack of appreciation of what the Poles have suffered at the hands of Germans,”
and that the statement was made to encourage Polish adherence to Article XIII of the
Potsdam Agreement and “the spirit in which it was adopted.”200An oral statement critical
of Polish actions was preferable because it would avoid offending Poland or the Soviet
Union publicly.201
Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, ethnic conflict consultant for Lerner Publications,
acknowledges that even though the population transfers are painful to the evicted party,
transfers solve problems when other possible solutions have failed to work.202 Population
transfers “separate combatants, stabilize the situation, prevent future outbreaks of
violence and they promote regional peace.”203 For the United States not to pursue an
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international solution to the German minority question of East-Central Europe would
have exposed “millions of people and their children to unnecessary suffering in the
generations to come.”204 By adopting population transfers as a solution to the German
minority question the United States successfully played both sides as the Czechs and
Poles (with assistance from the Russians) got rid of the Germans and the United States
was able to implement the least complicated and most convenient of all possible solutions
available that would allow American officials to focus on other postwar issues that were
deemed more important to American and European security and prosperity. Yet by
allowing the expulsion of the German minority of East-Central Europe the United States
also participated in the continuation of Hitler’s racial policies by allowing ethnic
cleansing to occur.
Planned Chaos
On November 17, 1945, after nearly three months of meetings and negotiations
the Allied Control Council revealed its “Plan for the Transfer of German Populations”
into the four occupied zones of Germany.”205 In actuality the Prisoner of War and
Displaced Person Directorate submitted the plan to the Coordinating Committee for
approval at their twenty-first meeting held on November 16, 1945.206 The ACC plan was
to oversee the transfer of the entire German population of Poland and some 3,500,000
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other Germans who were to be transferred to the Soviet and British zones of
occupation.207 The total German population of Czechoslovakia, some 3,150,000 persons
were to be moved from Czechoslovakia, Austria and Hungary to the American, French
and Soviet Zones of Occupation.208 Tentatively, the plan stipulated 2,000,000 Germans
from the Polish territories and 750,000 Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia were to
be transferred to the Soviet Zone.209 The British Zone agreed to accept 1,500,000
Germans from the newly recovered territory of Poland and the American Zone of
Occupation was to accommodate 1,750,000 Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia and
500,000 Germans from Hungary.210 The French Zone of Occupation also agreed to accept
500,000 Germans from Austria with the actual entrance of the transferees into the French
zone not to start until April 1946.211 The transfers had been originally scheduled to begin
in December 1945 when 10% of the Germans from each nation would be sent to their
assigned zone of occupation.212 In early 1946 the expulsion of Germans would continue
at the following levels: 5% in January/February; 15% in March; 15% in April; 20% in
May; 20% in June; and 10% in July.213 Included in the plan was a stipulation that
declared changes could be made due to severe weather or transport emergencies.214 The
plan also provided that once more information had been gathered “about the quantity of
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population transferred” the transfers could be halted and rescheduled so as to make the
transfer process more logistically feasible.215
The ACC intended that the organized expulsions from the Sudetenland of
Czechoslovakia and the newly recovered Polish Territories would begin in December
1945 and be completed by August 1946.216 The expulsions were unanimously supported
by Czechoslovakia and Poland and were seen by the people of those nations and the
United States, Great Britain and Soviet Union as a convenient “strategic, historic and
economic agreement” that solved the German minority question and created economic
opportunity for Czechs and Poles.217 Neither Czechoslovakia nor Poland wanted the
Germans within their respective borders, and anti-German sentiment combined with the
“desire of the new postwar governments to secure their nations by making them
ethnically homogenous” for the welfare and protection of the “dominant nationality” or
nationalities created an enthusiasm for the removal of Germans.218
To say the expulsion of Germans from Czechoslovakian and Polish lands were a
convenient, efficient and peaceful solution to the German minority problem is
misleading. While the expulsion of Germans was the most workable approach for all
nations involved, there was also a strong possibility that the arrival of millions of
expellees in Germany could cause as many problems as it fixed. For Czechoslovakia and
Poland the expulsions were a win-win situation but for the United States the expulsions
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presented many problems. A 1946 study conducted by the ACC concluded that the influx
of expellees into to Germany would create a demographic nightmare that would impact
Europe and the world in a negative manner.219 The ACC harbored fears that the large
number of expellees residing in Germany would be looking back to their homelands and
become a source of constant political tension, presenting a constant threat to a prolonged
European and world peace for many years.220 Another problem was that upon arrival in
Germany the expellees had to be bathed, fed, processed, placed in holding and then
provided with permanent housing and employment by the United States and the other
Allies in their zones of occupation.221 Most problematic of all for the United States and
the nations of the ACC was that millions of expellees were to arrive and permanently
reside in Germany, a nation that saw its agricultural resources greatly reduced by the
cession of land to Poland east of the Oder-Neisse line.222 As the world’s great economic
power, it was the responsibility of the United States to feed a large portion of the world
that could not feed itself after World War II, and the expulsions along with combined the
loss of arable land presented many possible problems to American officials.
The expulsions that were to begin in January 1946 were no different than the wild
expulsions of spring/summer 1945 as both were acts of ethnic cleansing. During the dead
period in January 1946, unnamed United States Occupation leaders met with Czech
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Government officials in Prague on January 8-9, 1946 and rescheduled the beginning of
the expulsions for later that month.223 It was agreed that the expellees would be
transported in heated rail cars and families to be allowed to travel together as family
units.224 In addition, Czech officials would provide the expellees with enough food to last
the trip to Germany and agreed to allow the expellees to take thirty to fifty kilograms of
personal property and one hundred Reichsmarks with them.225 Czech officials would
make available to United States Occupation officials weekly schedules of expellee
shipments that contained the time of expellee train arrival, the number of expellees
aboard each railroad car and documentation for each individual expellee who arrived in
Germany.226 Once these last details were taken care of and the weather improved in late
January 1946 the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans of Czechoslovakia resumed.
On January 25, 1946 the first transports of expellees left for the United States
Zone of Occupation.227 The first official trainload left from Mariankse Lazne,
Czechoslovakia and contained 295 men, 700 women and 214 children.228 From January
1, 1946, until February 2, 1946 two trains of expellees arrived in the American zone each
day until April 1946 when the number increased to four trains a day, with the exception
of Sunday.229 Dr. Karl Grimm a German who served as a police doctor for the
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Czechoslovakians in the town of Brüx from May to July of 1945, where he witnessed the
wild expulsions firsthand, including the suicidal deaths of acquaintances who could not
deal with the reality of the coming expulsion process. After being arrested on August 1,
1945, by Czech officials Grimm was first sent to an evacuation camp at Nieder
Georgenthal and then transferred to a punishment facility near Striemitz where he stayed
for approximately a year.230 When time came for him to be expelled, Grimm was
transferred back to the evacuation camp at Nieder Georgenthal.231
Grimm noted that the expellees arrived at the camp aboard large trucks from cities
and towns or by horse and cart from rural areas with possessions they had managed to
save from being looted.232 The Germans were then registered by Czech finance officers
who made sure that no one exceeded the prescribed fifty kilograms of luggage for the trip
while confiscating money, cigarettes and other valuables from the helpless Germans.233
Registration was followed by delousing, medical examinations and housing assignments
to crowded rooms that held forty to fifty people.234 Once the final evacuation began in
January of 1946, families in the camp at Nieder Georgenthal were given evacuation
orders by the evacuation committee a few days prior to expulsion.235 On the day of actual
expulsion the Germans carrying their fifty kilograms of luggage boarded one of forty
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railroad cars that housed thirty individuals each for a total of 1,200 people per train on a
fourteen-day journey to Bavaria, with trains leaving Czechoslovakia every ten to fourteen
days.236
For many, the expulsion process was more spontaneous and disorganized than the
detailed description offered by Dr. Grimm. Many of the expellees were “forcibly driven
from their homes by the appointed administrators and given no time to collect their
possessions” and thus many of those being evacuated from Iglau left their homes with
less than fifty kilograms of luggage.237 To make matters worse many of the men of the
Iglau transport had just been released from labor camps and were void of any possessions
and a number of women were being expelled without their husbands who were still in
labor or internment camps.238 Most inhumane of all was the expulsion of eight year- old
Frank Zaboj without the accompaniment of his parents who were being detained at the
district prison of Iglau for subversive actions.239 However, it was the denial or lack of
opportunity to secure the prescribed fifty kilograms of travel luggage that rankled
expellees from Bohemia and Moravia after their arrival in Bavaria where they filed
formal complaints to American officials, which contained instances of American soldiers
at receiving stations who disputed expellee claims that they arrived with too little
luggage.240
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Even though these transfers were organized and regulated by the ACC in
conjunction with Article XIII of the Potsdam Agreement, Germans were still being
treated inhumanely in many instances by Czechs and Poles, but this time they were being
expelled as per the requirements of an international agreement.241 These post-Potsdam
transfers were legitimized by a formal agreement between the United States, Great
Britain and Soviet Union, which set a precedent for future episodes of ethnic cleansing.
Czechoslovakian and Polish politicians and citizens cared nothing about the expulsions
international legality because they saw the transfer of Germans as the start of new
homogenous nations for Czechs and Slavs.242 Whether this was achieved by international
law or their own unilateral action did not matter.243
The organized expulsions that followed the Potsdam Agreement were conducted
in a shroud of mystery at the point of departure because local officials in Czechoslovakia
frequently procrastinated when making the decision on the destination of each individual
trainload of expellees departing Czechoslovakia.244 Coordination of the expulsions was
very difficult for Czech officials due to the points of departure being located at many
different railheads.245 Final “destinations” of the expellees were commonly last minute
decisions on whether individual shipments of expellees were to go to the American or
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Soviet Zone of Occupation.246 In some instances, trains were ordered to go to both the
American and Soviet zones.247 As a designated destination for expellees the Soviet Zone
of Occupation was a source of many headaches for the ACC during the organized
expulsions.248 Many of the expellee trains were refused by the Soviets and rerouted to the
United States zone because the Soviets did not want to feed or house the expellees.249
The spur of the moment nature of the expulsions presented political and public
relations problems for the United States. After the conclusion of the war Sudeten
Germans were able to correspond with relatives in the United States via telegrams and
letters and informed them of their impending expulsion from their homeland to either
Germany or the Soviet Union.250 In reaction to this information, American relatives of the
Sudeten Germans brought forth many inquiries concerning when and where the
expulsions were to take place.251 In response, American Ambassador to Czechoslovakia
Laurence A. Steinhardt instructed diplomatic and military officers responding to these
inquiries to explain to the American relatives that a majority of the expellees from
Czechoslovakia were to be sent to the United States Zone of Occupation in Germany, but
there were no guarantees.252
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As before, Czech officials criticized the American military treatment of Sudeten
Germans as being too soft. Czech civilians, politicians and members of the military could
not understand how the soldiers of the United States Army could fight a war and kill
Germans for four years and then after the war treat the Germans as friends.253 Unlike the
Czechs the United States did not have a long history of hatred towards the Sudeten
Germans (or any other Germans) and when that mindset was exposed to the harshness
and inhumanity of the expulsions process, it was therefore not surprising that American
soldiers were friendly and sympathetic toward the Sudeten Germans. In contrast the
Czechoslovaks saw the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans as an act of national
preservation through ethnic homogenization. An unidentified Czechoslovakian official
explained the Czech stance on the expulsion process and the perception of Czechs as
being cruel and inhumane by stating “we are attempting to do a cruel thing in the most
humane way.”254
On October 30, 1946 the Christian Science Monitor reported “the biggest
organized migration of human beings ever witnessed in modern times” ended when the
final shipment of Sudeten Germans departed Karlovy Vary for their assigned destination
in the United States Zone of Occupation.255 Since the beginning of 1946 approximately
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1,415,135 Sudeten Germans had been expelled to the American zone and somewhere in
the neighborhood 750,000 Sudeten Germans were expelled to the Russian zone.256 Not all
the Sudeten Germans were expelled from Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovakian
government deliberately retained nearly 311,000 Germans because their skills were
needed to keep the economy of Czechoslovakia from collapsing.257 How the Sudeten
Germans were treated during their voyage depended upon whether an individual was to
be transferred to the American or Russian zone. American officials conducted the transfer
process at a slow pace “in order to guarantee decent rail service and transportation
conditions” and provided the expellees with “housing and food upon arrival” in Bavaria
where the expellees were processed and evaluated before being assigned permanent
residence.258
The Allied authorities terminated the compulsory transfer of Germans from
Czechoslovakia under the Potsdam Agreement at the end of 1947.259 From 1947 on, all
further transfers of Germans to western Germany were done on a “unilateral basis” by the
Czechoslovakian government without Allied regulation or participation, with the
exception of the reunification of expelled families.260 Czech President Edouard Beněs
summed up his view of the removal of the Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia in a
May 9, 1947, speech in which he proclaimed emphatically “if someone should get the
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idea that this question has not finally been settled. We should resolutely call the nation to
arms.”261 Victory had been declared by Czechoslovakia and the German problem had
been solved from a Czechoslovakian perspective.
Although Allied leaders declared the expulsion of Sudeten Germans complete by
the end of 1947, in reality they continued. In 1948-1949, the Czechoslovakian authorities
shipped 34,985 Sudeten Germans illegally from Czechoslovakia to Bavaria with no
advance warning.262 The United States led the Allied effort to reunite Sudeten Germans
who remained in Czechoslovakia with relatives who had been expelled. In July 1949 the
Allies announced throughout Czechoslovakia that Sudeten Germans with relatives in
Germany qualified for transfer so they could be united with families that had been
separated during the wild or organized expulsions of 1945 through 1946.263 The July
1949 announcement resulted in 55,000 Sudeten German applications for 30,000 transfer
passes that were distributed at a rate of 1,000 per day.264
More Sudeten Germans were to be united with their families in the spring of 1950
after the Allied High Commission on West Germany signed an agreement with the
Czechoslovakian government to transfer 20,000 Sudeten Germans to the residences of
relatives in Germany.265 The transfers began on March 17, 1950 and those being
transferred had to be approved by the West German Government and would become the
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sole responsibility of the receiving family once they arrived in West Germany; they
received no assurance of employment or other benefits from their new homeland.266 In
practice, only 16,832 of the intended 20,000 Sudeten Germans were transferred to West
Germany because of the transfers being canceled by the Czechoslovakian Government on
April 21, 1951 without reason, but probably because there was a shortage of skilled
labor.267 The transfers continued periodically into the 1960s, but most of these were
instances of voluntary migration from Czechoslovakia to West Germany of the very old
and were monitored by organizations such as the Red Cross of West Germany.268 These
later transfers represented an effort by West German social welfare policy to reunite
families fractured during the earlier phases of the wild and organized expulsions.
The Polish government viewed the post-Potsdam organized expulsions as an
opportunity to solidify the Allies acceptance of the newly recovered territories and the
recognition of Poland’s western border as the Oder-Neisse line.269 Polish leaders wanted
to demonstrate that the newly recovered territories were “truly Polonized and integrated
into a new Poland” which meant that Poland would be more than happy to cooperate with
Article XIII in order rid itself of its German population.270 Both Polish politicians and
citizens wanted nothing more than to de-Germanize Poland so as to rid themselves of a
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minority population that had caused Poland nothing but trouble in the past and would also
be a prospective source of conflict as long as they were allowed to reside within Polish
borders. Poland wanted rid of its German population so it could solidify and legitimize its
western border in order to strengthen national security and to exact a good measure of
revenge for the inhumane occupation suffered by Poland at the hands of Nazi Germany
for six long years during World War II.
The post-Potsdam expulsions of Germans from the newly recovered territories of
Poland, “Operation Swallow,” began in February 1946 under management of the British
army 271 The original plan called for 1,500,000 Germans to be transferred to the British
Zone of Occupation in Germany but only approximately 500,000 actually made it across
the German border in the six months between February and September.272 American
officials in Europe monitored the operation from afar. Once underway in late February
the transfers were anything but humane a fact that raised the ire of the British Parliament,
which feared that by accepting Germans into the British zone Great Britain would be seen
by the Poles as being the protectors of the Germans.273 In fact the immediate postPotsdam expulsions differed little from the wild expulsions of 1945, in that the German
expellees were herded to assembly centers where they were robbed, physically abused
then crowded onto train box cars and shipped to Germany where they arrived “in a state
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of physical and spiritual deprivation.”274 However conditions did begin to improve in the
summer of 1946 after ACC regulations had been fully implemented.275
Operation Swallow was supposed to accomplish the transfer of Germans from the
newly recovered territories of Poland, but the process did not always go according to
British plans. Numerous “non-Germans,” most notably Jews from Russia began to arrive
in the British Zone in May of 1946 with the aid of various Jewish organizations that
provided them with forged identification papers.276 A few trainloads of expellees were
exclusively Jewish.277 Jews with false identification papers were not the only problem.
Local political leaders throughout Poland authorized the release of many elderly,
mentally and terminally ill citizens so that they could be put aboard Operation Swallow
transport trains.278 The presence of “750,000 economically unproductive expellees” only
worsened the situation for the expellees and the British by causing food, housing and
health crises that led the British to cut the number of expellees that arrived daily from
9,000 to 5,000 on 15 July, 1946 without any communication with the ACC.279 After a
few starts and stops, and numerous reductions in the number of transports the British
would accept on a daily basis, Operation Swallow came to an end in July 1947.280
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On March 3, 1949, the last 125,000 Germans were to be expelled from the
western territories by Polish authorities with 25,000 headed for East Germany and the
other 100,000 to be resettled elsewhere in the Soviet Zone of Occupation where they
would be forced laborers.281 An unnamed Allied official addressed the expulsions in a
matter of fact way when he stated “within a year there will be no Germans left in East
German provinces recovered by Warsaw.”282 The first trainload consisted of 689
Germans to be followed by future increments of 800 to 1,200 until all 25,000 had been
removed from Poland.283 Those Germans expelled from Poland’s new western territories
in the 1950s largely consisted of physicians, engineers and businessmen who had been
deemed necessary to the functioning of the Polish economy and were not included in the
earlier wild or Potsdam transfers.284 Once their services could be performed by Poles,
officials decided to cleanse themselves of what had become unwanted and unneeded
German skilled laborers.285
Although the expulsions eventually wound down, Poland’s Western border
continued to be a point of contention for the United States for the duration of the Cold
War. In late November 1950, Poland and East Germany approved “an agreement” that
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made the “Oder Neisse Line the permanent border between the two countries.”286
Approval of the Oder-Neisse line by the United States as the permanent western border of
Poland did not occur until after the Cold War when a 1990 peace treaty between
Germany and Poland (The Treaty of Gorlitz which became final on November 14, 1990)
made American recognition of the border official.287 The United States handled the
Polish border question in a way that never drifted from decisions made at Potsdam in
1945 that called for the American recognition of Poland’s western border (wherever the
final location was) only after the issue had been negotiated and agreed upon at a peace
conference.288 What the American approach to the Polish border question reveals is that
the expulsion of Germans was not the center of American foreign policy by any means.
Issues such as the scheduling of a peace conference, the political and economic structure
of Germany and the composition of reparations took precedence over territorial issues.289
Hence the issue of the expulsions was intertwined with issues that proved to be of far
greater regional and global importance to the United States.
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CHAPTER V
AMERICAN MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE GERMAN EXPULSIONS

In the spring of 1945, when the wild expulsion of Germans from East-Central
Europe began, the average American citizen stayed informed on world events through
daily newspapers, popular magazines and niche publications tailored to political and
religious interests. During this period, various forms of print media were not only a
means by which to stay informed of world events, but also a source of entertainment,
public service and personal communication. This chapter will examine the coverage of
the expulsion of Germans from East-Central Europe utilizing newspapers, periodicals,
scholarly publications and publications of intellectual organizations. The newspapers
examined in this chapter are the Chicago Tribune, Christian Science Monitor, New York
Times and the Washington Post. Although each of these newspapers possessed their own
political slant, as evidenced in both their editorials and reportage, they were selected for
use in this chapter because they were the most prominent daily publications in the United
States. The Chicago Tribune was very anti-New Deal and isolationist and this came
through its criticism of Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman’s actions
at Yalta and Potsdam respectively. The Christian Science Monitor approached the
expulsions from a perspective that was more informative and humanitarian than political
with its middle-of-the road attitude toward the situation in East-Central Europe.
Traditionally more liberal in scope the New York Times focused more on the
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humanitarian tragedy of the expulsions and criticism the role of the Western Allies’
involvement in the expulsions. The Washington Post relied upon a more analytical style
regarding the expulsions. Even though the political perspective of each publication was
not the basis of selection for this chapter, this knowledge does help to understand why
each covered the expulsions the way they did. Periodical publications chosen for this
chapter include the mainstream publications Time and the Saturday Evening Post and the
more intellectual and politically oriented American Mercury, The Nation and New
Republic, along with the religious periodicals Catholic World and Christian Century.
These periodicals were chosen not for their political or social ideology, but because they
were among the very few publications to present insightful opinion and analysis on the
expulsions. This chapter will demonstrate that discussion of the expulsions within the
American print media failed to generate an awareness and fervor among the American
public and thus the policy regarding the expulsions never changed as a result of public
scrutiny. Inconsistent coverage of the expulsions combined with the reality that those
mostly writing about the expulsions composed a niche group of Czechoslovakian, Polish
and German political exiles, diplomats, immigrants and American clergy and
intellectuals. It was not so much the lack of information but rather the indifference of the
American public looking forward to peace that assured any words written about the
expulsions fell upon deaf ears.
American Press Coverage of the Expulsions
The first really detailed mention of forced population transfers occurred when
both the New York Times and Washington Post included articles on February 22, 1945
that warned the American public of Czechoslovakia’s intent to expel its Sudeten German
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minority. European correspondent for the New York Times John MacCormac wrote of
Czechoslovakian President Edouard Běnses’s intended removal of Sudeten Germans as
revealed at his press conference in London prior to his triumphant return to his
homeland.1 MacCormac explained that Beněs’s comments were the most “definite”
statement that had yet been made about Czechoslovakia’s plans for the expulsion of
Sudeten Germans.2 Various Czech governmental officials made it clear that the expulsion
of the Sudeten Germans would not be a big ordeal because many of them had already left
Czechoslovakia voluntarily before the war ended.3
Whereas the New York Times article warned of the intentions of Czechoslovakia,
an editorial that appeared in the Washington Post on the same day was quite different.
The editorial approached Czechoslovakia’s intent to expel Sudeten Germans from an
analytical perspective. It suggested the expulsion of Sudeten Germans from
Czechoslovakia would only be the start of the expulsion of the millions of Germans who
resided in East-Central Europe.4 It also asserted that the expulsions would solve
Czechoslovakia’s German minority problem but would endanger the stability of Germany
and Europe.5 Even though the Washington Post was sympathetic toward the liberated
nations and the unique problems their individual minorities presented them, it also stated
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that the Allies should not allow the unilateral expulsion of Germans by any nation.6
Therefore the paper questioned the validity of Beněs’s argument that the expulsion of
Germans was “justified on grounds that the Germans themselves, through their wholesale
deportation of conquered peoples,” had set a precedent that could be followed by
Czechoslovakia and Poland in the removal of Germans from their respective nations.7 In
conclusion the article suggested that Europe’s German minority problem be subjected to
extensive international analysis.8 This would be necessary before any binding
international agreement regarding the fate of the Germans could be reached, and
subsequently such an agreement among all the member nations of the United Nations
should be humanitarian in manner and not be implemented through unilateral decisions
by individual nations.9
Once the wild expulsion of Germans from Czechoslovakia began in the late
spring of 1945, very little factual information was available to the American press
because they had few correspondents on the ground in Czechoslovakia. That changed
some when General George S. Patton’s U.S. Third Army occupied Southwest
Czechoslovakia (Bohemia). By June of 1945 the expulsion of Sudeten Germans from
Czechoslovakia was well underway and causing major logistical problems for the
American military stationed in the Sudetenland, where large numbers of German
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expellees were clogging roads, hampering the functioning of occupation forces.10 The
Chicago Tribune explained that Great Britain, once a proponent of the expulsions, now
stated that the fate of the Sudeten Germans would be decided by the four major Allies
who opposed the Czech policy of unilateral “mass deportation” and had made that clear
to the Czech government.11 Also on June 17, John MacCormac of the New York Time,s
who had followed the American military into the Sudetenland, wrote of the human
tragedy and political hypocrisy that characterized the wild expulsions.12 MacCormac
reported that the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia had begun and
women and children had been “forced to leave in oxcarts with only the bare essentials of
living.”13 He also observed that the Czech government was prepared for “radical
unilateral action” in order to solve the German problem, but President Benes preferred
that the “German question” be dealt with in an agreement with the Soviet Union, the
United States and Great Britain.14
As a news story the expulsions were never a daily fixture within the pages of the
leading American print media. Rather they were covered sporadically and never received
the same prominent daily exposure as other postwar events. On June 23, 1945 an
unattributed article in the New York Times described the inhumanity of the situation of
expellees in Czechoslovakia with a report that the Czech government had confiscated
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270,000 farms and corporations from German and Hungarian owners without
compensation under the authority of the Benes Decrees.15 Property confiscation was the
first act in a strategy to remove all Germans and Hungarians from Czechoslovakia
permanently.16 The Christian Science Monitor expanded upon the New York Times article
by reporting that the Czechs were expelling the Sudeten Germans with the approval of
the Soviet Union.17 The article revealed that as Czech Under Secretary of State Vlado
Clementis put it, the “cleansing of Germans from Czech lands was being carried out
energetically.”18 Although much remained unclear about what was going on inside
Czechoslovakia, American correspondents in Europe reported the situation in
Czechoslovakia as best they could and presented it to the American public in a concise
but thorough way.19 Thus any lack of action or concern toward the plight of the Germans
by the American people was not due to a lack of information, even though information
from East-Central Europe during the expulsions remained limited.
Benes wanted to expel as many Germans as possible before the Potsdam
Conference, reported the Chicago Tribune, but he also knew that Sudeten Germans could
be removed more efficiently and in larger quantities if the expulsions were regulated and
supervised by the United States, Great Britain and Soviet Union.20 With American
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(Allied) involvement in the expulsion process soon to be a certainty Benes revealed that
no fewer than two million Sudeten Germans and 400,000 Hungarians would be expelled
and added there would be no attempts to “compromise” with the Germans as there had
been in 1939.21 The article noted that Benes desired the Allied-regulated expulsions be
quick, trouble free and “executed as humanely as possible.”22 Also on July 15, the New
York Times captured Benes’s enthusiasm for Allied participation in the expulsions in his
own words when he stated “the whole project of cleansing Czechoslovakia in this radical
manner can be undertaken only with wholehearted Big Three approval and
cooperation.”23 Ironically Benes called for the expulsion of Germans to be done
humanely under the auspices of international cooperation while in reality he allowed
Germans to be expelled from Czechoslovakia unilaterally and inhumanely.
American Public Opinion and Public Persuasion
Article XIII of the Potsdam Agreement made the expulsion of Germans from
East-Central Europe official Allied policy on August 2, 1945. The last paragraph of
Article XIII ordered the suspension of “further expulsion” of Germans by the Czech and
Polish governments until Allied occupation officials had “thoroughly” examined the
situation that faced their respective zones of occupation in Germany.24 Both the
American and British occupation zones had been inundated with expellees, displaced
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persons and refugees and subsequently Allied officials placed a moratorium on
expulsions to keep from having to deal with a flood of millions more expellees.25 This
was done because Allied leaders needed time to increase the food supply in order to be
able accept the German expellees into their respective zones of occupation in order not to
exacerbate an already critical food shortage in postwar Germany.26 American occupation
officials feared that an immediate influx of German expellees into Germany would
increase the population to nearly 20,000,000 immediately and foster the rapid spread of
disease and civil disorder.27 The Potsdam moratorium on expulsions would allow the
problems of food and housing to be dealt with before the expellees entered Germany in
the winter of 1945-1946.28
Despite the official suspension of expulsions many expellees still entered the
Allied occupied zones of Europe. According to a September 24, 1945, Time magazine
article, “the unwanted children of enforced marriages of nations” that no longer existed
were forced from their homes by the Czech and Polish governments and sent to West
Germany.29 There was no concern on behalf of the Czechs or Poles concerning where the
expellees were headed. Czech Premier Zdenek Fierlinger proclaimed that the movement
of Sudeten Germans into Germany was “as an Allied problem.”30 Sydney Gruson of the
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New York Times explained that the expulsion of Germans from Polish administered
territories east of the Oder-Neisse was justifiable because the Germans had shown the
people of Poland no quarter during the wartime occupation.31 Gruson therefore supported
the expulsion of Germans in accordance with the Potsdam Agreement because they
would not be a unilateral act of revenge like the wild expulsions had been.32
A Chicago Daily Tribune article addressed the postponement of the indirect
expulsions by the Allies. The Allied Control Council (ACC) strongly urged Poland to halt
the eviction of Germans until a detailed “resettlement program” compatible with Article
XIII of the Potsdam Agreement had been worked out.33 This was requested of the Allies
by German welfare officials who specifically wanted an extended pause in “German
migration west from the new Polish frontier along the Oder-Neisse rivers unless each
migrant had been certified” by ACC officials.34 As appeals to temporarily halt the
expulsions until after the “winter of 1945” had been ignored by the Czechs and Poles,
Allied officials had no other choice but to speed up plans to implement organized
expulsions.35 Not only would the “orderly transfer of Germans” prevent conditions from
deteriorating too quickly in the American and British occupation zones, but organized
expulsions would also bring about an “element of predictability” in relation to when,
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where and how many expellees were to be allowed in the American and British zones at a
given time.36 Although coverage of the indirect expulsions by American print media
outlets was anything but voluminous, the reports that did reach American readers made it
clear that “the moratorium called for in Article XIII of the Potsdam Protocol had been a
total failure.”37
Heinz Eulau the German and assistant editor of the liberal publication The New
Republic, explained that even though the Big Three had delayed the transfers to make
them more orderly and humane they knew the transfers “had to happen” and were the
price of “power politics.”38 Eulau added that the supporters of population transfers could
not “deny the terrible hardship, human misery, and cruelty” that characterized such a
process but, the Germans also posed “minority problem number one” to East-Central
Europe and had to be dealt with in order to sustain peace in the future.39 The expulsion of
Germans, Eulau warned, could create “the emergence of a new form of irredentism and
chauvinism” that could only be prevented by the creation of a “decent standard of living”
in Germany by the Allies.40
Princeton Seminary Professor Otto A. Piper, who had been expelled from
Germany in 1933, criticized the Potsdam-sanctioned expulsions and their delay from
August through January until they could be carried out under orderly and humane
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conditions.41 Piper believed such delay allowed the “partisans” and other groups to
operate independently of the authority of the Czechoslovakian and Polish governments
and perpetuate violence and cruelty toward the expellees for far longer than should have
been allowed.42 Through sanction of the expulsions the Allies violated their own
interpretation of international law according to Piper who explained that western
democracies supported the “right of emigration of individuals, and even large groups of
minorities could select” the geographic location and “political conditions they deemed
best.”43 Piper fully sympathized with and understood reasoning behind the
Czechoslovakian and Polish hatred of German minorities in their respective nations
whom they believed had supported their Nazi oppressors.44 That said, he saw the
expulsions as “not a spontaneous act of emotional overexcitement,” but as a “deliberate
and premeditated policy” allowed by the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet
Union that would set a new precedent on how minorities and population transfers would
be handled under international law.45
By allowing the expulsions to occur as prescribed at Potsdam Piper explained,
that the United States and Great Britain violated Christian moral law, stating that nations
are not guided by Christian principles “and have no moral obligation toward its
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subjects.”46 To the governments of nations, including the United States and Great Britain,
human life was of no value and their approval of the expulsions totally ignored Christian
natural law and meant that they had chosen to adhere to policies in line with the
“philosophy of unlimited power.”47 Piper believed it was then the responsibility of
churches throughout the United States to expose the “anti-Christian philosophy of
Potsdam”.48
Gruson, Eulau and Piper possessed different perspectives on the expulsions. Eulau
was pragmatically in favor the expulsions, as was Gruson, but Piper opposed them on
moral grounds. Even so, there were similarities in their thinking. All understood the
feelings of hatred and the need for revenge that resonated in Czechoslovakia and Poland
and were sympathetic to the suffering of both nations during the Nazi occupation. The
difference was that Eulau viewed sympathy and revenge as justification for the
expulsions and Gruson saw them as the less troublesome path, whereas Piper did not.
Writings penned during the moratorium obvious differences in opinion regarding the
expulsions exist, but they each author understand the origins of the desire for revenge that
existed in the hearts and minds of the citizens of Czechoslovakia and Poland.
Overall, the American print media covered the expulsion of Germans by the
Czechoslovakian and Polish governments during the August-January 1945 moratorium
very sparsely. Which is surprising because the United States Military had a presence in
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the Sudetenland of Southwestern Czechoslovakia where almost all of Czechoslovakia’s
Germans resided and the press had access to the area and the American soldiers as well.
Such access should have led to more frequent coverage of the expulsions. American
soldiers in the Sudetenland had been eyewitnesses to the forced eviction of Germans in
October 1945, during the moratorium, and had observed the merciless treatment of
Germans at the hand of the Czechs.49 American soldiers deployed in Czechoslovakia
were sympathetic with the Czech people and what they had been through but questioned
the harsh methods used by the Czechs in their deportation of the Sudeten Germans.50
One newspaper report from the same time period contradicted American military
accounts about how the Czechs treated the Sudeten Germans. Godfrey Lias a reporter for
the Christian Science Monitor, toured the Sudetenland extensively and was allowed
access to locations that had been unobserved by the international press. He reported that,
according to Czech leaders, once the Potsdam Agreement became official the expulsion
of Sudeten Germans had been curtailed immediately.51 The problem with Lias’s portrayal
of the Czech treatment of the Sudeten Germans was that it may have been somewhat
biased.52 Lias had authored a biography of the Czechoslovakian leader-in-exile Edouard
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Benes in 1940 Beněs of Czechoslovakia, and had been named Director of the Political
Intelligence Department of the British Foreign Office in Czechoslovakia in 1944. Lias’s
accounts of how the Sudeten Germans were treated by the Czechs ran counter to
eyewitness accounts of American soldiers.53 Although Czech acts of cruelty were
acknowledged to have occurred during the wild expulsions, Lias described the postPotsdam treatment of the Sudeten Germans as strict but fair and humane.54 He described
the Sudeten Germans as well fed, well housed and as content as could be expected
despite being prisoners in internment camps while they waited to be sent west to
Germany.55
During the Potsdam-imposed moratorium on the expulsions, the American print
media focused on Czechoslovakia’s justification of the expulsion of the Sudeten
Germans. Newspaper and magazine articles during this time period focused more closely
on why Czechoslovakia wanted to expel its Sudeten Germans than the fact of continuing
expulsions of Germans from Czechoslovakia. The press explained that the
Czechoslovakian expulsion plan was not a reactionary or retaliatory measure of revenge
but rather a well contemplated strategic decision made with the future domestic and
regional stability of Czechoslovakia in mind.56 The absence of the Sudeten Germans
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from Czechoslovakia would remove the possibility of “outside intervention” in Czech
affairs.57
American journalists explained that the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans was an
“issue of national importance” to the Czech government and its citizens who wanted the
Germans gone and the destination did not matter.58 Ralph Parker Moscow correspondent
for The Nation, London Times and the New York Times during the war, had been a
member of the British Foreign Office’s Czechoslovakian Intelligence Office before the
war which gave him a familiarity with and sympathy towards the Czech government and
people.59 In 1939, Parker had been a correspondent for the New York Times in Prague and
was assigned to Belgrade in 1940 during which time his wife was killed.60 After her death
Parker became romantically involved with a Russian secretary whose influence tilted his
political ideology toward a “pro-Soviet perspective,” which also influenced the content of
his writing to such an extent that his editors were cynical in relation to any reports he
made that had been approved by Soviet officials.61 After the war Parker observed that the
German wartime occupation had changed the national character of Czechoslovakia from
being tolerant of the German minority to being near fanatical in the insistence that the
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Germans be expelled.62 “The once tolerant Czechoslovak heart had hardened” and the
removal of the Sudeten Germans was clearly a much-needed major “surgical” procedure
that would make Czechoslovakia a more secure nation in the future.63 Reports from
Czechoslovakia during the Potsdam moratorium described the Czechs as having no other
choice but to expel the Sudeten German population from their country. In reporting the
expulsions from Czechoslovakia the American print media gave affirmation to the
orderly and humane doctrine and United States approval of the expulsion of Germans in
accordance with the Potsdam Agreement.
Once the transfer of Germans formally resumed after January 25, 1946 the
American print media covered the expulsions much differently than before. Eyewitness
reporters viewed conditions the expellees had been forced to endure and as a result
reports were more critical of the expulsions, which gave the average American citizen a
vivid picture of the expulsions. The reporting of New York Times European
correspondent Anne O’Hare McCormick best exemplifies the descriptive and analytical
media coverage of the post-Potsdam expulsions. McCormick explained that although the
Potsdam Agreement called for the transfer of Germans to be conducted in an orderly and
humane manner, the reality of the situation was somewhat different.64 Expellees might
have received orderly and humane treatment after they arrived in Berlin or Munich
according to McCormick but the trek through Czechoslovakia and the new Polish
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territories occurred under terrifying conditions void of “international supervision or any
pretense of humane treatment.”65 To McCormick the treatment of the German expellees
by the Czechoslovakian and Polish governments was akin to the wartime atrocities
committed by the Nazis.66
In Czechoslovakia Allied approval of the resumption of the expulsions meant the
removal of the Sudeten Germans and the beginning of a new ethnically homogenous
Czechoslovakia comprising only Czechs and Slovaks.67 It sounded simple and
straightforward. Czechoslovakia would remove approximately three million Germans
from its borders and all would be fine. In reality all was far from fine. Czechoslovakia
was expelling Germans but most of those expelled were women, small children and the
elderly who were of no value to the Czechs because they could not perform manual or
skilled labor and would do nothing but drain food and housing resources.68 Hal Foust of
the Chicago Daily Tribune reported on the retention of skilled and manual German
laborers by the Czechs and pointed out that the “absence of able-bodied men arriving
from Czechoslovakia” indicated the Czechs were utilizing Sudeten Germans as slave
labor until industry and agriculture could be fully Czech restored.69 Not only was the
Czech retention of able-bodied German men criticized by Allied occupation leader
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General Lucius D. Clay, the German Landerat strongly suggested to the Americans that
families not be separated during future transfers.70 The Germans made it clear that if
able-bodied men were not included in the expulsions then the Allies would have to send
the women and children back to Czechoslovakia because they wanted to keep families
together, and families without male providers would also be a financial burden.71 Just a
few weeks later, the Chicago Daily Tribune reported that after a serious rebuke from
American military leaders the Czechs had formally requested that they be allowed to
retain “skilled workers” until those positions could be filled by Czechs.72 The Czech
government detained a total of 311,000 Germans, because their skills were needed while
the labor base of the Sudetenland was being replenished with Czech citizens and their
presence would prevent the Czech economy from collapsing.73 Media reports brought the
reality of the expulsions and the cruel aftermath of war home to the American public, but
most Americans were more fixated on other things, such as demobilization and wartime
reconversion at home, tensions with the USSR abroad, and the rebuilding of Japan.
The transfer of Germans from the newly recovered Polish territories east of the
Oder-Neisse Line was the responsibility of Great Britain and the Soviet Union. The
British accepted 1,500,000 expellees into their zone of occupation from February 1946
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through July 1947 in what was called Operation Swallow.74 As with the transfer of the
Sudeten Germans, the American media had unlimited access to the arriving Germans in
the British zone. A Christian Science Monitor report told of Germans en route by train
through “Polish administered Silesia” being guarded by Soviet and Polish soldiers so as
to prevent Polish civilian hostility toward the Germans from turning violent.75
Poland’s expulsion of Germans from its new territories was linked to the
final location of Poland’s western border. At the behest of the Soviet Union, Poland
assumed administration of German territory east of the Oder-Neisse Rivers, an idea that
was unacceptable to the United States, which preferred Poland’s border be located further
east at the Curzon Line. Thus, the transferred Germans posed a substantial threat to the
future stability of East-Central Europe, which according to J. Emlyn Williams of the
Christian Science Monitor was ironic because the expulsions “were crowded out of the
news” by what were considered more relevant matters.76 American citizens, politicians
and media entities were more concerned with the rebuilding of Germany and Japan and
of course the spread of communism all of which were more pressing and newsworthy
than the fate of Germans whom many held responsible for starting World War II.
Williams reported that Poland wanted the expulsions to be over and done with as soon as
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possible so that the Allies would not re-evaluate the situation and the permanence of the
Oder-Neisse line.77
Germans were being expelled by Poland in order to resettle Poles in the German
lands of East Prussia, Silesia and Pomerania who had been displaced from their homes in
the parts of eastern Poland that had been ceded to the Soviet Union. Joel Cang another
Christian Science Monitor correspondent, who visited the newly recovered Polish
territories twice after the war, reported that Poland had been awarded approximately
61,000 square miles of eastern German territory as compensation for the nearly 104,000
square miles of Polish land seized by the Soviet Union during the war.78 Extension of
Poland’s border as far west as the Oder-Neisse line meant that Poland would acquire
territory that possessed a well-developed industrial base, fertile agricultural land and
abundant deposits of minerals that would replace what had been lost and that could
sustain the Polish people.79 In November 1947, Polish officials insisted to the United
States and Great Britain that Poland had no choice but to annex German land to the west
because without that land “the Polish economy would be unbalanced and be unable to
provide food and work for more than two-thirds” of the Polish people.80
Editorial analysis and criticism of the expulsion of Germans from East-Central
Europe by the American print media did not begin in earnest until several months after
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the resumption of the expulsions in January 1946. The cruel and inhumane nature of the
expulsions received most attention. The expulsion of Germans by the Czechoslovakian
and Polish governments were, in the opinion of McCormick of a magnitude never seen
before and were without a doubt “a crime against humanity” that would impact Europe’s
future for many years to come.81 John Fisher of the Chicago Daily Tribune explained that
the expulsion of Germans from Czechoslovakia and Poland had been anything but
orderly and humane as mandated per the Potsdam Agreement.82 Fisher quoted the Office
of the Military Government of the United States (OMGUS) representative James K.
Pollock who conveyed that the rules set down at Potsdam had yet to be followed.83 Soviet
control over the entrance of expellees into eastern Germany made information on the
traveling conditions hard to obtain, but their condition upon arrival revealed much.84
The United States and Great Britain were not involved in the actual expulsion of
Germans because they only dealt with the expellees after they arrived in Germany.
Fisher’s editorial does not openly state it, but it does suggest that by only being involved
in the arrival and not the actual gathering and transport of the expellees, the western
Allies facilitated the violation of the orderly and humane requirement of Potsdam, and in
doing do so violated it themselves. Former United States Under Secretary of State
Sumner Welles on the other hand was open and direct in his criticism of the Allies
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handling of the expulsions. He articulated that the expulsions had not been humane and
should have been regulated by the United Nations (UN) and that the Allies would delay
future effectiveness such as the United Nations Commission for Human Rights
(UNCHR) for years because of their poor handling of the expulsions.85 Welles was not
exactly opposed to expulsion because he had long supported the transfer of minority
populations as a means by which to prevent “minority disputes.”86 He favored population
transfers as a means by which to deal with minority threats to “international peace” but
he opposed the Potsdam Agreement because like other post World War II agreements it
“would increase rather than diminish, the danger already existing.”87
John MacCormac of the New York Times leveled further criticism against
Potsdam by comparing the treatment of minorities after World War I to the Allies’
actions after World War II. He noted that the principle of national self-determination was
used to redraw the map of Europe after World War I because Europe’s races had been
scattered throughout “like trees in a forest.”88 Minorities were a big focus of the post
World War I peace process but national self-determination took precedence over minority
issues after World War II in that the desires of nations as a collective whole were more
important than those of each distinctive majority or minority group.89 Potsdam prescribed
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the movement of peoples not the movement of boundaries, in what MacCormac referred
to as a “drastic ethnic rearrangement” of Europe.90 MacCormac stated that this was not so
much the idea of any one government but a trend that originated with the ethnic political
policies of Adolph Hitler before and during the war.91
Samuel von Valkenburg a professor of geography at Clark University also
referred to the practice of altering the population to fit set boundaries as a “post World
War II trend in map-making” to fit the political situation of various nations, and the
expulsion of Germans by Czechoslovakia and Poland did just that.92 MacCormac and von
Valkenburg’s sentiments were echoed by the Christian Century, which condemned the
post war policy of pushing populations to “fit” boundaries as a “savage policy” that
ignored the welfare of the expellees and exposed them to horrible conditions.93 The only
interest nations regulating and physically implementing this policy had in regard to the
expellees was to “get them out of where they are.”94 The previous assessments
demonstrated that the media perspective resonated with a concern for the fate of the
people and downplayed the geopolitical realties facing the Allies at the time.
The total lack of attention to the human side of the peace process at Potsdam
provoked a response from global religious leaders, such as the “Resolution Regarding the
Transfer of Populations,” from the World Council of Churches (WCC). The resolution
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was response to the orderly and humane decree issued at Potsdam that the WCC deemed
to be a failure and thus demanded the postponement of the expulsions so that the time and
rate of transfers could be examined and adjusted to make the process less horrific.95
Nothing but “hardship” sickness and death had been perpetuated by the expulsion of
Germans, especially upon children, women and the elderly, which offended the
“Christian conscience.”96 Leaders of the council knew that “some aspects” of Potsdam
had to be recognized but asked the Allies and the new United Nations Organization
(UNO) that relief be provided those in distress, and in accordance with the orderly and
humane decree that decent transportation, protection and sufficient food supplies be
provided during the trip97 In addition the WCC requested that the UNO make plans to
find a permanent destination for the expellees before they entered Germany.98 The WCC
demanded a re-examination of the Potsdam Agreement on the grounds that it allowed for
the “starvation or death” of minority populations in order to reduce their numbers so that
they “fit the new frontiers” of Czechoslovakia and especially Poland, which would “bring
ruin not only upon Germany but Europe” as well.99 The WCC also declared that the
expellees were “guilty of no crime” and should be awarded the rights of asylum as
political refugees by the Allies and the UNO, along with guarantees that they would not
be “repatriated against their will.”100
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Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn a Catholic Austrian aristocrat and political
philosopher, pronounced the Potsdam Agreement to be a threat to a shaky world peace
and that it violated the principles of Christianity and Catholicism.101 Von KuehneltLeddhin explained that Catholicism forbade “punishment of persons not guilty of a
crime’” and the expulsion of Germans punished the innocent.102 Catholicism also refuted
“moralizing” on the uniqueness of one group over another and thus various
“nationalities” did not actually exist an the expulsions violated this principle.103 This was
a “catastrophe” that he thought had to be studied and analyzed by historians that
possessed no preexisting ideas regarding the expulsions.104 Although von KuehneltLeddhin espoused the Catholic virtue of the equality of groups of individuals he was very
aware of differences among the people who composed the various regions of Germany
and criticized the United States for failing to understand that until 1933 that regional
identification preceded national identification.105 Meaning that the people of Germany
saw themselves as Prussian, Saxon, and Bavarian and not as Germans.106 Thus, the
failure to recognize that nearly two-thirds of the expellees were Prussian meant that the
United States, Great Britain and Soviet Union accomplished what the Hohenzollerns
never did, the Prussianization of Germany.107 By feeding, sheltering and finding
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employment for the expellees and other regulatory acts the Western Allies would
transform Germany from a “semi-capitalist state to a socialist state.”108
Von Kuehnelt-Leddhin predicted that the quality of life for the German expellees
would disintegrate so far until “death becomes preferable to life,” which would lead to
years of unrest created by the expellees and “their children” would be dehumanized by
the expulsions.109 The hatred and irredentism generated by the expulsion process could
propel the expellees to invade Bohemia and Moravia, where they “might slaughter, gas or
cremate every single man, woman and child” out of revenge against the expulsion policy
of Benes.110 He also wrote of those expelled from eastern Germany returning to Polish
territory and committing acts of violence so vile they would make Nazi war atrocities
seem like “a humanitarian love feast.”111 Such actions were possible because, he claimed
the immediate aftermath of the war was not an age of morality anchored by an ethical
God but an era of “enlightened self-interest” that would hopefully pass as quickly as the
enlightenment did.112 He also believed that the expellees would be the catalysts for the
onset of World War III, and that even though the United States provided assistance to the
expellees the German problem was far from being solved and would probably “occupy
Western Civilization for decades to come.”113 Godless and immoral was how von
Kuenhelt-Leddhin portrayed the expulsions and their impact. He believed that the
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German expellees epitomized the uncertainty and misery that hung over East-Central
Europe after the war.
The condemnation of the expulsions within the American religious community
pointed to the Allied adherence to the Potsdam Agreement as anti-Christian and
inhumane in principle. But in Czechoslovakia, Protestant clergymen saw the expulsions
as a safety measure as long as they were implemented orderly and humanely.114 Robert
Root of the Christian Century quoted American religious leader Reinhold Niebuhr
describing the expulsion of Germans from Czechoslovakia as an example of “man’s
inhumanity to man.”115 However, Czech Protestant leaders did not quite see it that
way.116 They adamantly exclaimed that the expulsions were not an act of revenge.117
Instead the expulsions were a measure of “national self-defense against a fifth column” of
Germans who posed a future threat to Czech security.118 The example used by these
Protestant leaders to convey that threat was Nazi atrocities of the recent past, such as the
Lidice massacre and how Sudeten Germans “willingly accepted Hitler” and in doing so
chose Germany over Czechoslovakia and should therefore go there.119 The justification
given by the Czech clergy was that they knew the Germans and the German mentality.120
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Root pointed out that there was a European predisposition toward nationalities
and that Europeans “pigeonhole” other ethnicities more frequently and nonchalantly and
with less bigotry than “Americans.”121 He claimed Czech Protestant leaders “sound like
southern or western bigots who insist that they really know the colored peoples,” and
stated that there was no racism in their minds or hearts when they said they knew the
Germans and supported the expulsions but wanted them carried out with a “minimum of
cruelty.”122 Czech religious leaders believed their support of the expulsions to be the
essence of Christianity in that it would prevent future armed conflict in the heart of
Europe. Whereas American Christian leaders opposed all suffering and heavily criticized
the Western Allies, Czech religious leaders saw the orderly and humane edict of Potsdam
as a Christian solution to Czechoslovakia’s German minority problem.
Almost as fervent as American Christian leaders in their opposition to the German
expulsions were two members of the British media, F.A. Voigt and Walter Knopp who
voiced their criticism of the expulsions and the approval of the Potsdam agreement by the
Western Allies to the American people. Voigt, who was editor of the British intellectual
publication the Nineteenth Century and After, penned an editorial in the American
Mercury a highly provocative, anti-establishment magazine. According to Voigt “has
been and is being done this time not by war-makers but by peace-makers.”123 These
expulsions could not be rationalized as were “retributory wrongs which may have a
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certain wild justice and are condoned as naturally understandable,” because an impartial
solution was attainable, especially in the case of the Sudeten Germans whose expulsion
from Czechoslovakia did nothing but add “wrong to wrong.”124 Voigt explained that the
expulsion of the Sudeten Germans effectively placed collective guilt on an innocent
group of people and was nothing more than “mimicry of German wrong.”125 He pointed
to Potsdam as the root cause of and creator of all of the misery the Sudeten Germans had
experienced and suggested that it would end only if those Americans who witnessed the
situation returned home to tell their story and inform the American people on what was
happening.
Even though the Saturday Evening Post was a nationalistic mainstream
publication, criticism of the Allied handling of the Polish border situation at Potsdam
graced its pages. Werner Knopp a German-born British citizen, former newspaper editor
and European political expert, explained that the hunger and displacement of the
expellees made a joke of the orderly and humane declaration of Potsdam.126 The cession
of eastern Germany to “Soviet dominated Poland” ensured that the United States and
Great Britain would become the permanent benefactors of Germany since Knopp
believed it could not survive without the east, and without Western Allied assistance the
“Sovietization” of Germany was possible.127 The real crime committed at Potsdam was
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that Germany was relieved of its eastern “grainlands” that fed the entire nation and was
then forced to accept millions of expellees after that.128 Of course the Western Allies fed
the German people but they were responsible for creating the situation. Although more of
a niche publication, the Catholic World echoed Knopp’s assertions by editorializing that
at Potsdam a “full fifth of the Reich was handed over to Soviet Poland for administrative
purposes and the orderly deportation” of the eight to ten million German inhabitants that
accompanied it created a starving, homeless underclass.129 The only way for Germany to
continue to exist and prevent “the bolshevization of the heart of Europe” would be
financial support from the United States, which would in all likelihood be for an
indefinite period of time.130 The aftermath of Potsdam in the opinion of the Catholic
World, would be the “most humiliating defeat of all ideals Americans have died for in
World War II.”131
With the exception of Robert Root editorials of the post moratorium expulsions
criticized the orderly and humane aspect of Article XIII of the Potsdam Agreement as the
abandonment of the innocent for the sake of geopolitics. The United States was accused
of violating the principles of freedom and humanity the basic beliefs for which the war
was fought in the minds of many. By allowing Germans to be expelled the United States
and Great Britain unleashed a starving homeless mass upon a helpless German nation and
by doing so they imitated the policies of Hitler.
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The post-1947 expulsions were an afterthought to American citizens even though
stories pertaining to them appeared in major print media publications. The Potsdam
sanctioned expulsion of Germans from Czechoslovakia and the newly acquired Polish
territories came to an end in late 1947 but the expulsions continued well into the 1950s
and even into the 1960s. Poland expelled 125,000 Germans (100,000 to the British Zone
and 25,000 to the Soviet zone) in early March of 1950 as part of an agreement with the
Western Allies and West Germany that was not a part of the Potsdam Agreement.132
These transfers consisted of doctors, engineers, business management experts and others
who possessed unique skills needed to keep Poland operating during the transition period
after the expulsions had been completed. By 1950 the world had moved on and few
outside of East-Central Europe cared about the plight of the expelled Germans with the
exception of those American citizens of German, Czech and Polish heritage. An analysis
of post-1947 expulsions and the expulsions in general appeared in the Washington Post
penned by journalist Agnes E. Meyer, who asserted that allowing the expulsion of
Germans to occur had brought western civilization to “an all-time, inhuman, unchristian,
barbaric low” that endangered the future stability of Germany and Europe.133 Meyer
explained that the expulsions were in a sense an act of Germans invading Germany,
which produced nothing but unemployment and hunger.134
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Biased Opinions
It has been a long tradition in the United States for citizens to voice their opinions
on domestic and foreign affairs by writing letters to editors of newspapers and magazines.
Such letters written during the period of the expulsions were unique, as the majority of
letters were written by American citizens of Czechoslovakian and Polish heritage,
politicians from the region of East-Central Europe stationed in the United States, and
eyewitnesses to the aftermath of the expulsions in Germany and politicians in exile. As
far as can be ascertained, Americans not of East-Central European ancestry wrote very
few letters–to-editors and voiced little opinion for or against the expulsions. Even though
Germans were being inhumanely expelled from Czechoslovakia and Poland, GermanAmericans remained silent, maybe out of indifference, or because they identified
themselves as Americans and did not want to seem sympathetic to a German nation that
started the war. The lack of written protestation by German-Americans suggests both.
At times the debate over the expulsions transformed into a campaign of public
persuasion due to the participation of Czech, Polish and German politicians who resided
in the United States (and elsewhere) and who wrote letters to newspapers and magazines
that voiced their nation’s strategic stance on the expulsions. Broader public opinion
concerning the expulsion of Germans from East-Central Europe was nearly non-existent
during the period of wild expulsions in the spring and summer of 1945. But once Article
XIII of the Potsdam agreement became official in early August of 1945 it did not take
long for various opinions pertaining to the expulsions to appear within the pages of
popular print media vehicles. Letters of justification for the expulsions by
Czechoslovakian officials stationed in the United States and Czechoslovakian Americans
178

for the most part explained that Czech government officials had tried very hard to get
along with the Sudeten German minority. The letters conveyed that Czech President
Benes had made many attempts to make the Sudeten Germans a prominent social and
political force within the nation of Czechoslovakia.135 Some of the letters suggested that
Czech citizens were anything but intolerant and had even thought of the Sudeten
Germans as fellow Czechoslovakian citizens. The prime example given was that of
German writer Thomas Mann who had been denied citizenship by the Nazis and Sudeten
German towns throughout Czechoslovakia but was granted citizenship by a town that was
administered by citizens of Czechoslovakian ancestry.136
Czech opinion within American popular media consistently argued that the
Sudeten Germans were not innocent victims but a disloyal minority who did not respect
the democratic principles of Czechoslovakia.137 For the global Czech diaspora the
Sudeten Germans represented a privileged minority within Czechoslovakia and claimed
that for Czechoslovakia to be a truly democratic nation such a minority should not exist.
Vlastimil Kybal a former Czechoslovak Ambassador to places such as Argentina, Brazil,
Portugal, Italy, and Mexico and an intermittent guest lecturer at Columbia University
from 1944 to 1948, wrote a letter to the editor of the New York Times on September 25,
1945, that expounded on the Sudeten Germans as a privileged minority within
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Czechoslovakia.138 Kybal contrasted the pre-war privileged Sudeten Germans of
Czechoslovakia to the status of minority groups in the United States none of whom
possessed a privileged position within American society.139 In order to insure that the
Sudeten Germans did not regain their privileged status within a democratic postwar
Czechoslovakia there was only one workable solution, the expulsion of Sudeten Germans
from Czechoslovakia.
Similarly Jan Papanek head of the Chicago-based Czechoslovak Information
Service and a Czechoslovakian United Nations representative from 1946 to1948,
solidified the Czech stance on the removal of the Sudeten Germans in a December 1945
letter to the New York Times. He stated that the expulsions would be an “act of selfpreservation” for Czechoslovakia.140 Papanek also explained that expulsion of the
Sudeten Germans would “settle once and for all the minority problem and eliminate the
danger that might undermine” Czechoslovakia for years to come.141 Most harsh on the
Sudeten Germans was Czech Minister to the United States V.S. Hurban who told the
Washington Post that by being expelled from Czechoslovakia the Sudeten Germans
would “reap what they themselves by their conduct” had sown.142 Hurban also explained
that Sudeten German support of the Nazis during the German wartime occupation of
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Czechoslovakia could not be totally “forgotten and forgiven.”143 Hurban also mentioned
that every Sudeten German could, under law be charged with treason and executed but
instead Czech citizens and government officials were “willing” to transport them back to
Germany the land from which they had migrated to the Sudetenland hundreds of years
before.144 It is not the chronology but the message of Czech officials that is important.
Following the finalization of Article XIII at Potsdam in August 1945, Czech officials
stationed in the United States utilized American newspapers and magazines to present the
Czech position on the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans. Letters to editors and other
pieces authored by Czech officials and Czech Americans were an attempt to justify the
expulsions to American officials, intellectuals and civilians.
Allied-regulated expulsion of the Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia began
in late January 1946, but reaction to the expulsions did not appear in the form of letters or
opinion pieces to newspapers and magazines until midsummer 1947. Letters written to
popular media vehicles were characterized by a pervasive anti-German sentiment. One D.
Siskind wrote to the Washington Post on July 29, 1947 that the Sudeten Germans saw
themselves as an innocent minority who were being “unduly persecuted” by the Czech
government.145 The Czechs held the Sudeten Germans collectively guilty for occupation
atrocities according to Siskind, who also stated that most Czechs believed that the
Sudeten Germans wanted to be part of a Greater German Reich.146 Siskind refuted claims

143
144
145
146

Ibid.
Ibid.
D. Siskind, “Sudeten Germans,” Washington Post; 29 July 1947, 8.
Ibid.
181

by those who believed the expulsion of Sudeten Germans was cruel punishment when he
quoted the opinion of unidentified neutral observers who stated that Czechs and Poles
were not intentionally cruel to the Germans but were merely “humans handling a nasty
situation” the best they could.147
Former secretary of the American Czechoslovak Chamber of Commerce, Frank J.
Rosner penned a letter to the Washington Post that took anti-German sentiment to a new
extreme.148 “How could any intelligent person defend the so called Sudeten Germans?”
Asked Rosner who went on to explain that the Sudeten Germans had wanted for nothing
as Czech citizens as they had German language schools, and more money had been spent
on social and infrastructure programs in German areas of Czechoslovakia than in Czech
and Slovak areas of Czechoslovakia.149 In addition, the Sudeten Germans had been well
represented within the democratic Czech parliament, and there were also several Sudeten
German ministers who had served in the Czech government before the war.150 But it iwas
the existence of German as an official language and German speaking schools before the
war that created a perspective of privilege and, more importantly, German ungratefulness
and treason in the minds of Czechoslovaks such as Rosner.
Once Hitler and Nazism became a powerful force, the fate of the Sudeten
Germans was sealed because the cession of the Sudetenland in 1938 solidified the
collectivization of Germans into one menacing threatening group in the minds of
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Czechoslovakians, which intensified during the German occupation and manifested itself
in the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans who were viewed as a permanent threat to
Czech democracy. Instead of being part of a democratic nation the Sudeten Germans
gave their loyalty to Germany and according to Rosner by being expelled the Sudeten
Germans were getting what they always desired which was to be sent back to Germany
“which they were loyal for, and where they would cause no harm.”151Rosner made it
clear that what happened to the Sudeten Germans was nothing like what they had done to
the Czechs “during seven dreadful years of terror and oppression” when many “men,
children and women were murdered in cold blood.”152
Throughout the time period of the expulsions (1945-1947 and beyond)
alternatives to the expulsion of Germans by the Czechoslovakian and Polish government
appeared in the opinion pieces and letters-to-editors pages of American newspapers. Such
letters did more than offer solutions they were an attempt to make Americans aware of
what was actually happening to the Germans of East-Central Europe. A letter written by
H.F. March to the New York Times on September 1, 1945, asserted that the Sudeten
German question had been presented from a predominantly Czech perspective within the
American press.153 March contested that World War II had been fought to end tyranny
but that the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans represented a continuation of that
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tyranny.154 According to March, one viable solution would have been the separation of
the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia and allowing the Sudeten Germans to reunite with
Austria.155
Father W. Martin Haertwig wrote a letter from Marktredwitz, Germany on July
26, 1945 that appeared in the Chicago Tribune but was not published until September 5,
1945.156 Haertwig sought to inform the American public about the expulsions and present
possible alternatives to the forced transfer of people from their homeland.157 Haertwig
wrote that the American people needed to know that there was no word in the English
language to describe what was happening to the Germans expelled from Pomerania,
Silesia and elsewhere.158 Millions of Germans were being forced to leave homes located
in the newly recovered Polish territories and were exposed to unfathomable hardship at
the hands of the Poles.159 For Haertwig the alternative to the expulsions and the best
guarantee of world peace was the restoration of land in East-Central Europe to its rightful
owners, which meant that the Germans should be allowed to move back to their native
land.160 Not only would world peace be achieved.161 The restoration of land to its original
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German owners would save American taxpayers money on food and raw materials that
would otherwise be required to feed and rebuild Europe.162
Whereas Father Haertwig was witness to the end result of the expulsions from his
base in a truncated Germany, German-born journalist and professor Alexander Boker of
Taos, New Mexico declared that the expulsion of Germans from the new Polish
territories represented the de-Germanization of the affected territories.163 Boker’s October
6, 1945 letter to the Christian Science Monitor explained that the Polish government had
implemented a strategy of de-Germanization that included the removal of all
characteristics of German culture from the newly recovered territories via the expulsion
of Germans and removing German names from cities and streets replacing them with
Polish names.164 Boker opined that the expulsion of millions of Germans was a
“contradiction to the democratic and humanitarian and Christian principles for which the
United States have fought.”165 He also believed the Allies responsible for the tragedy had
“acted” no differently than Hitler.166
Nine former German Reichstag members in exile in the United States wanted the
American people to know that the United States supported a policy of border change that
would create mono-racial states that would result not in a lasting European peace but
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certain conflict in the future.167 They believed that awarding land in Eastern Germany to
Poland and expelling the German occupants was an “impediment to the free flow of men,
merchandise and ideas” that characterized a democratic world.168 The exile group
proposed that despite the “devastation” Germany had “unleashed on the world” it was
time to give the German people a chance to be peaceful and productive European
citizens.169 The letter co-signed by the nine exiles appeared in the January 13 issue of
Time and formed a portion of a declaration that had previously been sent to various
United States governmental officials that protested American led Allied policies of
frontier change and expulsion.170 To the nine exiles, such policies were acts of vengeance
that would never bring about lasting peace.171 In their opinion the only way durable peace
in East-Central Europe could be achieved was not through border shifting and forced
population transfer but rather through “understanding and reconstruction.”172
American Intellectuals and the Expulsions
Scholarly analysis of the expulsions did not start appearing until the beginning of
1946. Not all such pieces appeared in academic publications; some were published
independently by groups of intellectuals who sought to express their particular opinion on
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the forced removal of Germans from East-Central Europe. Although there were few
scholarly works regarding the expulsions, much of it expressed strong opinion and
criticism of the great powers for embracing convenience and disregarding humanity when
it came to their policy regarding Europe’s German minority following the war.
Sidney B. Fay, an American historian of the liberal school and professor at
Harvard from 1929 to 1946, criticized the policy of the United States and Great Britain
and portrayed the German expellees as the unnecessary byproduct of the political
machinations of great powers. He wrote in the March, 1946, edition of Current History
that a vast array of Germans were being forcefully removed from their homes to a
truncated and economically depressed Germany.173 Fay explained that the Allies had
officially classified individuals uprooted from their places of residence due to the
circumstances of war as displaced persons (DPs) or refugees.174 In addition to the DPs
and refugees, he noted there was a third group of individuals made home homeless by the
consequences of war, and that group was the German minority population of eastern,
southern and Central Europe that Allied policy had forcefully expelled from their historic
homes.175 Fay explained that the German minority populations had been expelled from
Silesia, East Prussia, the Free City of Danzig the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia, Russia,
Hungary, Yugoslavia and South Tyrol.176 Some of the expellees had been Germans
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repatriated by Hitler to eastern Germany and western Poland during the war but were
expelled back to Germany once the war ended.177 Most of the expellees, however, had
been “forcefully expelled from their ancestral homes” so as to make nations such as
Czechoslovakia and Poland mono-ethnic nation-states.178 Most importantly Fay
explained that the Germans expellees were not “classified” as either DPs or refugees and
thus received “no protection or assistance” from the United Nations Relief and
Rehabilitation Administration (UNRAA) and were “distributed among villages and
towns” that possessed little cultivatable farmland and very few “industrial jobs for locals
much less the expellees from the East.”179
In April 1947, Fay wrote that DPs and refugees were an unavoidable result of the
war but the German expellees of Europe were not.180 The expellees, most of who came
from East of the Oder-Neisse line or the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia were “victims of
human measures” after the unconditional surrender of Germany.181 A German expellee
experienced a “living death” characterized by starvation, near enslavement, exposure to
cold temperatures due to lack of shelter, and separation from family members.182 Fay
blamed the hopeless reality of the expellees on American and British officials who at
Yalta in February 1945 conceded German territory to Poland and the Allied approval at
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Potsdam of orderly and humane population transfers of Germans from Czechoslovakia,
Hungary and the newly recovered Polish territories.183
Poland’s expulsion of Germans from its newly-gained territory was tied to the
location of Poland’s Western border, which had the potential to impact Europe
geographically, economically and politically for decades. Isaiah Bowman an American
geographer, member of the Council on Foreign Relations and advisor to the State
Department during World War II, pointed to the expulsions as evidence that the “idea of
tolerance” had disappeared and the “goal of orderly and humane” was unachievable.184
Bowman asserted that the cruelty of the expulsions would open a “bank of hatred” that
would create the “need to separate the good people from the bad people” throughout
Europe and the consequences would be “eternal.”185 Polish officials felt themselves able
to handle the consequences of their expulsion policy because evicting the Germans would
remove a serious threat to Poland’s future security from within Poland and would also
free up land for those who had been similarly uprooted from what had previously been
eastern Poland.186 Bowman believed that the adoption of a policy of “recognized
fairness” that would include the evaluation of past history and the current situation along
with the establishment of a future ideal for dealing with Poland’s minority problem and
border issue, would best assist the United States in the prevention of inhumane acts that
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accompanied the expulsions in the future.187 He warned, if the United States did not
follow the strategy of waiting for a more peaceful environment to make Poland’s western
boundary “stable by international agreement” the most democratic nation on earth would
“confirm the injustice of an arbitrary or careless decision.”188 The failure to confront the
Soviet Union immediately after the conclusion of the war concerning Poland’s Western
frontier represented Allied confirmation of an unjust, inhumane and arbitrary policy of
expulsion implemented by the Polish government.
Like Bowman, Sidney B. Fay pointed to United States policy that demanded
Poland’s permanent Western border be decided at an undetermined future peace
conference as one of the main reasons why the Poles treated the Germans so cruelly.189
Hatred of Germans and revenge for occupation atrocities were obvious reasons for such
an attitude, but the failure to settle Poland’s western border status after Potsdam led to
Polish treatment of Germans mirroring Hitler’s policies in Poland during the
occupation.190 Fay declared that “even with sympathy for Poland the wholesale expulsion
of Germans was not right” and the viciousness of the expulsions was proof of Poland’s
“unilateral, arbitrary and unjust” interpretation of Article XIII of the Potsdam
Agreement.191 Germany had lost key agricultural and industrial land to the Poles and
gained millions in population as punishment for starting the war, but after a period of
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time, Fay suggested that some agricultural land in Lower Silesia, Brandenburg and
Pomerania should be returned to Germany.192
Allen W. Dulles, one of the original members of the Office of Strategic (OSS)
Services during World War II who served as Berlin bureau chief for a brief period after
the war, claimed that Russia’s need for a western buffer zone to secure the Russian
homeland was a major reason that the expulsions unfolded the way they did.193 By
controlling land as far west as the Oder-Neisse Russia could possibly use the threatened
restoration of “Germany’s ancient eastern border” as a way to guarantee future Polish
compliance with Russian policy wishes.194 Dulles believed that immediate United States
involvement in the placement of Poland’s western frontier was a much better strategic
policy than waiting to address the border issue at a future peace conference.195 The point
made by Dulles was a valid one, in that immediate international settlement of Poland’s
western border would possibly have made the expulsion of Germans from the OderNeisse region a bit more orderly and humane, in that a U.S. military presence would have
decreased violent and abusive behavior against the expellees. It would also have sent a
message to the Soviet Union that the future geographic shape of Europe would not be
decided without American input.
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One group of intellectuals protested the expulsion of Sudeten Germans from
Czechoslovakia and the provisions of Article XIII. This group of mostly northeastern
American intellectuals called themselves the American Friends of Democratic Sudetens
(AFDS), and members included prominent thinkers such as Roger N. Baldwin, cofounder of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), Oswald Garrison Villard owner
of the liberal publication The Nation and the New York Evening Post, and Robert J. Watt,
international representative for the American Federation of Labor (AFL).196 The
American Friends of Democratic Sudetens produced a pamphlet that protested American
support of the expulsion of Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia titled “The Tragedy
of a People: Racialism in Czechoslovakia.” The AFDS opposed the United States
government’s support of the expulsion of Germans from Czechoslovakia and elsewhere
in Europe, declaring Article XIII an American submission to “Hitler’s spirit.”197 Even
though the expulsions had been approved via international agreement the war had
effectively been lost because Hitler’s racial ideology was now endorsed by the United
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Columbia University, Liston Oaks editor of the New Leader, A. Phillip Randolph
President of the Union of Sleeping Car Porters, Rabbi David Sola Pool of the Spanish
and Portuguese Synagogue, Mark Stark Educational Director for the International
Ladies Garment Union, Norman Thomas Chairman of the Socialist Party, Michel
Williams founder of The Commonwealth, Matthew Woll Vice President of the
American Federation of Labor, Hollingsworth Wood Chairman of the International
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States.198 To back this point up the AFDS noted that in one of his final speeches Hitler
had “predicted that even if defeated his spirit would still live on” and they claimed that
American policy in favor of the expulsions was ample proof of that.199 The American
Friends of Democratic Sudetens wanted the ugly truth of American expulsion policy to
be known and urged the American people to “influence American policy” by raising their
voices as individuals and organizations to government officials.200 It was time for the
American people to be heard because even though Potsdam was supposed to “humanize
the expulsions from Czechoslovakia” and the newly recovered territories of Poland, it
had failed to do so.201
To emphasize their point, the American Friends of Democratic Sudetens included
evidence gleaned from newspapers, religious leaders, intellectuals and politicians. But the
biggest indictment of American expulsion policy came from an unexpected source, an
American soldier who had served in Czechoslovakia and witnessed the expulsions
firsthand. The unidentified soldier was angered by what had happened to the Sudeten
Germans and stated: “I thought I came over here to stop this sort of thing, where on
God’s earth do our American ideals come in?”202 He also asserted that even though the
Czechs were American allies he “despised them” and really had nothing but positive
feelings toward the Sudeten Germans but his hands were tied and could do nothing but
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complain about the situation.203 In closing, the soldier praised the American Friends of
Democratic Sudetens for their attempt to educate the American people about what was
going on in Czechoslovakia.204 Such a stirring testimonial by a member of the American
military who had witnessed the horror of the expulsion process solidified the introduction
of The Tragedy of a People which closed by urging all Americans to remember the war
had been fought to uphold “principles which we have long accepted in words and so
callously flaunted in deeds” as a nation.205 The Tragedy of a People generated next no
publicity or press coverage of any kind and, therefore, no policy change by the United
States government in relation to the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans, most probably
because of limited distribution to the public but also because the expulsions had largely
been completed.
As a solution to the minority problem the Committee Against Mass Expulsion
(CAME) saw the expulsion of Germans from the newly acquired Polish territories as an
offense to the “basic principles of civilization.”206 The Committee Against Mass
Expulsion opposed frontier change and the expulsion of Germans from territory in
Eastern Germany awarded to Poland by the Allies after the war. Members of the
Committee Against Mass Expulsions were liberal intellectuals from the fields of
journalism, higher education, religion and social activism. In fact, many of the

Ibid.
Ibid.
205 Ibid.
203
204

Committee Against Mass Expulsion, Land of the Dead: The Study of Deportations
from East Germany (New York: Committee Against Mass Expulsions, 1947), 4.
194
206

individuals involved in the Committee Against Mass Expulsions were also affiliated with
the AFDS, but there were a few notable exceptions such as William Henry Chamberlin a
socialist journalist for the Christian Science Monitor, Varian Fry founder of what
eventually became the International Rescue Committee, radio commentator H.V.
Kaltenborn and radio and print journalist Dorothy Thompson.207 These thinkers and
activists voiced their opposition to United States policy on the expulsion of Germans by
Poland and the question of Poland’s western frontier in a pamphlet, The Land of the
Dead: The Study of Deportations from East Germany published in 1947.
The pamphlet placed responsibility for the brutality of the Polish expulsions of
Germans from the new Polish territories squarely on the shoulders of the Truman
administration.208 To CAME, the “wholesale expulsion of the local population” of
Germans was a policy perpetuated by the United States at Potsdam that was a betrayal to
the American people’s standards of truth, justice and humanity.209 Not only was the
United States government responsible for the inhumanity of the expulsions, the failure of
the American press to address the matter was disconcerting as well.210 According to
CAME, the Allies were understandably sympathetic to “Poland’s suffering” during the
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war but Poland should not have been awarded German land.211 Rather, it should have
been given aid for economic recovery and the rebuilding of infrastructure.212 Instead of
dealing with the expulsions in a fair and moral manner the United States chose to protect
the “atrocities of our Allies” and assist in the perpetuation of new and old hatreds
throughout East-Central Europe.213 During the expulsions millions of Germans had been
exposed to disease, starvation or been executed due to the “attitude of resignation” that
characterized United States policy toward the expulsions.214 A lasting peace would never
be achieved because the “rights of man were being replaced by the rights of nations.”215
Reaction to CAME emanated from organizations opposite in ideology such as the
Society for the Prevention of World War III (SPWW3) and the American Friends of
Czechoslovakia (AFC). The SPWW3 was founded in 1944 by Rex Stout, author of the
Nero Wolfe detective stories, and included such high profile members as First Lady
Eleanor Roosevelt, Albert Einstein and Henry Morgenthau.216 It functioned to combat
“the organized German propaganda” and undeserved sympathy that was widely prevalent
in universities, the business world “and all throughout American Life.”217 Most of all, the
SPWW3 favored a harsh peace that would prevent another rise in German militarism and
“Potsdam seemed to denote that tough terms remained the policy” of American
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leaders.218 The SPWW3 accused individuals and groups like CAME of being “prophets
of doom” who were unduly sympathetic Germany.219 The difference between the CAME
and the SPWW3 was in the depth and breadth of their respective messages; CAME
focused on the forcible expulsion of minorities throughout Europe and dedicated itself to
exposing the suffering inflicted upon the expellees by the declaration of Potsdam.
Possessing a wider focus the SPWW3 favored a harsh peace toward Germany and
supported every aspect of the Potsdam Agreement but focused mainly on the economic
provisions of the agreement. For them support for the expulsions was just one strategic
prong in the SPWW3 mission to combat liberal America’s sympathetic stance to all
things German.
Like CAME, the AFC also possessed a high profile membership including
President of Columbia University, Nicholas Murray Butler, and President of the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace and adviser to the State Department, James T.
Shotwell plus Edouard Beněs as an honorary chairman.220 The AFC basically published
pamphlets about the struggle facing Czechoslovakia during Nazi occupation. Democracy
in Czechoslovakia written by Brackett Lewis in 1941, expounded on Czechoslovakia
being the foundation of democracy in Central Europe and suggested that the Sudeten
Germans had possessed more rights than required by minority rights treaties of the day.221
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CAMES’s opposition to U.S. expulsion policy was valid and at the same time
cliché. There is substance o the idea that the U.S. should have approached postwar
Poland differently than it did by adopting the policy of offering recovery and economic
aid to Polish leaders instead of agreeing to award Poland German territory. Yet it must be
remembered that the U.S. was part of an alliance and that contained a member, the Soviet
Union that had suffered much during the war and liberated Poland, which had also
suffered greatly and in the minds of Allied leaders the awarding of territory to Poland
made up for massive war losses. The intellectuals of CAME failed to realize that the
United States was not working alone and had to take part in the process of collective
policymaking with Great Britain and Russia and had to conduct itself accordingly. As
CAME mentioned the Potsdam Agreement did legitimize the inhumanity of the
expulsions and set the stage for the continuation of old hatreds indefinitely. Liberal in
ideology CAME, to a large degree, placed blame for the horror of the expulsions on the
Democratic Truman administration, which it also accused of betraying the humane nature
of the American people. The Land of the Dead made many good points regarding the
expulsions but it changed nothing because the expulsions were well underway by the
time it was published. Potsdam may not have been perfect but it was the best of many bad
solutions and for the U.S. and Great Britain to do nothing at all would have been the
ultimate display of inhumanity. To criticize Potsdam and suggest policy changes in
midstream as CAME did in 1947 was unrealistic in that the only solution that could have
been adopted in that time was the turning back of the expellees by the Americans and the
British which would have resulted in genocide throughout East-Central Europe.
However, the American support of Potsdam and the expulsions allowed ethnic cleansing
198

to occur which did run counter to he American principles of freedom and justice. But
what the members of CAME failed to realize was that sometimes principles are subject to
the pressure of insane realities and the best solution to the German minority question was
the worst reality.
The Land of the Dead had a very isolated impact on public opinion concerning the
expulsions in the United States. But there was a place where it aroused a great bit of
passion, and surprisingly, that place was Germany. From an American historical
perspective based upon the fact that Germany was a defeated and downtrodden nation
after the war, it would be logical to presume that the German people were silent on the
Potsdam Agreement and its future impact on Germany out of the powerlessness and
embarrassment of defeat. But, that was not the case; the German people were very critical
of the Potsdam Agreement, which generated heated and vociferous debate.222 The
German public believed the Potsdam Agreement would not “last ten years” and its
collapse would bring about anarchy and nuclear war.223 Anti-Czech, Pole and Soviet
sentiment throughout Germany that was the foundation for revisionist thinking regarding
Potsdam after the publication of The Land of the Dead in 1947 fueled disgust with the
Potsdam Agreement.224
Three versions of The Land of the Dead were published and distributed in
Germany in 1947. There was the American version published by CAME, another version
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published in Lippstadt, Nordrhein-Westphalia by Priest Council Georg Goebel with the
title translated into German as Das Land der Toten and a third version published by the
Foreign Policy Committee of the conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU) in the
British Zone of Occupation.225 The text of the CDU edition was altered to accompany
their political goals and ideology that believed the Potsdam-sanctioned expulsions
ignored and thus violated the principles of humanity.226 Not surprisingly, the opinion of
the CDU was prevalent throughout Germany, largely due to the CDU presenting the
message of the American version of The Land of the Dead in a way that represented the
concerns of the German people in regard to international law.227 For the German people,
it was not “the skill of the argument but the spirit of how it was written” and that Land of
the Dead in its various forms demanded that the wrongs of Potsdam be corrected.228
German Historians Eva Hahn, a specialist in Bohemian history and her husband
Hans Henning Hahn, a professor at the University of Oldenburg and Eastern Europeanist,
explain that a “comparison” of the three versions of the Land of the Dead discloses that
its motivations were not humanitarian but political.229 Rather, it was an “appeal for the
revision of U.S. foreign policy” to revert to its democratic past and abandon the Potsdam
Agreement which threatened the basic fundamentals of “civilization which stands on the
individual’s right to his home.”230 The lack of an attentive American audience for The
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Land of the Dead and its widespread acceptance in Germany displays the cold
indifference of the American people and American policy toward the not only the
expellees but also the people of Germany.
Coordinator of Catholic Affairs in Germany after the war, Bishop Muench of
Fargo, North Dakota explained, “the one thing which is perhaps even a greater atrocity
than the Allied looting of 12 million people is the conspiracy of silence about it” and he
placed blame on the American public and media.231 To say a conspiracy of silence
existed is a bit strong because coverage of the expulsions appeared in newspapers,
periodicals, scholarly journals and works published by several interest groups. The
problem was that even though the tragedy of the expulsions appeared in newspapers and
periodicals they were not mentioned on a consistent basis in reported stories, editorials or
in letters to publications. Frank discussion about the expulsions in popular newspapers
and periodicals originated from Europe from those who had a vested interest in the
expulsions, such as politicians, diplomats and members of the clergy. For the average
American, however, the fact the war had ended and the American people were moving on
and separating themselves from the tragedies of Europe blinded them to the fate of the
German expellees.
Public debate about the expulsions did take place within some clerical, intellectual
and scholarly circles. The orderly and humane declaration of Potsdam and the position of
Poland’s western boundary generated some outspoken opinion most of which criticized
policy decisions that seemed to set Europe up for more unrest in the not too distant
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future. Thus, to these critics, the United States and Great Britain seemed to have betrayed
the ideology of freedom and humanity for which the war had been fought. And most
Americans cared little and seemed content to believe that the war had ended once the
shooting had stopped, but in reality it had only just begun.
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CHAPTER VI
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN POLICY AND OPINION

For United States and British officials the transfer of Germans by the
Czechoslovakian and Polish governments was just one of many issues of concern during
the Potsdam Conference of 1945. In fact, they viewed to be of secondary importance,
“especially” President Harry S. Truman who, according to Alfred de Zayas saw the
transfer of Germans as “unimportant.”1 In his memoirs, Secretary of State James F.
Byrnes admitted as much, explaining that American policymakers believed that other
issues were far more critical to the security of Europe, such as setting the date for
discussion of a final peace agreement with Germany, the economic and political structure
of occupied Germany, the implementation of everything previously agreed upon at the
Yalta Conference, and a reworking of how reparations would be disbursed.2 However,
once the expulsions began and details about the violence and hunger that characterized
them became known criticism of Article XIII intensified from both American diplomats
in Europe and members of Congress in Washington. Although some in the American
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diplomatic corps elieved the expulsion of Germans to be justified, some politicians in the
House of Representatives and Senate believed the treatment of the expellees ran counter
to the humanitarian ideals of the United States.
Loyal Servants but Skeptical Observers
Although low on the list of priorities among the Western Allies, the expulsion of
Germans by the Czech and Polish governments could not be completely ignored. The
mass movement of Germans possessed the potential to destabilize East-Central Europe
both at the point of departure and in the immediate and long-term future after the
expellees had settled into German society. While Truman focused his attention
elsewhere, American diplomats and military administrators on the ground were acutely
aware of these practical problems. American and British diplomats and European
officials feared that if the Sudeten Germans were not expeditiously expelled,
Czechoslovakian President Edouard Benes might be replaced by a less cooperative
leader.3 Benes had agreed to abide by the provisions put forth in Article XIII of the
Potsdam Agreement regarding the “orderly and humane” transfer of Germans from
Czechoslovakia.4 Although the degree of Benes’s adherence to the guidelines of Article
XIII could be questioned, he mostly cooperated with Allied administration of the
transfers and was preferable to a leader who might exploit the Czech population’s hatred
of the Sudeten Germans to act unilaterally in solving the Sudeten German problem.
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Poland represented a different situation as the Polish border had been moved west into
what had been Germany before the Allies could react, which made the expulsion of
Germans “unavoidable” in the strategic calculations of American diplomats.5 Regardless,
the presence of Soviet forces influenced American decisions in relation to the expulsions
more than any other factor.
At the time Potsdam Conference commenced on August 2, 1945 the Soviet Union
controlled Czechoslovakia and Poland politically and militarily. Eastern Poland had
become part of the Soviet Union and a Polish government heavily influenced by the
Soviets administered the rest of Poland. The Russians also occupied most of
Czechoslovakia except for the area south of the Karlsbad-Pilsen-Budweis line that was
under American control. One of the most contentious points of negotiation at Potsdam
concerned the location of Poland’s western border, which the Western Allies preferred to
be located at the Curzon Line while the Soviets preferred the more western location of
the Oder-Neisse line. Unable to reach an agreement, both parties pledged to delay
discussion of the matter until a peace conference could be arranged. In effect, the
temporary boundary of Poland became permanent because the Polish administration of
former German territory up to the Oder-Neisse line was under direct control of the Soviet
Union.6 This fact not lost on the Western Allies who knew there was very little chance of
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getting the Oder-Neisse territory returned to Germany at a future peace conference.7 This
is relevant because even though the United States opposed the unilateral wild expulsions
that had occurred in Czechoslovakia and Poland, they were likely to continue and prove
to be uncontrollable because of Soviet political influence over the expelling nations.
Thus, military action to halt the expulsions was never a viable option. The Soviet Union
was a wartime ally, however distasteful, and agreements had been made concerning the
expulsions with Czechoslovakian and Polish leaders before the war. Thus, the Western
Allies believed that the best way to impose some order on the expulsions was to regulate
them through international agreement, which the Potsdam Agreement supposedly did,
although with varying degrees of effectiveness.
American officials recognized that an unspecified number of Germans were going
to be transferred regardless but they hoped that the transfers would not be wholesale in
nature.8 United States Secretary of State James F. Byrnes revealed in a post-Potsdam
memo in October of 1945 that the United States had no intention to “encourage or
commit ourselves to transfers in cases where other means of adjustment were practicable”
but other means of adjustment were never considered by Western Allies or the Soviet
Union and their communist underlings in Czechoslovakia and Poland.9 United States
Political Advisor to Germany Robert Murphy thought the violation of the “orderly and
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humane” directive of the Potsdam Agreement by Czechoslovakia and Poland was
unacceptable and a disgrace to “humanity.”10 Murphy acknowledged that the presence of
the United States military in Czechoslovakia had prevented the expulsions from being
more inhumane than they were but by allowing the expulsions to occur the United States
was a willing accomplice in a crime of convenience.11 Murphy viewed the United States
military’s logistical support of the expulsion process as an affront to the “American way
of life” and core American beliefs and principles.12 Secretary Byrnes was less harsh in his
assessment because he helped to implement the policy, but he did point out to United
States Ambassador to Poland Arthur Bliss Lane that “such mass distress and
maltreatment of the weak and helpless” by the Poles was a violation of the Potsdam
Agreement.13
Similar doubts and concerns existed in the upper echelon of the United States
military administration in Europe. General Lucius D. Clay Deputy Governor of the
American Zone of Occupation within the Office of the Military Government of the
United States in Germany (OMGUS), believed the expulsion of Germans from EastCentral Europe possessed the potential to create long-term problems within the nations of
the region. To Clay the removal of people from their historic homes to a war-ravaged
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foreign nation where they were unwelcome and without personal property or resources
was an act of heartlessness.14 Clay pointed out that Germans expelled from
Czechoslovakia and the recovered Polish territories were being sent to a nation they had
been “separated from” for hundreds of years.15 The expelled Germans spoke a completely
different dialect of German and they “no longer shared common customs or traditions nor
did they think of Germany as home.”16 Most importantly the German expellees viewed
their exile to Germany as temporary and saw their return to their historic homelands as
inevitable, making them a group that had the potential to destabilize East-Central
Europe.17 To Clay there was no easy solution to the German minority problem.18 It was
not just a German problem but also a European problem that had to be dealt with
effectively in order to ensure lasting peace in Europe.19
As Deputy Military Governor of the American Zone of Occupation Clay was not
only an eyewitness to the plight of the expellees but privy to information concerning their
treatment from various special advisors. One such person was James K. Pollock, a
political science professor at the University of Michigan, who served under Clay in 19451946 where he advised OMGUS on the structure of Germany’s postwar government.
During his time as an observer and adviser, Pollock worried that the manner in which the
expellees had been treated from departure to arrival in the U.S. zone represented a threat
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to long-term social and political stability in Germany after the occupation ended.20 In a
critique of the handling of expellees in the U.S. zone Pollock characterized the settling of
expellees “as communities” as unfair to the expellees and the communities where they
settled.21 He referred to the case of Sudeten Germans who had been “settled too close to
the Bavarian border” rather than being assigned to Northern Bavaria and elsewhere
throughout Germany farther away from the Sudetenland.22 He worried about attempts by
these Sudeten Germans to return home and preventing possible terror attacks emanating
from Germany against those who had taken their property in neighboring
Czechoslovakia.23 The two million German expellees who were to eventually inhabit the
U.S. zone, Pollock warned, would create food and housing shortages that could prove to
be insoluble.24 Pollock noted in his diary in the spring of 1946 that the “Potsdam decision
which has resulted in moving millions of people hither and yon will, in the end, have
tremendous international consequences.”25 The crowding, starvation and despair
observed by Pollock led to his evaluation that the expulsion and relocation of Germans
would have an adverse impact within Germany and throughout the region of East-Central
Europe.
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Nevertheless, there were other American officials on the ground, who supported
the Allied policy of expulsion and saw the population transfers as both a viable solution
to the German minority troubles of Czechoslovakia and Poland and as means by which to
exact retribution for German acts of violence and oppression during the wartime
occupation of both nations. One such person was Laurence A. Steinhardt, the United
States Ambassador to Czechoslovakia following World War II.26 Steinhardt believed that
the expulsions were justified by the six-year German occupation of Czechoslovakia and
was subsequently shocked that there had been “so little ill treatment of the Germans”
expelled from Czechoslovakia.27 At a December 1947 question-and-answer on
Czechoslovakia, Steinhardt pronounced that the transfer of Germans was more humane
than anything “carried out in Europe before.”28 He went on to state that the United States
Army had implemented and executed the expulsions efficiently, few complaints had been
filed, and those complaints that had been filed originated from American officers who
had been persuaded to do so by their Sudeten German girlfriends.29 Steinhardt firmly
believed that Czechoslovakia had the right to expel the Sudeten Germans as long as it
was done humanely, which he believed had been the case.30 To Steinhardt, any debate
over the morality of the expulsions was a moot point because they had now been
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concluded and could not be reversed.31 Similarly, Ambassador to Poland Arthur Bliss
Lane cited the destruction of Poland during the German occupation as justification for the
expulsion and made the cruel treatment of Germans during the expulsion by the Poles
understandable.32 Lane believed that the Poles should be allowed to treat the German
expellees as they desired without rebuke.
Criticism from Afar
In Congress, a very small number of Democrats and Republicans expressed strong
opposition to the expulsion of Germans. The legislators had not participated in the
planning and negotiation of the Potsdam Accords, including the controversial Article
XIII. Senator Kenneth Wherry (R-NE) believed that the State Department had not acted
in the best interests of the United States in this matter.33 Wherry decried Poland’s
expulsion of 40,000-60,000 Germans from the city of Breslau who were forced to endure
the inhumanity of being crowded into railroad cars for a trip that was “instant death” for
the old and young children.34 Their unfortunate fate was a direct result of Article XIII,
which had been negotiated solely by the State Department without input and approval by
Congress.35 According to Senator Wherry, Article XIII and subsequent population
transfers ran counter both to American values and also American interests in Europe.36

Ibid.
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Czechoslovakia (Steinhardt), 30
November 1945, FRUS, 1945, II: 1318-1319.
33 Cong. Rec., 79th., 2d sess., 1946, 92, pt. 1: 894-895.
34 Ibid, 900.
35 Ibid, 894-895.
36 Ibid.
31
32

211

Congressional criticism of the Potsdam Agreement generally focused on how it
violated all that the United States stood for and represented a betrayal of the American
people by their leaders. Senator James Eastland (D-MS) called the removal of Germans
from the Sudetenland and Oder-Neisse and the hardships that accompanied their
expulsion “one of the most cruel chapters in history.”37 According to Eastland Article
XIII of Potsdam represented a compensatory give away of territory by the Allies to the
Czechs, Poles and Russians that ran counter to the ideas of justice and peace and instead
spread hunger and disease.38 Eastland explained that the United States was bound to
prevent the starvation of the expellees both legally and morally.39 Most bothersome to
Eastland was the fact that the American people seemed to know so very little about what
was going on in Europe in late 1945, and he charged that American government officials
were complicit in a “conspiracy of silence” to hide the cruelty of American policy toward
the German expellees.40 Partial blame for the cruel nature of the expulsion policy, in the
opinion of Eastland, belonged to the American people who were not only gullible but
also happily uniformed about the plight of the German expellees.41 By allowing Article
XIII to become United States policy and international law at Potsdam Eastland argued
that President Truman had failed to bring security to Europe.42 Eastland had a unique
perspective on the expulsion policy having witnessed firsthand the impact of Article XIII
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on the expellees and the rest of Germany during a Senate Naval Affairs Committee trip to
Europe in 1945.43 The delegation traveled through cities and towns of Bavaria and into
Austria on June 1-2, 1945, during the phase of wild expulsions of Sudeten Germans from
Czechoslovakia.44
Senator Henrik Shipstead (R-MN), an old isolationist also opposed the Potsdam
expulsion policy and voiced his concerns at various times. Shipstead claimed that the
Potsdam Agreement had transformed international law into absolute rule by the victors of
World War II, who strengthened their power in Europe at the expense of helpless
millions who had no recourse.45 It was unfathomable to Shipstead that the American
people possessed so little knowledge of the expulsion and starvation of 16 million to 18
million German expellees.46 Even more unfathomable to the senator was the failure of the
United States government to inform the American people of the privation and destitution
experienced by the Germans as a result of the expulsions.47 To Shipstead the existence of
22 million homeless expellees, displaced persons and refugees in Germany was proof that
the freedom for which the war had been fought was not coming to fruition.48

Wolfgang Schlauch, “American Policy Towards Germany, 1945,” Contemporary
European History 5, no. 4 (1970): 124.
44 Cong. Rec., 79th Cong., 1st sess., 1945, 91, pt. 9: 11371-11379; Naval Affairs
Subcommittee Trip to Europe, May 25, 1945-June 14, 1945, Log of Military and
Naval Affairs Subcommittee Trip to European and Mediterranean Theaters of
Operation, James O. Eastland Collection, File I, Series 1: Personal/Political Papers,
Subseries 14: Trips, Box 1, Folder 1, University of Mississippi: Archives and Special
Collections; Oxford, MS.
45 Cong. Rec. Appx., 79th Cong., 1st sess., 1945, 91, pt. 13: A5416.
46 Ibid, A417.
47 Ibid.
48 Cong. Rec., 79th Cong., 2d sess., 1946, 92, pt. 9: 511.
43

213

Congressman Charles W. Vursell (R-IL) similarly castigated the Truman
administration for not providing sufficient information explaining the substance of
Article XIII.49 Vursell believed that Article XIII ran counter to the Christian principles of
the American people and their kindhearted, humanitarian nature.50 Article XIII served no
other function than to sow the seeds of hatred within Germany, and all of Europe. Despite
former President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s pledge to treat the German people fairly quite
the opposite had occurred.51 If provided factual information regarding the hunger, disease
and death that resulted from the expulsions, Vursell firmly believed that the American
public would force a change in policy pertaining to the expulsions.52
The most fierce and vociferous critic of the expulsions and the Potsdam
Agreement was Senator William Langer (R-ND). Langer’s interest in the expulsions and
the fate of postwar Germany emanated from his German ancestry. His father, Frank J.
Langer, had immigrated to the United States from Michelsdorf, located in the
Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia and home to millions of Germans since the 1400s but
who now faced expulsion in 1946.53 In regard to foreign policy ideology, Langer
belonged to a group called the old isolationists who believed that for Europe to remain
peaceful, an economically and socially strong Germany would be a necessity and could
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be achieved without the United States providing economic support to “half the continent”
of Europe.54 Langer was an isolationist, but he did not object to the application of
American military power when and where it was really needed. His isolationism
originated from the existence of a large population of Ukrainian and Lithuanian Germans
who had immigrated to a fourteen-county area of the Red River Valley in North Dakota
in the 1890s.55 These Germans found themselves unable to “send, food, clothing and
farming implements” to family and friends in Germany after the war because of the
American policy on “humanitarian aid,” that Langer characterized as “totalitarian in
nature.”56
Aside from his German heritage, Langer consistently, championed the underdog
and was “always on the side of the poor man, the little man, the under privileged or those
who had been neglected by society as a whole.”57 By 1946, there was no more neglected
group than the Germans expelled from Czechoslovakia and the new Polish territories.
Langer compared the plight of the neglected in postwar Europe to farmers in North
Dakota who saw themselves as a “colonial” possession of Wall Street.58 According to
Charles M. Barber, Professor Emeritus of German-American studies at Northeastern
Illinois University and editor of the Yearbook of German American Studies, Eintracht
and several articles on Langer, it was the exploitation of the people and resources of
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North Dakota and their similarity to other exploited “peoples around the world that gave
him a larger sense of moral anger” that he directed to the predicament of the expellees
following the war.59 Langer spoke for those who had been exposed to the inhumanity of
war and postwar geopolitics, spoke of the Holocaust and vertreibung (the German name
for the flight and expulsion of Germans from East-Central Europe that occurred after
World War II from the spring of 1945 through the end of 1947), and acknowledged that
both Jew and German had suffered greatly.60
Although the Holocaust and expulsion of Germans had been chronicled on a
regular basis by the American media the American people were largely indifferent to the
ordeal of the Jews and expellees who were caught up in circumstances beyond their
control and had been punished inhumanely for being German.61 Langer “abhorred the
indifference among Christians in the United States to the remnant surviving after Hitler’s
killing of millions of Jews” and it was to the indifference of the American people and the
brutal starvation and uncertainty inflicted as a result of the Potsdam Agreement that he
directed his March 29, 1946, Senate speech.62 Titled “The Famine in Germany,” he
criticized American citizens and leaders for having accepted the expulsion of Germans
from their homes and demanded that the expulsions be suspended until they were,
without a doubt, orderly and humane.63 Langer cited the words of George Orwell, who
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believed that the Allies had allowed crimes against humanity to be committed against the
Germans as punishment for having started the war or had ignored them because the
Germans had angered and frightened the world and for that the world should show them
no pity.64
Langer declared that politicians had a duty to inform the American people about
the horrid conditions in Central Europe, despite the reluctance of the Truman
administration to make public information about the expulsions and the overall
occupation of Germany.65 Langer urged his fellow Senators to counter what he claimed to
be “almost a conspiracy of silence in the press” concerning the treatment of Germans
because they had access to information most Americans did not.66 Here, Langer referred
to classified information possessed by the Truman administration contained in a report by
the Russian-created German Central Administration for Health that gave a description of
conditions facing the expellees in the Russian zone of occupation.67According to the
report, conditions were so atrocious that Langer likened them to the period of Black
Death that scourged medieval Europe.68 Langer claimed reiterated that there was almost a
“conspiracy of silence in the press” and politicians had a civic duty to inform the
American people of events and conditions in occupied Germany.69
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Contrary to the claims of Langer, there was no conspiracy of silence concerning
the plight of the expellees. Stories pertaining to the expulsion of Germans from EastCentral Europe might not have appeared on the front page of major American
newspapers but there was enough coverage to nix the idea of a media-led conspiracy of
silence. Langer was correct that the expellees were facing a nightmare. However, the
horrid conditions that they faced were not exactly a secret even though the amount of
press coverage concerning the expulsions in comparison to other postwar events was
minimal. Had there been a desire by the American public to learn more about the
situation facing the expellees there would have been more press coverage and most likely
more questions and involvement by politicians on behalf of the expellees. At the time
there was very little sympathy for anything German among the American public. The
Truman administration, in Langer’s opinion, had disgraced civilization through its
support, implementation and enforcement of the Potsdam Agreement, which he thought
ridiculous and responsible for having exposed millions to “cruelty unknown to
civilizations.”70 Langer believed that this cruelty stemmed from the Western Allies’
failure to confront the ethnic cleansing conducted by the Czechs, Poles and Soviets
before and after Potsdam.71
Nothing irked Langer more than United States food policy in Germany, which
was based on President Roosevelt’s premise that the Germans “should not have a level of
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subsistence above the lowest level of the people they conquered.”72 Subsequently “a
disease and unrest formula” devised and implemented by the Supreme Headquarters of
the Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) set the average calorie intake of the German
people at 1550 calories a day, which in actuality was somewhat lower in the summer of
1945 at 700-1190 calories per person.73 Langer vehemently opposed the United States
policy of starvation in Germany and heavily criticized the U.S. limitation on
humanitarian aid and the failure to get food into Germany as totalitarian.74 American food
policy prioritized the “feeding of non-German displaced persons and liberated Allied
nationals” and left the expellees at the end of the food supply chain in Germany.75 The
massive influx of millions of expellees from Czechoslovakia and the new Polish
territories intensified the scarcity of food in postwar Germany, which placed greater
pressure on the United States government to feed the German people.76 Food might have
been scarce but the unequal distribution of food by the United States indicates a policy of
punishment via starvation, which created a situation in which certain groups of people in
occupied Germany were considered more worthy than others.
Government officials joined the criticism of U.S. food policy in Germany. Thirtyfour senators signed a petition that demanded that the United States Zone of Occupation
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in Germany be opened to inspection and be serviced by private relief organizations.77
Public pressure followed during the spring and summer of 1946 when criticism of the
American handling of the food crisis in Germany by American humanitarian workers,
newspaper and magazine correspondents as well as various “editors and publishers” who
toured Germany suggested food assistance was needed in Germany.78 The United States
Military Governor in Germany Lucius D. Clay, warned War Department officials,
Secretary of War Howard Petersen and Major General O.P. Echols of the Civil Affairs
Division, that hunger in Germany could lead to severe social and political crises if it were
not curtailed, but because food policy was controlled by the Truman administration Clay
could do little more than issue a warning.79 U.S. food policy came under such scrutiny
that American relief agencies such as the American Friends Service Committee and
CARE were permitted by the Truman administration to provide food clothing and
miscellaneous supplies from private sources under the umbrella of a governmentsanctioned alliance of relief organizations, the Council of Relief Agencies Licensed for
Operation in Germany (CRALOG) in late 1946.80 The influx of aid represented a muchneeded change in U.S. food policy toward Germany, but even with this increased
distribution of aid food shortages continued.81
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Langer did not confine his support to the hungry and mistreated. He also spoke
out on behalf of the Polish people. He believed that they had also been victims of
Potsdam and over the course of six years had been “stabbed in the back not only by
Germany, but by Russia, England and the United States.”82 Poland was so unstable and
unsafe that there was, in the words of Langer, “no security left for man nor beast.”83 To
Langer the “casual American acquiescence” in the transfer of German territory to Poland
that not only displaced millions of people but also bequeathed livestock and grain lands
to the Poles that could have been used to feed Germans, made no sense, and he did not
understand the indifference of American statesman and the public to these
circumstances.”84 He believed all of Europe’s post-World War II problems were the
product of an inept and aloof United States State Department bereft of world experience
and therefore incapable of formulating practical policy in Europe or anywhere else.85
Langer was correct in that United States approval of the cessation of German lands to
Poland did contribute to the chaos and hunger of postwar Europe, but he failed to
recognize the other half of the equation in Poland and all of postwar Europe, the Soviet
Union. With a formidable military and a desire to carve out a sphere of influence in
Eastern Europe, the United States viewed the acquiescence of German land and the
transfer of Germans from that territory to be practical and the best of many bad policy
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options. Practicality, however, led to the perception of indifference and aloofness.
Langer’s March 1946 Senate speech was important because it brought to light
deficiencies in American support for Article XIII and the injustice and inhumanity it
inflicted upon Germans expelled by Czechoslovakia and Poland after the war. Langer’s
speech spoke for the “unwanted of the earth,” whether Jews, Poles, German expellees or
any other group that suffered indignities from “vindictive” U.S. policies in Europe.86
Unfortunately his humanitarian views were rather unique and were never taken seriously
“by most pundits at the time.”87
Government Justification of Expulsion Policy
American officials may have supported the expulsions but they wanted to explain
that the United States held no direct responsibility for the hunger, chaos and inhumanity
they generated, and that American adherence to Article XIII of the Potsdam agreement
was a humane reaction to events beyond American control. Hence, the House of
Representatives Committee on Judicial Affairs empowered a subcommittee to investigate
the role the United States played in the expulsion of Germans and the plight of refugees.
By commissioning the investigation of the subcommittee Congress looked to differentiate
its postwar policies from those of the Soviet Union in these early days of the Cold War.
By launching the investigation it was to be proven that American adherence to Article
XIII of the Potsdam agreement was an act of humanitarian intervention. The committee
was headed by representative Francis E. Walter (D-PA), led the group of fellow

86
87

Barber, “The Isolationist as Interventionist,” 415-416.
Larsen, “William Langer,” 196.
222

representatives on a fact finding mission to Austria and Germany from September 1
through 22, 1949, to investigate the expulsions and gather information pertaining to
American responsibility for them.88 Upon arrival in the United States Zone of Occupation
at Frankfurt am Main on September 7, members of the subcommittee held hearings
arranged by U.S. Military Governor John J. McCloy where they heard “testimony” and
statements from representatives of American military and civilian staffs and German
expellee organizations, German government administrators, labor unions, business
organizations and leaders of American aid organizations.89 After the conclusion of the
hearings on September 8-9 and a briefing by General Thomas T. Handy of the European
Command, United States Army (EUCOM), fact-finding missions traveled to their
assigned regions in Austria and Germany, escorted by liaisons of the Central
Administration Division of OMGUS, the Central Affairs Division and EUCOM to assess
the refugee and expellee situation.90 Group North, comprising representatives Michael A.
Feighan (D-OH), William T. Byrne (D-NY) and Clifford P. Case (R-NJ) traveled through
the British Zone of Occupation into refugee camps in Lower Saxony and SchleswigHolstein.91 Group Central, made up of representatives Frank L. Chelf (D-KY), Josephy
R. Bryson (D-SC) and Chauncey W. Reed (R-IL) toured camps and other stations of
interest in the Province of Hesse and the cities Limburg, Neustatdt, Marburg and West
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Berlin.92 Group south made up of representative Francis E. Walter, Chairman of the
subcommittee, J. Frank Wilson (D-TX) and Frank Fellows (R-ME), inspected places of
interest in the areas of Stuttgart, Munich and rural Bavaria with emphasis on camps
located near border of Czechoslovakia.93
The real mission of the subcommittee was to correct a “historical error” that had
emanated from the “misinterpretation” of Article XIII of the Potsdam Agreement within
the United States and Europe that held the United States responsible for the “expulsion of
national minorities of German ethnic origin.”94 The subcommittee issued its findings
entitled Expellees and Refugees of German Ethnic Origin, known as the Walter Report,
on March 24, 1950. The report concluded, that the “indisputable facts clearly show the
fallacy of the theory of American co-responsibility for the uprooting of German expellees
and refugees.”95 The Walter Report denied American responsibility for the expulsions by
ascertaining that a “large proportion of Germans” had been forcibly removed from their
homelands prior to the finalization of the Potsdam Agreement in August 1945, and by
also citing Josef Stalin’s assertion at Yalta that most of the Germans had fled in fear of
the Red Army.96 Furthermore, the subcommittee refuted the idea of American coresponsibility for the expulsions by claiming that the United States only agreed to Article
XIII so that the expulsion of remaining Germans would be “more orderly and humane,”
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and to save those poised for expulsion to the Soviet “sub-arctic” from a hideous fate.97
The report went on to cite that the expulsions were going to occur no matter what and
that the refusal of the Soviet Union “to do anything about them” had to be taken into
consideration when evaluating United States approval of Article XIII.98 In fact, the
subcommittee believed Article XIII reflected the principles of humanitarianism and
internationalism that were vital to solving the problem of Europe’s “national
minorities.”99
One could call the Walter Report an act of self-persuasion of innocence that
concluded the Germans had fled or been expelled before the implementation of the
Potsdam Agreement.100 Not only did the Walter Report deny U.S. responsibility in
relation to the brutality of the expulsions, it portrayed the Americans as saviors of the
expelled Germans through the implementation of Article XIII.101 The Walter Report not
only denied American responsibility for the expulsions.102 It assigned responsibility
squarely on the shoulders of the Czechs, Poles and Russians.103
The Walter Report focused on the origination of the expulsions in the spring of
1945 in Czechoslovakia and the new Polish territories, but failed to mention the approval
of the transfer of Sudeten Germans by FDR in June 1943.104According to the conclusion
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of the Walter Report, Article XIII of the Potsdam Agreement was an effort by the United
States to bring about an “international solution for the problem of national minorities” in
Europe, a problem that President Woodrow Wilson had tried to solve through the creation
of “homogenous states” following world War I.105 Article XIII was a combination of
Wilson’s self-determination of peoples and the politics of convenience which resulted in
a huge inconvenience to anyone of German ethnicity in Czechoslovakia or the new Polish
territories. Proof of U.S. culpability in the expulsion of Germans is the fact that many
expulsions happened after January 1946 as part of an international agreement negotiated
and implemented by the United States that basically made ethnic cleansing an
international legal precedent and was anything but “orderly and humane.”
Published in 1950 during the early Cold War period the Walter Report was not
just a denial of United States responsibility concerning the expulsions but also Cold War
propaganda and a rebuke to domestic critics of decisions made by Democratic
administrations at Yalta and Potsdam general. Republican politicians thought Roosevelt’s
foreign policy to be “enigmatic and ambiguous” and believed Truman possessed little
knowledge of international affairs and American foreign policy, which allowed some of
his advisers to become policymakers.106 To Republicans Truman’s foreign policy was the
continuation of Roosevelt’s legacy of Yalta that included procrastination, excessive
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executive authority, poorly defined goals, burdensome commitments and softness toward
the Communists of the Soviet Union.107
Of all the criticism directed at Democratic foreign policy during the early Cold
War, the most scathing and consistent emanated from 1948 Republican Presidential
nominee Thomas Dewey of New York and fellow Republican Senator Robert A. Taft of
Ohio. During the election of 1948 Dewey criticized the Democrats for their betrayal of
Poland and China to Communism at Yalta and Potsdam, which revealed that the United
States needed to abandon Truman’s foreign policy.108 Dewey exclaimed that that the
Republicans had not been consulted or confided in by the Truman administration either
before or during the Potsdam Conference where the United States made territorial and
economic concessions to the Soviet Union.109 According to Dewey, Truman’s policies
pertaining to the Greek and Turkish problem, China and Palestine were formulated and
implemented without consulting the American people.110 In the early stages of the Soviet
Union’s blockade of Berlin in July 1948, before he agreed to quieten down on the
subject, Dewey posited that the problem in Berlin stemmed from policy “assumptions”
made at Yalta and Potsdam that failed to identify the rights of the United States in
Berlin.111 Other Republicans such as Senator such as Eugene Millikin of Colorado stated
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that both Yalta and Potsdam were void of Republican approval and participation and
represented secret executive agreements had been made that coddled the Soviet Union.112
Although Dewey lost the 1948 election to Truman but the criticism of Democratic
foreign policy continued. Most vociferous in the denouncement of the Democrats was
Senator Taft who stated in May 1950, that foreign policy under Roosevelt and Truman
had been secretive and pro-communist at Yalta and Potsdam and had paved the way to
World War III.113 Democratic appeasement at Yalta and Potsdam had made the Soviet
Union the dominant power in Central Europe that possessed the potential to “threaten the
liberty of Western Europe and the United States.”114 In 1951, Taft again stated that the
secret diplomacy practiced by Roosevelt and Truman after the war had “repudiated the
wise democratic doctrine of open diplomacy” by not allowing the Senate and House of
Representatives to participate in the formulation of foreign policy.115
The harshest condemnation of Democratic foreign policy resonated from the
Chicago Tribune, which on August 8, 1950, argued that Roosevelt’s approval of the
Yalta agreement that led to the Germans of East-Central Europe being “robbed of their
land, homes, and possessions” and being forced to relocate to a strange country.116 This
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policy carried on by the Truman administration.117 The article concluded that trouble in
Korea and western Germany had been caused by the flawed Democratic concessions to
the Soviet Union.118 The Chicago Daily Tribune again assailed Roosevelt and Truman on
December 25, 1950 claiming that Roosevelt “proceeded to sell out Europe and Asia” to
the tyranny of the Soviet Union at Yalta, and that Truman closed the deal by allowing the
Soviets to enter Berlin “without a corridor of supply for American forces.”119
The indifference with which the Truman administration approached the expulsion
of Germans exasperated many and generated sparse, but fierce, criticism and outright
condemnation. Some, such as OMGUS advisor James K. Pollock, were more reserved
than Senator William J. Langer. Despite claims that United States approval of Article
XIII perpetuated a grisly, inhumane reality on innocent civilians, the policy toward the
expulsion of Germans never changed. Instead it was defended in the pages of the Walter
Report, which claimed the expulsions had begun before Potsdam and shifted
responsibility from the Truman administration to the Czechs, Poles and Russians. The
Walter Report not only defended United States involvement in expulsions, but also
served as a rebuttal to domestic criticism from the Republican Party, which blamed the
Democratic administrations of Roosevelt and Truman for the onset of the Cold War and
expansion of Russian power in Germany and Asia.
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CHAPTER VII
UNIFICATION, COMPENSATION, VICTIMIZATION AND MEMORY

The expulsion of twelve million Germans by the Czechoslovakian and Polish
governments following World War II, and the death and displacement that accompanied
it, guaranteed that both the expellees and expellers would forever be consumed with the
past. For the German expellees, their eventual economic and political integration in their
new home of West Germany (later he Federal Republic of Germany-FRG) during the
Cold War was not enough to keep them from looking back to their historical homelands
and discussing the expulsions. Within the expeller nations the memory of the expulsions
was controlled in a suppressive manner by the communist governments of
Czechoslovakia, Poland and East Germany (German Democratic Republic-GDR),
respectively. The collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 brought the memory of the
expulsions back from the past and ever since then they have been at, the center of debates
on German unification, property rights, human rights, European unification and
victimization. This chapter will use English language sources to examine and explain that
the post-Cold War era has been one in which the German expellees have sought the
acceptance of the idea that they, too, were victims of the Second World War and endured
atrocities and indignities as did the citizens of Czechoslovakia and Poland. The
exploitation of the expellee diaspora by conservative politicians combined with the
expellees’ need to be recognized as victims introduced the idea that there were multiple
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endings to World War II in Europe, an idea that met much resistance especially in
Czechoslovakia and Poland. Thus it will be demonstrated that the combination of politics
and culture in the post-Cold War era has transformed the discourse on the expulsions
from discussions about compensation for property losses and suffering to a debate over
the definition of victimization and who can be identified as victims of World War II.
The Post-Cold War Era
Once the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, it did not take long for the expulsions to
become a hot political issue within East-Central Europe. The renewal of the expulsion
controversy brought back the ghosts of World War II to East-Central Europe, especially
in Poland. Expelled Germans represented by the Federation of Expellees (Bund de
Vertriebene-BdV) saw the end of the Cold War as an opportunity to pursue some sort of
“territorial compromise” with the Polish government.1 Most West Germans did not want
to reclaim territory lost to Poland after the conclusion of World War II, but the two
million-member Federation of Expellees saw the unification of Germany as an
opportunity to assert its political power within the new nation in an attempt to recover
lands confiscated by the Poles during the expulsions.2 In Poland looming German
unification rekindled fears that Germany might want to reclaim territory lost at the end of
World War II, and as result Poland feared that its western border was in jeopardy of
being moved east.
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Both older and younger generations of expellees in Germany remained embittered
and sought compensation from Poland and Czechoslovakia immediately following the
Cold War. Expellees believed they were “a people summarily and illegally uprooted” in
an inhumane manner from their historical homeland and claimed that they should be
compensated for their loss of property.3 They saw the pending unification of Germany as
an opportunity to obtain such compensation.4 But, German unification presented
problems as well. In 1990, the German border question had yet to be resolved and even
though the eastern border of Germany was never really in any danger of ever being
moved farther east Poland feared otherwise.5 Therefore “old tensions” reappeared and the
past became part of the present and the Polish people feared territory awarded Poland by
the Allies after World War II might become part of Germany once again.6
The issue of compensation for land lost as a result of the expulsions was pushed
by the politically powerful Federation of Expellees, which possessed a large and
politically influential membership base and received millions in West German
government funds for operational expenses and cultural activities.7 Conservative
politicians allocated government funds to the Federation of Expellees because they were
such a numerous voting bloc, which prompted important German leaders such as
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Chancellor Helmut Kohl to cultivate a very cozy relationship with them expellee
organization.8 Kohl attended many Federation of Expellee functions and served as guest
speaker more than once, as did many other German conservative politicians.9 Federation
of Expellee influence within German politics and government was solidified due to the
fact that twenty Bundestag representatives were federation members.10 With a treaty on
the German-Poland border question under negotiation throughout 1990s the Federation of
Expellees insisted to German leaders that there should be no “unconditional Polish border
guarantee.”11 The Federation pushed expellees’ “rights to their homeland, including the
right to move back,” plus reparations for confiscated property and assurances that would
guarantee the rights of the approximately one million Germans still inside Poland
“whose culture was repressed” by Communist Poland during the Cold War.12
Given their political clout Kohl approached the negotiations with interests of the
expellees as a main priority. He ignored requests by the United States, the Soviet Union
and Poland to promise that a unified Germany would not attempt to redefine the GermanPolish border.13 Kohl demanded that Poland waive war reparations from Germany and
“guarantee” the rights for Poland’s German minority in return for reassurances about the
current border.14 Kohl’s negotiating position made it seem as though Germany was
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attempting capitalize on Poland’s fears of a border change.15 Despite guarantees from
Kohl that a united Germany had no plans or desire to move Poland’s Western border to
the east, Polish leaders were still very skeptical of German statements on the issue.16
Polish fears were driven by the German linkage of expellee compensation and the border
question a negotiating strategy influenced by the political clout of the Federation of
Expellees.17
On November 14, 1990, the Treaty of Gorlitz finalized the German-Polish border,
and thus “settled the last major dispute of World War II” by recognizing Poland’s
ownership of the 40,000 square miles of Germany’s eastern territory allocated to Poland
by the Allies after the war.18 The settlement did not sit well with the expellees in
Germany who insisted that the land “was German.”19 Accompanying the treaty, Polish
Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki issued an apology for the expulsion of Germans and
requested forgiveness stating “one has to speak of the suffering of the German nation that
resulted from the movement of Poles from east to west.”20 Despite the apology most
Polish citizens were not as forgiving and remembered that one in every five Poles had
been killed during the German occupation of Poland.21
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Those expelled from former German lands in the Oder-Neisse region were not
alone in their desire either to be compensated for their loss of property and the pain and
suffering that accompanied it or to be allowed to relocate to their homeland and resume
ownership of confiscated property. In 1989, the expellees argued that “those other
Germans from across the border,” not the Sudeten Germans, were responsible for acts of
violence during the World War II occupation of Czechoslovakia.22 The Sudetendeutsche
Landmannschaft (SdL) an expellee organization founded in 1949-50 in Bavaria by
Sudeten German expellees, represented their claims of injustice and demands for an
apology and compensation for lost property.23 The SdL sought the repeal of the Benes
Decrees, the possible return of Sudeten Germans to their homeland and recognition
within Czechoslovakia as a national minority with guaranteed rights and compensation
for confiscated property.24 Leaders of the SdL such as President Franz Neubauer knew
that the pursuit of such goals would be difficult but also could only be achieved through
the symbolic language of human rights and European integration.25 26 In essence the SdL
was a Sudeten German lobby group that sought to achieve “the realization, or at least the
very recognition” that the Sudeten Germans “had rights.”27
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Czechoslovakia reacted to Sudeten German demands through a political and
diplomatic strategy that stressed admission of guilt for the expulsion but also projected
Czechoslovakia as a victim of Communism that had been exiled from the West.28 New
Czech President Vaclav Havel issued the first apology on December 23, 1989, but stated
that the return of Sudeten Germans “was out of the question, but an apology had to be
made in order to keep the evil past from perpetuating itself over and over.”29 Then on
January 3, 1990 Havel made the Czech dual strategy of apology and victimization clear
when he explained that even though Czechoslovakia wished to “condemn the violence
and injustice” of the expulsions, the Czech people were still maimed by the merciless
“Nazi Occupation.”30 Havel’s apology was hollow even though it recognized the cruelty
of the expulsions he inadvertently justified them when he asserted that the Czech people,
like the Sudeten Germans, were victims of the consequences of war.31 It was the dual or
dueling images of victimization that that fueled public debate about the expulsions
throughout the 1990s.
The Czech and German governments made an attempt to put the expulsions
behind them on February 27, 1992, when Kohl and Havel signed the Treaty on
Neighborly Relations, which was nothing more than an agreement to put the expulsion of
the Sudeten Germans in proper perspective so that Czech-German relations could evolve
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beyond the past.32 What the treaty did not do was more revealing than what it did do.
While both parties pledged friendship and neighborly relations, they failed to address the
issue of compensation for confiscated property of Sudeten German expellees and Czech
claims against Germany for “human and material” suffering during the war.33
Czechoslovakia and Germany agreed to be friends from 1992 on, but the past remained
omnipresent in relations between the two nations. Czech officials insisted early on in the
treaty negotiations that under no circumstances would the Benes Decrees be repealed.34
Germany responded with a refusal to repeal the 1938 Munich Pact because, according to
German leaders it would nullify legal measures taken in the “Sudetenland from 19381945 including the registration of births, marriages and property transactions.”35
In practice, the 1992 Treaty on Neighborly Relations and Friendship represented a
way for both nations to achieve political goals related to the expulsions and the future of
Europe.36 First and foremost the treaty made Czechoslovakia’s membership bid to the
European Union a certainty because Germany agreed to support it.37 Second, the treaty
was an attempt to “marginalize non-government groups such as the SdL” which through
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their representation of the interests of the expelled Sudeten Germans strained CzechGerman relations.38 Future friendship and neighborliness may have been agreed to but the
expulsions were to become a hot button topic in the politics of East-Central Europe in the
future.
In 1993, Czechoslovakia dissolved into the nations of Slovakia and the Czech
Republic, both of which sought to become members of the EU with help from Germany.
However, the politics of the past yet again affected the politics of the present when the
SdL and prominent Sudeten German leaders sought to link any expansion of the
European Union with grievances related to the postwar expulsions.39 Mainly the SdL (and
some other expellee groups) sought the repeal of the Benes Decrees, procure the right for
Sudeten Germans to return to their native Sudetenland and “restitution or compensation”
for land confiscated during the expulsions.40 They were willing to utilize their political
power within German politics to highjack the Czech Republic membership bid to the EU
achieve their demands.41 In 1995, Germany was at the forefront of EU expansion through
its support of membership for Central European nations such as the Czech Republic.42
However, the expellee issue and the influence of the Sudeten German lobby on German
politicians posed a possible threat to the inclusion of the Czech Republic in the European
Union.43
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Despite pressure from the Sudeten Germans to hold up the Czech Republic’s EU
membership bid, Vaclav Havel gave a “basic lecture” on Czech-German relations on
February 24, 1995, that reiterated that the Sudeten Germans were never going to receive
compensation in the form of land or money from the Czech Republic.44 Havel explained
that any developments related to the Sudeten German question would be part of a “future
oriented policy” that was to be the basis of Czech relations with Germany.45 Although the
Czechs nixed compensation for property lost during the expulsions, Havel did declare
that the Sudeten Germans and their descendants would be welcomed back to their former
Heimat as “guests of honor” in the land of their “forefathers.”46 For German Chancellor
Helmut Kohl, however, the Sudeten German issue was not that simple. He was
hamstrung in a way, because if he failed to support the Sudeten German quest for some
form of compensation for their suffering during the expulsion his government coalition
would be in trouble. The Sudeten Germans composed 16% of the German electorate.47
On the other hand if Kohl supported “Sudeten German demands” that Germany oppose
the admission of the Czech Republic and Poland into the European Union, it would
greatly damage Czech-German and Polish-German relations.48 Oddly enough the issue of
whether or not the Czech Republic and Poland were to be admitted to the EU was a
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“paradox” for the expelled Sudeten Germans and their descendants.49 The paradox was
this: if the Czech Republic and Poland were admitted to the EU, the Sudeten Germans
would then be able buy property and settle in their homelands from which they were
expelled in accordance with EU regulations and possibly lose their political clout within
Germany.50 Yet, the Sudeten Germans were adamant that Czech Republic EU
membership “without the abolition of the Benes Decrees” would never happen.51
The dispute over the postwar expulsion issue was further complicated by the fact
that the only nation in Europe Germany had yet to compensate for acts of Nazi
persecution during World War II was the Czech Republic.52 For Germany, the problem
was that many inside the Czech Republic believed that the Sudeten Germans had made a
“wrong decision” when they cast their lot with Nazi Germany and subsequently as a
whole Czech society was of the opinion they had done no wrong and the “expulsions
were an appropriate response to transgressions committed by Germans” during the
occupation.53 This denial of guilt resulted in the refusal of Germany to compensate Czech
victims of Nazi aggression until the Czech Republic formally apologized for the
expulsions.54 Both the Czechs and Sudeten Germans saw themselves as victims of the
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war but from different perspectives of the past and present and the reality of the aftermath
of World War II was that the “humane treatment of humans was not common” at the
time.55
Apologies came in 1996 when German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel and Czech
Republic Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec initialed what was called the German-Czech
Declaration on Mutual Relations and their Future Development.56 The agreement was a
mutual apology. Germany acknowledged that “National Socialist policies of violence
paved the way for the ground flight, expulsion and forced settlement” of people that
occurred after the war.57 The Czech Republic expressed remorse for the “suffering and
injustice” suffered by innocent victims that resulted from the expulsion of the Sudeten
Germans from the former Czechoslovakia that was the result of the “expropriation and
the deprivation of citizenship” that resonated from the “assumption of collective guilt.”58
However, the apology of the Czech Republic represented a contradiction because the
Benes Decrees had not been repealed, and even though they were unenforced they still
existed in law.59 Officially signed on January 20, 1997 the new Czech-German treaty did
more than establish friendship between the two nations.60 Contained in the provisions of
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the agreement were the stipulations that Germany was not to pursue property claims on
behalf of the Sudeten Germans and their descendants.61 Germany was to back the Czech
Republic bid for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and EU membership.
Finally, a joint Czech-German fund was created to compensate former Czech
concentration camp prisoners in an attempt to promote friendly relations between the
Czech and German peoples.62
The German-Czech agreement was mutually advantageous and secured German
support for Czech inclusion in NATO and the EU, but the agreement also benefitted
German interests because it solidified and strengthened both organizations.63 The new
agreement forced the leaders of various Sudeten German political interest groups to grasp
the reality that “their demands for return of property no longer resonated” throughout the
Sudeten German diaspora.64 The desire to pursue property claims dwindled among
Sudeten Germans over time time and their successful integration into Germany
economically and socially. Forty-plus years after their expulsion, the expellees had
become an aging group. Many who had lost property had passed away, and political the
representation of the group had been assumed by the descendants of the original
expellees who had benefitted from integration into German society and realized that the
recovery of property was politically unrealistic. Hence, political support for Sudeten
German property claims waned. German Chancellor Kohl agreed to the treaty in spite of
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warnings from Sudeten German organizations that he could pay a heavy political price
for his actions, but he also realized the issue had the potential to cause great strife within
East-Central Europe.65 He and explained the situation this way “we cannot stay in the
past, or, in the end, the past will win.”66 Kohl suffered little political backlash over the
ratification of the reconciliation agreement with the Czechs. Even though the Sudeten
Germans and their descendants comprised a powerful political constituency, especially in
Bavaria, “their rhetoric was widely seen as political posturing.”67
The Expulsions in the Twenty-First Century
Ironically, the War in Kosovo in 1999 characterized the next phase in the debate
over the expellee issue in East-Central Europe. German expellees saw the forced
migration and return of Albanians to Kosovo as a way by which to gain “international
recognition” and a solution their own expulsion saga.68 Expellee organizations connected
their own plight to that of the Kosovar Albanians in an attempt to reverse the ethnic
cleansing that followed World War II through tactics that were “beyond moral
reproach.”69 Events in Kosovo allowed the expellees and the representative organizations
to instigate debate about the expulsions of Germans in 1945 that identified “ethnic
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cleansing as a phenomenon of the twentieth-century” that resulted in the German public
becoming more compassionate and understanding regarding to the expulsions.70 In short
the war in Kosovo inspired German expellees to debate the “significance” of their own
past and led to their desire to commemorate and memorialize that past.71
The year 2000 was the beginning of a new century and the world was undergoing
a technological transformation that made nations and individuals around the globe more
interdependent through electronic communication. Also undergoing a great
transformation in the region of East-Central Europe was the issue of the expulsion of
Germans after World War II. This stemmed from the evolution of German expellee
thought that came to believe they were victims of the war too, just as the Czechs and
Poles had been. Exploration of German victimization during the postwar expulsions of
1945 was advanced in the 2002 novel Crabwalk by German author Gunter Grass, a native
of Gdansk (Danzig) from which the German population had ousted been after the war.
Crabwalk was a fictional account of the January 30, 1945, sinking of the Wilhelm
Gustloff, a German passenger ship sunk by a Russian submarine.72 The Wilhelm Gustloff
was well over its 10,000 passenger capacity and included approximately 3,000 German
refugees from Danzig, of whom only 1,100 survived.73 Grass brought the issue of the
expulsions to the fore of Germany society, especially within the expellee community.74
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Grass’s depiction of German victimization resulted in the rediscovery of the expulsions
by the descendants of expellees from the Sudetenland and the recovered Polish
territories.75 For these descendants, the idea of discovery and contemplation of German
victimization gave additional life to the belief that those responsible for the expulsions
should apologize to their victims.76 The concept of German victimization reverberated
throughout German society and created a school of thought, especially among younger
generations of Germans, that Germany as a whole “had paid its debt to history” and it
was time for the world to realize millions of Germans were victims of the war, just as the
Czechs and Poles had been.77
The awakening sense of German victimization brought about a harsh reaction
from Czechs and Poles. Czech Republic Prime Minister Milos Zeman proclaimed that the
“Sudeten Germans were Hitler’s fifth column bent on the destruction of
Czechoslovakia.”78 Zeman added that “many Sudeten Germans committed treason, a
crime punishable by death according to the laws of the time” and their transfer to
Germany was much better fate than the customary penalty for treason, the death
penalty.79 Historian at the Czech Academy in Prague, Josef Harna explained that the
Sudeten Germans had only themselves to blame for their expulsion, which was triggered
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by their support of the Nazis during the occupation of Czechoslovakia.80 Candidate for
Chancellor of Germany Edmund Stoiber, of the Christian Social Union (CSU) the
Bavarian sister party to the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), forcefully countered the
comments of Zeman Harrna and many others and claimed that the “expulsion of Sudeten
Germans” was unjustifiable “under any circumstances.”81
Another dimension of the expulsion issue early in the new millennium was the
demand of German expellees that the legal basis for the expulsions, the 1945 Benes
Decrees, be repealed. The Benes Decrees made the Sudeten Germans noncitizens and
placed them outside of Czechoslovakian society through the revocation of rights such as
property ownership and citizenship. The decrees remained valid law in the Czech
Republic, and are still intact to this day due to the refusal of the Czech legislature to
repeal them. In April 2002, the parliament of the Czech Republic voted 169 to 0 against
repeal of the Benes Decrees out of fear that repeal would lead to a deluge of “property
claims” by the Sudeten Germans.82 Most Czechs conceded that the expulsions had been
severe but reiterated that they had suffered through a six-year German occupation in
which the Sudeten Germans were willing accomplices who had welcomed Nazi troops
into Czechoslovakia in 1938-9.83 Predominant public and political opinion in the Czech
Republic overwhelmingly saw Sudeten German demand for repeal of the Beněs Decrees
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as invalid and an attempt to change the results of World War II.84 Historian Harna
described the Benes Decrees as “an expression of Czech liberty” that was in no way
“criminal ethnic cleansing because non-criminal anti-Fascist Sudeten Germans were
allowed to stay” in Czechoslovakia.85
Not only did the Sudeten German survivors and their descendants want the Benes
Decrees repealed so too did other East-Central Europeans.86 Many politicians throughout
Central Europe and numerous Sudeten German leaders demanded that the Czech
Republic not be admitted to the European Union unless the Benes Decrees were
repealed.87 Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban vehemently demanded that Czech
Republic admission to the EU be linked to repeal of the Benes Decrees.88 Czech Republic
officials were unyielding in their declaration that there would be “no formal apology or
repeal of the Benes Decrees.”89 Despite relentless pressure from various expellee
organizations both Germany and Austria decided not to veto the Czech Republic’s
inclusion in the EU, which paved the way for the Czech Republic to become an official
member in 2004.90 However, debate over the Benes Decrees was all about politics in
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2002. The nations of East-Central Europe were facing national elections and politicians
exploited the issue as a means by which to garner publicity and more importantly votes.91
In 2000, Erika Steinbach, a Christian Democrat (CD) member of the Bundestag
and President of the Federation of Expellees proposed that a Center against Expulsion be
erected in Berlin (Zentrum de Vertreibungen) to memorialize all Europeans who had been
victims of ethnic cleansing and expelled from their homelands in the twentieth-century.92
The plight of Armenians, Jews, Croats Hungarians, Albanians etc., was to be one aspect
of the Center against Expulsion, but most of the center’s space was to be devoted to
Germans expelled from their homelands by the Czech and Polish governments.93 The
establishment of the Center against Expulsions began to receive great support amongst
Germans in 2003, which triggered cries of opposition from Czechoslovakia and Poland.94
It was Poland where opposition to the Center against expulsions was the most intense.95
Outrage appeared throughout the Polish media where social commentators and political
experts referred to the proposed expulsion center as the “Center against Reconciliation.”96
The Polish weekly magazine Wprost published a “photomontage” of Erika Steinbach
dressed in a SS uniform astride the back of German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder
accompanied by the headline “German Trojan Horse.”97 Such depictions of Steinbach by
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the Polish media made her the representation of evil in the hearts and minds of Polish
citizens who believed that to locate the Center against Expulsions in Berlin would make
German victimization equal to that of the Czechs and Poles.98 What made the Center
against Expulsion even more controversial to many was that it was to be located next to
the new Holocaust memorial.99
Negative reaction to the Center against expulsions by Polish politicians and
citizens was not productive and it only promoted “old phobias and stereotypes” that
strained German-Polish relations.100 Polish reaction to the proposed Berlin center was a
reaction to the reformation of German “public, national and historical memory” that now
concluded that German civilians were also victims of the circumstances World War II.101
German reassessment of World War II memory was a reassessment that befuddled many
Germans and the “traditional victims of German aggression the Czechs and Poles.”102 For
Czechs and Poles the German presentation of civilians and expellees as victims was seen
as another attempt to rewrite history. Germans, especially the expellees saw themselves
not only as victims of war but also messengers of a truth that had been hidden from the
world for way too long. German “reunification and the fall of communism” transformed
the idea of “nationhood” which led to increased public debate about the expellees and
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their historical Heimat.103 The concept of identity had become “multi-dimensional” and
thus strained German diplomatic relations with both Poland and the Czech Republic and
also complicated the process that led to admission to the European Union for both
nations.104
Membership in the European Union was a conundrum for Polish officials who
feared that EU membership status would generate an avalanche of court cases brought
forth by the expellees at the European Tribunal of Justice in Luxembourg.105 Possession
of personal property had become a “human right” according to European law and
“dispossession without compensation,” as in the case of German expellees, depending
upon interpretation of the law, could have possibly been seen as an infringement of
human rights.106 In 1995, the United Nations Commissioner on Human Rights, José
Ayala Lasso iterated in a speech at Pualskirche, Germany that “the right not to be
expelled from one’s homeland was a fundamental human right.”107 Then in 1997 a United
Nations Court of Human Rights (UNCHR) report served to fuel the aspirations of
expellee organizations and alarm the Polish and Czech governments when the report
“emphasized the right to return, restoration of properties, and compensation for any
property that cannot be restored.”108 Polish fears were heightened even more by a June
22, 2004, decision rendered by the European Court of Human Rights that favored a
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descendant of Polish expellees “from the former Polish territories of the east” that
became part of the Soviet Union during the war.109 Poland was found “liable” for the loss
of property and ordered to compensate the descendants of the expellees for lost property
located in Lvov (Lemberg as it was known before the war) in the Ukraine.110 Liability
was placed on Poland because it was a member of European Union and the Soviet Union
had ceased to exist.
Polish fears became a reality in 2004 when the Prussian Trust filed claims for
property compensation on behalf of German expellees and their descendants (Preussiche
Treuhand) in Polish court.111 Compensation claims filed by the Prussian Trust were based
upon the belief that crimes against humanity had been committed against Germans during
the postwar expulsions and that there was one law for all and that crimes committed
against the Polish people during the war were no different than those committed against
the expellees.112 Things grew more problematic for Poland when the Prussian Trust filed
twenty-three cases against Poland in the European Court of Human Rights.113 The Polish
government insulted by the German organization’s assertion that they had suffered during
and after the war and believed such thoughts to be ridiculous when Warsaw had been
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destroyed and approximately six million Poles, half of whom were Jews had died at the
hands of Germans.114
German Chancellor Angela Merkel stressed on December 15, 2004, that Germany
had no “complaint against Poland” but could not prevent an individual or group such as
the Prussian Trust from filing compensation claims in European court.115 Merkel’s stance
on the Prussian Trust straddled a very precarious line in that by stating that Germany had
no complaint with Poland she honored the decision of a 2004 German-Polish committee
that found there was no legal foundation for German restitution claims against Poland.116
At the same time, Merkel placated the large expellee constituency within German by
allowing them to pursue individual property individual property restitution cases against
Poland and the Czech Republic. A final verdict issued by the European Court of Human
Rights in Strasbourg, France on October 9, 2008 rejected the Prussian Trust’s claim that
Poland owed German expellees compensation for human rights violations and property
lost in 1945 during the expulsions.117 For Germany and Poland the decision was final and
the dispute and the issue was closed for good.118 But the Prussian Trust threatened to
bring more cases before the European Court of Human Rights relating to expellee
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property confiscated by Poland after 1945 and also pursue property claims against Poland
in the American judicial system.119
Demands for compensation by the German expellees was a constant characteristic
of politics within the region of East-Central Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall in
1989, but it became overshadowed by the issue of German victimization in the latter half
of the first decade of the twenty-first century. German victimization became a hot issue
again when, on October 10, 2007, the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the
Federation of Expellees. German Chancellor Angela Merkel announced that the German
government planned to complete the Center against Expellees. The center would house
museum exhibits that pertained to episodes of European expulsions of the twentiethcentury but with emphasis on the German expulsions that followed World War II.120 To
Czechs and Poles, the idea of a museum and monument in Berlin that compared the
expulsion of Germans in 1945 to the genocide committed against Jews and Gypsies was a
misrepresentation of history.121 Czech and Polish opposition to the Center against
Expulsions increased in intensity when Merkel nominated Erika Steinbach for
membership on the board of directors of the museum. Steinbach’s nomination was
opposed by the Poles for a number of valid reasons: as a conservative member of the
Bundestag Steinbach had voted against the Oder-Neisse line as Poland’s permanent
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western border and she also opposed Poland’s admission into the EU.122 She was also
consistently falsely portrayed as a Nazi and a Holocaust denier by the Polish tabloid
press.123 Czechs, Poles and the European Jewry considered Steinbach’s nomination to the
board to be evidence that the Germans were going to use the museum to portray
themselves as the sole victims of the circumstances of World War II.
German Chancellor Angela Merkel was rather dispassionate on the issue of the
expulsions and did not want to put Steinbach on the expellee museum board, but she
needed votes from the expellee-laden conservative CDU/CSU constituency that
supported Steinbach.124 Merkel also knew that the CDU/CSU wanted expellees and their
descendants to decide the composition of the museum board, and thus the nomination of
Steinbach was a calculated move to secure conservative support in the next election.125
Although the Czech Republic opposed Steinbach’s nomination, Polish opposition was
even greater and Polish officials hinted that Steinbach’s inclusion on the museum board
of directors would negatively impact German-Polish relations.126 The German expellee
diaspora believed that they had the right to be represented by Steinbach, president of the
Federation of Expellees, and Poland should accept the composition of the board and stay
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out of German domestic affairs.127 For German expellees and their descendants the
Center against Expulsions and the inclusion of Steinbach on the museum board was part
of a quest for acknowledgement of their suffering during the expulsions.128 For Czechs,
and especially the Poles, the presence of Steinbach on the Expellee Museum board was a
German attempt to revise the history of the Second World War.129 An increase in tensions
between Germany and Poland combined with pressure from within Germany and abroad
led Steinbach to withdraw her name from consideration for the museum board, a solution
that satisfied Merkel, quieted the Polish government and allowed the project to move
forward.130
Even now, the issue of the expulsions seems to be as much of a social and
political issue as it ever was throughout East-Central Europe. Conservative politicians in
Germany have utilized the expulsion issue to cultivate votes since the end of the Second
World War and still do so today because there is a constituent base of expellees and their
descendants that still represent a large percentage of the German electorate. In early 2011
Chancellor Angela Merkel, in conjunction with the Free Democrats (FDP) “courted” the
expellees and their descendants through the proposal of an Expellee Commemoration
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Day.131 Merkel’s party, the CDU, was becoming increasingly unpopular with the German
public and the Expellee Commemoration proposal was described by Spiegel Online
reporter Charles Hawley as being part of a “tried and true method in Germany of shoring
up the conservative vote, not unlike the Republicans in the U.S. pandering to religious
conservatives.”132 Opposition to the day of expellee commemoration came mostly from
within Germany from sixty-eight historians who published an open letter that explained
that support for such a day by the Bundestag would send an insensitive and “incorrect
historical-political signal” that there was no difference between Holocaust victims and
German expellees.133
While the expellees continue to see themselves as victims, it is conservative
German politicians who use collective victimization and memory to harvest the expellee
vote in much the same way that Czech and Polish politicians use their victimization at the
hands of the Germans during World War II for political purposes. As Stefan Wolff points
out the idea of the expellees as victims is not new at all but has long been at the core of
“expellee identity” and had gained renewed currency as part of the debate of homeland
and belonging in the region of East-Central Europe after the Cold War.134 Therefore the
expellees have always seen themselves as victims but the exploitation of their
victimization by German politicians has shifted the debate in Europe from the actual
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expulsions to a debate that categorizes the victims of the war. For Jews, Gypsies, Czechs
and Poles the expellees, or any German for that matter, can never be seen as a victims
whereas the expellees see themselves as equally the victims. The intense feelings
generated by the expulsions exist because the nations involved Germany, Poland and the
Czech Republic have failed “to recognize the injustice of collective victimization.”135
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the discourse on the expulsions has
moved away from discussion on expellee repossession of property and compensation for
lost property and suffering to the present debate on victimization and memory. Debate on
the expulsion of Germans shifted as Europe was going through a great physical,
economic, political and cultural transformation, triggered by the end of Communism and
the Cold War, the unification of Germany, the creation of the European Union and
admission of the Czech Republic and Poland to the European Union and the war in
Kosovo. All of these developments helped to redefine the discourse on the expulsions.
The expulsions remain a very contentious and controversial topic, but they have been far
from front-page news in the American print media. Few stories have been written about
the expulsions and the effect that they had on relations between Germany and its Polish
and Czech neighbors. The only discussion of the expulsion in the United States has been
among scholars who have written books, journal articles and participated in conferences
devoted to the post World War II expulsions in Europe. But the reality of the situation is
that scholarly works on the expulsions by American scholars represent a mere fraction of
historical scholarship and are rarely, if ever, read by the American public. Thus,
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American examination of the expulsion of Germans has been anything but mainstream
history since the end of the Cold War and therefore awareness in the United States of the
largest episode of ethnic cleansing in the twentieth-century is minimal. The lack of
United States Government recognition or policy statements regarding the expulsions
since the end of the Cold War adds to the lack of public knowledge regarding the subject.
Basically the expulsions have not been a priority of the popular media, government or
academia. Yet the story is out there hidden in plain sight, right where few will ever find
it.
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CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION

The expulsion of Germans in East-Central Europe after World War II represents
the worst of humanity on all levels. Given the history of Eastern-Central Europe in the
twentieth-century the participation of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Great Britain and the
Soviet Union in the expulsion of Germans is really not that surprising. But what is
surprising is the matter of fact attitude with which the United States approached the
expulsions from conception to conclusion. The lack of importance placed upon the
expulsions by the U.S. spilled over into American society where the expulsions were of
little concern to the average citizen. There were pockets of opposition in journalistic,
intellectual, political, religious, military and diplomatic circles but nothing seemed to
spur a movement of disdain amongst the American public. Even though the expulsions
received some, albeit sporadic, coverage in the American print media other post war
issues took precedent over the fate of East-Central Europe’s German minority. At
Potsdam, where Article XIII set the legal precedence for the expulsions, matters such as
the location of Poland’s western border and the composition of its government and the
discussion of war reparations between the U.S. and Soviet Union dominated discussion.
Thus the lack of importance attached to the expulsion of Germans by the U.S.
government contributed to the lack of a popular anti-expulsion movement among the
259

greater American public and enabled of ethnic cleansing through the Potsdam
Agreement, which favored the rights of nations over the rights of people.
The secondary status of the expulsions as a policy priority emanated from
Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman, who both had more on their mind
during their presidencies than the fate of German expellees. Roosevelt’s lack of concern
about the expulsions began in summer 1943 during a visit by President Edouard Beněs of
Czechoslovakia to Washington. During Beněs’s visit Roosevelt supposedly approved
Benes’s plan to expel the Sudeten German minority of Czechoslovakia.1 However, there
is no written record of Roosevelt agreeing to such an action.2 Further of evidence the
secondary importance of the expulsions can be taken from United States policy
concerning the expulsions going into the Yalta Conference of 1945. The Roosevelt-led
delegation opposed the transfer of population but also knew that the expulsion of
Germans from Czechoslovakia and the newly recovered Polish territories were going to
happen regardless.3 Since there was no desire to intervene the transfer of Germans
presented the most peaceful solution to East-Central Europe’s German minority problem
and the subject was never discussed.4 In July and August of 1945 at the Potsdam
Conference, President Truman continued to display indifference toward the Germany

U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943: The
Conferences at Washington and Quebec (Washington, GPO, 1970), 749-751.
http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.d1/FRUS.FRUS1943
2 Ibid.
3 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Conferences at
Malta and Yalta, 1945 (Washington: GPO, 1955), 568.
http://www.digital.library.wisc.ed/1711.d1/FRUS.FRUS1945
4 Ibid.
1

260

minority issue and believed the transfer of Germans to be an issue of lesser importance in
comparison to other ongoing war related issues facing the United States.5 Even though
Article XIII laid down the orderly and humane condition regarding the transfer of
Germans, it was an issue of secondary importance compared to the composition of
Poland’s post war government and the location of its western border, which went
undecided.
While presidents Roosevelt and Truman assigned the German minority issue of
East-Central Europe low priority, both legislative houses held opponents of Article XIII
and its immediate and long-term impact in Europe and domestically. The opposition
within the House of Representatives and the Senate resonated from both Republicans and
Democrats who opposed the post war policies of Roosevelt and Truman, which they
believed to be at odds with the political ideology of the United States. Article XIII may
have organized the transfers, but the suffering of Germans being deported by the Czechs
and the Poles continued, and it sparked vehement protestations from some quarters in
congress. Though few in number, those congressmen critical of the Potsdam Agreement
were direct and to the point. Republican Senator from Nebraska, Kenneth Wherry
criticized the state department for not acting in the best interests of the nation and
Democratic Senator from Mississippi James O. Eastland claimed a conspiracy of silence
kept the American people uninformed on the hunger and disease facing the German
expellees, which to him ran counter to the American principles of justice and peace and
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could be blamed on the Truman administration’s support of the Potsdam Agreement.6
The most vociferous criticism and opposition to Potsdam came from North Dakota
Senator William Langer, a Republican and isolationist who believed the humanitarian aid
policy of the United States toward the expellees was “totalitarian in nature” and cited the
indifferent attitude of American citizens and politicians, and believed that the expellees
were being punished for being German and nothing else.7
Congressional criticism of the expulsions is interesting in that it originated from a
few individuals who for the most part based their opposition to Article XIII of the
Potsdam Agreement on information gleaned from newspapers such as the Saturday
Evening Post, New York Times, Washington Post, Washington Star, Chicago Tribune and
the Christian Science Monitor and other print media vehicles.8 These were same sources
utilized by the Committee Against Mass Expulsion in its publication of pamphlets
explaining the role played by the United States government in the expulsion of the
Germans. Those same media sources were available to Americans of all educational,
economic, religious and racial backgrounds but only intellectuals, the politically engaged
and those of East-Central European ethnicity who resided in the United States voiced
their opinions on the expulsions with very little opinion on the subject coming from the
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average American. Granted this study only examines national media vehicles in order to
understand the broad representation of the expulsions before and after the Potsdam
Agreement. And with large German, Czechoslovakian and Polish populations present on
the east coast, Midwest and southwest there is ample information in existence for further
study on the expulsions on a regional basis within the United States. The expulsions
became a niche issue in the United States taken up as a cause by segments of the
populations whose occupation or personal situation made them more aware of what was
going on in post war Europe.
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